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Abstract
Macroeconomic events in the United States during the last ten years—the housing bubble, the
financial crisis and the subsequent, deep recession—brought several puzzles to the attention
of economists and policymakers. Why were there such large price booms and busts in places
like Las Vegas and Phoenix, where land was readily available and construction markets
were very active? Why are economies so slow to recover from recessions that coincide with
financial crises? Can policymakers use fiscal stimulus to increase output and accelerate
economic recovery after a recession?
My dissertation research contributes to how we think about these questions. Using
ideas from finance and behavioral economics and a variety of methods—economic theory,
new data, natural experiments and anecdotal exploration—I document several surprising
facts. In the case of housing bubbles, introducing speculation into the standard supply-and-
demand framework can reverse the conventional wisdom, so that supply can increase price
volatility and exacerbate booms. In the case of policy responses to recessions, forcing banks
to close can speed up local lending and financial frictions can amplify the effects of fiscal
stimulus.
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Introduction
Macroeconomic events in the United States during the last ten years—the housing bubble, the
financial crisis and the subsequent, deep recession—brought several puzzles to the attention
of economists and policymakers. Why were there such large price booms and busts in places
like Las Vegas and Phoenix, where land was readily available and construction markets
were very active? Why are economies so slow to recover from recessions that coincide with
financial crises? Can policymakers use fiscal stimulus to increase output and accelerate
economic recovery after a recession? My dissertation research contributes to how we think
about these questions. I apply insights from finance and behavioral economics while using
a variety of methods: new data, natural experiments, anecdotal exploration and rigorous
theory.
Two questions that have long intrigued economists and policymakers are whether tax
policy affects firm behavior and whether credit market imperfections force firms to forgo
profitable projects. Past research has struggled to find compelling natural experiments to
address these questions. Experiments are necessary in the case of tax policy because taxes
often change based on how the economy is performing, and in the case of credit market
imperfections because firms will tend to borrow less when their prospects look worse. The
first paper of my dissertation develops an experiment based on the idea that tax policy
can affect different firms in different ways, and we use tax changes to create an “as-if”
experiment in the amount of cash firms need to pursue their desired projects. By focusing
on policies that were an important part of the 2009 U.S. stimulus bill, we also provide new
evidence on how and when stimulus policy can be effective.
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An important innovation of our study is that we work with a dataset which includes
more than one hundred thousand public and private companies in the United States, built
from a database of two million corporate tax returns filed between 1993 and 2010. Most
studies of tax policy and investment behavior rely upon financial accounting data for public
companies or aggregate investment data. These sources are limiting in several ways. First,
public firms have broader access to capital markets than smaller, private firms, so the sample
of public firms does not offer the ideal setting for documenting credit constraints. Second,
with aggregate data it is difficult to isolate potential confounds since these policies do not
happen randomly, and impossible to uncover the mechanism of any observed response. In
contrast, our data include a granular account of investment activity; a precise tax account;
a large sample of small, private firms; and measures of capital structure, payouts and
employment. As a result, we are able to document how firms respond to tax policy at an
unprecedented level of detail.
We present three findings. First, bonus depreciation raised investment 17.3 percent
between 2001 and 2004 and 29.5 percent between 2008 and 2010. Second, financially
constrained firms respond more than unconstrained firms. Third, firms respond strongly
when the policy generates immediate cash flows but not when benefits only come in the
future. The implied discount rate firms apply to future cash flows is too high to match a
frictionless model and cannot be explained entirely by costly finance.
The second paper of my dissertation applies insights from behavioral finance to explain
why cities with ample land experienced dramatic house price booms and busts in the early
2000s. This is a puzzle that economists have struggled to solve, but which is critical because
these relatively unconstrained areas—including Arizona, inland California, Nevada and
Florida—became the epicenter of the subprime and foreclosure crises.
The paper is methodologically diverse, combining national, subnational and within-city
statistical analysis with rich anecdotal detail about Las Vegas, Phoenix and the behavior of
public homebuilders culled from the footnotes of their annual reports. Our theory focuses
on speculation by investors and homebuilders on the supply side of the market. Speculation
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is easier in the land market than in the housing market due to rental frictions. Therefore,
speculation amplifies house price booms the most in cities with ample undeveloped land.
This observation reverses the standard intuition that cities where construction is easier
experience smaller house price booms. It also explains why the largest house price booms
in the United States between 2000 and 2006 occurred in areas with elastic housing supply.
These episodes are most likely to occur in elastic cities approaching a long-run development
constraint.
The third paper of my dissertation studies bank failures and how regulatory intervention
affects local lending activity. It is motivated by an old question in economics: why are
economic recoveries following financial crises so sluggish? I present micro-level evidence
that, in the recovery from the U.S. Great Recession, loss overhang in the banking sector
restricted lending and slowed growth. Zombie banks suffer from a debt overhang problem
caused by unrealized losses on past loans. To deter regulatory action, zombies restrict new
lending in healthy categories, prop up lending in unhealthy categories, and overallocate
to safe, liquid assets. FDIC-induced failures allow zombies to hive off bad loans and as
a result lending resumes post resolution. In the slump that began in the United States in
2007, limited FDIC liquidity and manpower prevented it from a timely reboot of all zombie
balance sheets. As a consequence, counties afflicted with unhealed zombies displayed
a slower recovery in employment, even in tradable goods industries less subject to local
demand conditions.
Taken together, the research in this dissertation demonstrates how insights from finance
can help answer important macroeconomic and policy questions.
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Chapter 1
Do Financial Frictions Amplify Fiscal
Policy? Evidence from Business
Investment Stimulus1
1.1 Introduction
Going back to Hall and Jorgenson (1967), public and macroeconomists have asked how
taxes affect investment. The answer is central to the design of countercyclical fiscal policy,
since policymakers often use tax-based investment incentives to spur growth in times of
economic weakness. Such policies often coincide with disruptions in capital markets, so it is
natural to ask how taxes affect investment in the presence of financial frictions. However,
the standard theoretical and empirical treatments assume perfect capital markets.2 This
paper uses recent episodes of investment stimulus to study whether the effect of taxes on
1Co-authored with James Mahon
2Key theoretical studies include Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Tobin (1969), Hayashi (1982), Abel and Eberly
(1994), and Caballero and Engel (1999). Abel (1990) presents a unifying synthesis of the early theoretical
literature. Key empirical work includes Summers (1981), Auerbach and Hassett (1992), Cummins, Hassett and
Hubbard (1994), Goolsbee (1998), Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), Desai and Goolsbee (2004), Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), and House and Shapiro (2008). Edgerton (2010) relaxes the frictionless assumption but, in
contrast to our study, finds mixed results.
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investment accords with the standard, frictionless model. We find that, by ignoring financial
frictions, the standard analysis overlooks a crucial driver of firm responses to tax policy.
The policy we study, “bonus” depreciation, accelerates the schedule for when firms
can deduct from taxable income the cost of investment purchases. Bonus alters the timing
of deductions but not their amount, so the economic incentive created by bonus works
because future deductions are worth less than current deductions. That is, bonus works
because of discounting: firms judge the benefits of bonus by the present discounted value
of deductions over time.3 Speeding up the timing of deductions reduces short term taxes,
but at the expense of higher taxes in the future. With a reasonable risk-adjusted discount
rate, bonus depreciation generates a modest subsidy, so the frictionless model predicts a
small effect of bonus on investment.4 But in the presence of financial frictions, firms sharply
discount future deductions. Thus financial frictions make bonus more appealing, since the
difference in today’s tax benefits dwarfs the present value comparison that matters in theory.
We study two episodes of bonus depreciation using a standard difference-in-differences
methodology to estimate the effect of these policies. We present three empirical findings.
First, bonus depreciation has a substantial effect on investment, much larger than past
estimates and much stronger than the conventional wisdom predicts. Estimates of how tax
changes affect investment vary, but the consensus prediction is that bonus depreciation has a
small positive effect.5 In contrast, we find that bonus depreciation raised eligible investment
by 17.3 percent on average between 2001 and 2004 and 29.5 percent between 2008 and 2010.
3Summers (1987) states this most clearly: “It is only because of discounting that depreciation schedules
affect investment decisions. . . ”
4Consider a firm making a $100 investment in computer equipment, which the IRS assigns a depreciation
life of five years. Under the normal schedule, a firm can only deduct from taxable income $20 in the year of the
purchase and must spread the remaining $80 over the next five years. Assuming a seven percent risk-adjusted
discount rate, the difference in present values for even full expensing—i.e., 100 percent bonus, which lets the
firm deduct $100 in the purchase year—implies a subsidy of less than four percent.
5Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994) study many corporate tax reforms and public company investment
data and conclude that tax policy has a strong effect on investment. Using similar data and a different empirical
methodology, Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) argue that tax policy has a small effect on investment and that
Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994) misinterpret their results. Hassett and Hubbard (2002) survey empirical
work and conclude that the range of estimates for the user cost elasticity has narrowed to between -0.5 and -1.
Surveying this and more recent work, Bond and Van Reenen (2007) decide “it is perhaps a little too early to
agree with Hassett and Hubbard (2002) that there is a new ‘consensus’ on the size and robustness of this effect.”
5
We estimate a user cost elasticity of approximately 1.6, outside the range of estimates of 0.5
to 1 surveyed by Hassett and Hubbard (2002) and more than double the consensus point
estimate.6
The first part of the paper details this finding and a litany of robustness tests. The
research design compares firms at the same point in time whose benefits from bonus differ.
Our strategy exploits technological differences between firms in narrowly defined industries.
Firms in industries with most of their investment in short duration categories act as the
“control group” because bonus only modestly alters their depreciation schedule. This natural
experiment separates the effect of bonus from other economic shocks happening at the
same time. If the parallel trends assumption holds—if investment growth for short and
long duration industries would have been similar absent the policy—then the experimental
design is valid.
The key threat to this design is that time-varying industry shocks may coincide with
bonus. This risk is limited for four reasons. First, graphical inspection of parallel trends
indicates smooth pretrends and a clear, steady break for short and long duration firms
during both the 2001 to 2004 and 2008 to 2010 bonus periods. The effects are the same size
in both periods, though different industries suffered in each recession. Second, the estimates
are stable across many specifications and after including firm-level cash flow controls,
industry Q, and flexible industry trends. Controlling for industry-level co-movement with
the macroeconomy actually increases our estimates. Third, the estimates pass a placebo test:
the effect of bonus on ineligible investment is indistinguishable from zero. Last, for firms
making eligible investments, bonus take-up rates (i.e., do firms fill in the bonus box on the
tax form?) are indeed higher in long duration industries. For these reasons, spurious factors
are unlikely to explain the large effect of bonus.
Firms respond to bonus depreciation as if they apply implausibly high discount rates to
investment decisions. This finding is inconsistent with a frictionless model of firm behavior.
6In Section 1.4, we collect estimates from past studies of tax reforms. The average user cost elasticity across
these studies is 0.69.
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In the second part of the paper, we explore alternative models that generate high effective
discount rates by adding financial frictions.7 One alternative is costly external finance,
which raises the total discount rate firms apply to evaluate projects. Another alternative is
managerial myopia, which raises effective discount rates by sharply discounting the future
relative to the present. Both models prove useful in explaining our findings.
Our second empirical finding is that, consistent with the costly external finance story,
financial constraints amplify the effects of investment stimulus. Nearly all prior empirical
tests of financial constraints use public firm data, which is problematic because public firms
have the best collateral, the strongest banking relationships and broad access to equity and
bond markets.8 In contrast, we work with an analysis sample of more than 120,000 public
and private companies drawn from two million corporate tax returns. Half the firms in our
sample are smaller than the smallest firms in Compustat.9 Our baseline estimate therefore
averages over substantial heterogeneity in firm type, including many firms likely to face
financial constraints.
The largest firms in our sample, those most like the firms in past studies, yield estimates
in line with the Hassett and Hubbard (2002) range. In contrast, small and medium-sized
firms, previously unstudied, show much stronger responses. Building on the differential
response by firm size, we perform a split sample analysis using several markers of ex ante
financial constraints. In addition to small firms, non-dividend payers and firms with low
cash holdings are 1.5 to 2.6 times more responsive than their unconstrained counterparts.
Moreover, we find that firms respond by borrowing and cutting dividends. These facts do
not match the frictionless model of investment behavior, in which firms divided by financial
7We use the term financial frictions as an umbrella term over a class of models that generate high effective
discount rates. Some of these—such as managerial myopia and agency theory—are not about external finance
per se, but refer instead to organizational frictions. These theories have not crossed from the finance literature
into standard public and macroeconomics treatments.
8Kaplan and Zingales (1997) find that very few of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen’s (1988a) most constrained
firms appear constrained by other measures.
9When aggregated, these small firms account for a large amount of economic activity. According to Census
tabulations in 2007 (http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/data/susb2007.html), firms with less than
$100 million in receipts (around the 80th percentile in our data) account for more than half of total employment
and one third of total receipts.
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constraint markers do not respond differently to bonus.
Firms with tax losses must wait to realize the benefits of tax breaks. Because many firms
in our sample are in a tax loss position when a policy shock occurs, we can ask whether firms
value future cash windfalls, namely, the larger deductions bonus depreciation provides them
in later years. Our third empirical finding is that, consistent with the managerial myopia
story, firms only respond to investment incentives when the policy immediately generates
cash flows. This finding holds even though firms can carry forward unused deductions
to offset future taxes, and it cannot be explained by differences in growth opportunities.
Furthermore, this fact contradicts a simple model of costly external finance, because firms
neglect how the policy affects borrowing in the future.
To confirm the myopia story, we study a second component of the depreciation schedule.
Firms making small investment outlays face a permanent kink in the tax schedule, which
creates a discontinuous change in marginal investment incentives. This sharp change in
incentives induces substantial investment bunching, with many firms electing amounts
within just a few hundred dollars of the kink. And when legislation raises the kink, the
bunching pattern follows. Consistent with myopia, bunching strongly depends on a firm’s
current tax status: firms just in positive tax position are far more likely to bunch than
firms on the other side of the discontinuity. For a different group of firms and a different
depreciation policy, we again find that firms ignore future tax benefits.
These facts do not match the predictions of a frictionless model, which cannot account
for the large baseline response, the differential response for constrained firms or the
nonresponse for nontaxable firms. The facts point instead toward models in which costly
finance matters and current benefits outweigh future benefits. We use an investment model
to clarify these findings. The model incorporates costly external finance and managerial
myopia into a general model in which the frictionless model of Hayashi (1982) is a special
case. These alternative theories make predictions about the discount rate firms apply to
future cash flows. The model shows how to combine reduced form estimates to distinguish
the frictionless benchmark from costly external finance and managerial myopia.
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The general model yields a set of theoretical moments—one comparing constrained
and unconstrained firms and one comparing taxable and nontaxable firms—which we can
combine with our empirical findings to measure financial frictions. With these comparisons
we can estimate the shadow cost of external funds and an implied present versus future
discount factor. We estimate the shadow cost of external funds to be between $0.63 and
$1.61 per dollar and an implied discount factor of 0.84. Combining these results, financially
constrained firms act as if $1 next year is worth just 38 cents today, yielding a total discount
rate of 97 percent. Thus accounting for the effect of bonus depreciation on investment
requires a major role for financial frictions.
Our paper sits at the intersection of several strands in the economics and finance litera-
tures. Most directly, the paper relates to studies of the effect of taxes on business investment.
Our data improve on past studies by including two periods of bonus depreciation; a granular
breakdown of eligible investment; a large sample of small, private firms; and better tax
variables. Earlier studies pool the effects of different tax reforms, which include depreciation
changes, tax rate changes and rule changes regarding corporate form. We focus on one
specific policy, bonus depreciation, and carefully dissect how firms respond. House and
Shapiro (2008) study the first episode of bonus depreciation using aggregate investment data.
Their design compares residuals from a prediction model for investment in short duration
(e.g., computers) and long duration (e.g., blast furnaces) categories. We compare firm-level
investment growth rates, so that our first difference does not depend on an estimated model.
In the literature on salience and taxation, our study offers an example of a strong tax policy
effect on economic behavior.10
The paper also relates to the literature on financial constraints.11 We use depreciation
10Our evidence is consistent with the strong behavioral response to and salience of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (Chetty, Friedman and Saez, 2013). It stands, for instance, in contrast to evidence that individuals react
incompletely to obscure taxes (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009) and that business investment does not react to
changes in the dividend tax (Yagan, 2013).
11Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) argue that, if firms more likely to be financially constrained respond
more strongly to cash flow shocks, then financial constraints are responsible. Subsequent studies make this
argument while identifying quasi-experimental variation in cash flows or credit supply (Lamont, 1997; Rauh,
2006; Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). We apply this insight to the case of bonus depreciation, which creates
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changes as a plausibly exogenous financial constraint shock.12 Unlike past studies, our
instrument also changes the relative price of investment. We use this feature and an
investment model to estimate the shadow price of internal funds from the difference between
constrained and unconstrained firm elasticities. Our findings imply that incorporating
financial frictions adds much explanatory power to neoclassical investment theory.13
Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1995) and Edgerton (2010) note that tax losses will
reduce the incentive of firms to respond to tax changes. The former study uses a sample of
sixty loss firms to conclude that losses reduce the effect of tax breaks on investment. The
latter maps financial accounting data to a tax account and finds mixed evidence that losses
matter.14 With our data, we can precisely measure whether a firm’s current tax position
means that the next dollar of investment affects this year’s tax bill. Our sample of loss firms
includes almost two hundred thousand loss year observations.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 formalizes intuition about how
bonus works and develops a set of testable hypotheses, which guide the empirical analysis.
Section 1.3 describes the corporate tax data, variable construction and sample selection
process. Section 1.4 describes the main empirical strategy for studying bonus depreciation,
the identification assumptions and presents results. Section 1.5 uses split sample tests by
markers of financial constraints and by tax position to show financial frictions can account for
the large baseline effect of bonus. We then develop a set of theoretical moments and combine
the empirical results to estimate implied discount rates. Section 1.6 studies substitution
margins and external finance responses to bonus. There, we use our heterogeneous size
a shock to the amount of cash firms need to perform their desired investment.
12See the conclusion of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988b)
for a discussion of how taxes might affect investment in the presence of financial constraints. They focus on
average tax rates more generally and do not perform an empirical analysis along these lines.
13Hayashi (1982) derives the workhorse neoclassical model. Stein (2003) surveys models in which financial
frictions influence investment decisions.
14Recent work documents large differences between “book” and tax accounts, which introduces the risk of
measurement error into such a mapping (see, e.g., Mills, Newberry and Trautman (2002). Edgerton (2010) is
very careful with this procedure, but acknowledges that “[one] cannot rule out, however, the possibility that
difficulties in measuring firms’ taxable status drive the relative unimportance of taxable status observed in the
Compustat data.”
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results to estimate the aggregate investment effect. Section 1.7 discusses policy implications
and avenues for future research.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
To direct our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of investment in the presence
of depreciation incentives, financial constraints and heterogeneous tax positions. We modify
the neoclassical investment model with adjustment costs (Abel, 1982; Hayashi, 1982) by
introducing an external finance wedge and managerial myopia. The model yields a formal
hypothesis corresponding to our baseline investment design: investment increases due
to bonus depreciation and increases more for industries doing longer lived investment.
We develop two further hypotheses corresponding to split sample tests. First, investment
responds more when firms face an external finance wedge. Second, investment responds
less when firms are in tax loss positions. Here, we focus on the intuition of the model
and the mapping from theory to empirical objects and tests. We use a simple one shot
static investment model with a reduced form credit wedge.15 Appendix A.1 derives the
hypotheses in an infinite horizon setting with adjustment costs and a dynamic leverage
constraint.
Consider a firm making a one shot investment decision. The firm begins with initial
profits pi0 and chooses a level of investment I to determine the capital stock and hence
future profits.16 Future profits are given by pi(I), taxed at the proportional corporate tax
rate τ. The firm discounts future flows at risk-adjusted rate r.
The tax code permits the firm to write off the cost of investment over time. The value of
these deductions depends on the tax rate and how the schedule interacts with the firm’s
15This wedge is a reduced form model of a set of capital market frictions, which might reflect, e.g., costly
monitoring problems or adverse selection (Stein, 2003).
16Normalize the price of investment to one.
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discount rate. We collapse the stream of future depreciation deductions owed for investment:
z0(β) = D0 + β
T
∑
t=1
1
(1+ r)t
Dt, (1.1)
where Dt is the allowable deduction per dollar of investment in period t and T is the class
life of investment. z0(β) measures the present discounted value of one dollar of investment
deductions before tax. If the firm can immediately deduct the full dollar, then z0 equals one.
Because of discounting, z0 is lower for longer lived items (i.e., items with greater T), which
forms the core of our identification strategy.
In general, the stream of future deductions depends on future tax rates and discount
rates. Our empirical analysis assumes the effective tax rate does not change over time, except
when the firm is nontaxable.17 For discount rates, we begin by assuming a risk-adjusted
rate of seven percent to compute z0 in the data, which enables comparison to past work.
We then relax this assumption in Section 1.5.3 when we estimate an implied discount rate.
β is an additional discount term between zero and one, which reflects the possibility of
myopia.18 We use our heterogeneity analysis to identify this term separately.19
Bonus depreciation, the policy we study in our empirical analysis, allows the firm to
deduct a per dollar bonus, θ, at the time of the investment and then depreciate the remaining
1− θ according to the normal schedule:
z(β) = θ + (1− θ)z0(β) (1.2)
At different points in time, Congress has set θ equal to 0, 0.3, 0.5 or 1. We use these policy
17We use the top statutory tax rate in the set of specifications requiring a tax rate. This is an upper bound on
the more realistic effective marginal tax rate, which in turn depends on tax rate progressivity and the level of
other expenses relative to taxable income. See, e.g., Graham (1996, 2000) for a method tracing out the marginal
tax benefit curve. The policies we study will increase the use of investment as a tax shield regardless of where
the firm is on this marginal benefit curve. Except when current and all future taxes are zero, bonus increases
the marginal tax benefit of investment.
18The myopia model is closer to Akerlof (1991) and Laibson (1997) than it is to the model of managerial
myopia in Stein (1989). Stein’s (1989) model of managerial myopia specifically refers to the incentive to boost
current earnings as a way of signaling high quality to the stock market. We use the term to reflect any motive to
boost current earnings and neglect projects with long term payoffs and short term costs.
19We assume that β explicitly applies to depreciation deductions, which have both a present and future
component. In the case of profits, which only arrive in the future, we assume pi incorporates β implicitly.
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shocks to identify the effect of bonus depreciation on investment. Industries differ by
average z0 prior to bonus, providing the basis for identification in a difference-in-differences
setup with continuous treatment.
We further generalize z by incorporating a nontaxable state. When the next dollar
of investment does not affect this year’s tax bill, then the firm must carry forward the
deductions to future years.20 Our general z reflects this case:
z(β,γ) = γz(β) + (1− γ)βφz(1), (1.3)
where γ ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for current tax state and φ is a discounter that reflects both
the expected arrival time of the taxable state and the discount rate applied to the future and
subsequent periods when the firm switches. Note that for the nontaxable firm, β applies
to all future deductions. Even when β equals one, φ is less than one, so the value of these
deductions are lower when the firm is nontaxable. We measure φ in the data and apply our
split sample results to determine whether we can justify these findings in a model without
myopia.
External finance matters for all investment exceeding current cash flow. During the
investment period, the firm faces an external finance wedge that is linear in expenses net of
cash flows, that is,
c(I) = λ [(1− τz)I − (1− τ)pi0] , (1.4)
where λ can be thought of as the shadow price on a borrowing constraint that may or
may not bind now or in the future. Thus, a dollar of cash inside the firm is worth 1+ λ.21
We include z in the net expense term and not just the first year deduction, to capture the
influence of depreciation deductions on future taxes and thus future borrowing. While
20This assumes that “carrybacks”—in which firms apply unused deductions this year against past tax
bills—have been exhausted or ignored. In ongoing work, we find that carryback take-up rates are surprisingly
low.
21Note that because we have assumed a linear external finance function, there will be no direct effect of cash
flows on investment, that is, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is zero. Because each dollar of investment can
only generate at most 35 cents of cash back, these policies cannot operate mainly through a direct cash windfall
channel.
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bonus depreciation relaxes the current constraint through reducing this year’s tax bill,
it does so at the expense of higher future taxes. The net effect is to reduce the present
discounted borrowing costs for the firm. However, if myopia plays a role (that is, for low
β), then only the current year change will matter. The two models thus yield different
predictions for constrained, nontaxable firms: constrained, myopic firms respond much
less to bonus when nontaxable than do constrained, farsighted firms. This is the feature
we use to distinguish costly external finance from myopia models, which are otherwise
observationally equivalent.
We derive a condition for optimal investment. Though the problem occurs over time,
we can write it as a static one shot investment problem by discounting future flows to the
present. Discarding elements not involving investment, the firm’s objective is
max
I
{
(1− τ)pi(I)
1+ r
− (1− τz)I − λ(1− τz)I
}
(1.5)
Here, we assume pi is weakly concave, which ensures that the problem yields a unique
interior solution.
The first order condition for optimal investment is
(1− τ)pi′(I∗) = (1+ r)(1+ λ)(1− τz). (1.6)
Intuitively, the investment decision trades off the after-tax future benefits of the marginal
dollar of investment against its price (normalized to one) and the marginal external finance
cost, less the marginal benefit due to depreciation deductions. Deductions lower the hurdle
rate for investment both through their net present value and through relaxing the external
finance constraint. With costly external finance, optimal investment is strictly lower than
in the frictionless case or when inside cash can cover all investment expenses (i.e., when
λ = 0).
We derive three testable hypotheses from the model. The first concerns the average effect
of bonus depreciation on investment, while the latter two concern heterogeneous effects by
the presence of costly external finance and by tax position. Bonus depreciation increases
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the present value of deductions, reducing the price of investment. Thus bonus depreciation
should increase investment. Each hypothesis builds on the comparative static with respect
to the bonus parameter θ. In the Appendix, we show that investment is increasing in θ.
Hypothesis 1 Investment responds more strongly to bonus depreciation for industries with more
investment in longer lived eligible items. That is, ∂2 I/∂θ∂z0 < 0.
Bonus depreciation works through increasing θ. Hypothesis one concerns the basic effect of
this policy on investment. The more delayed the normal depreciation schedule is, the more
generous bonus will be. Longer lived items like telephone lines and heavy manufacturing
equipment have a more delayed baseline schedule than short lived items like computers (i.e.,
z0Long < z
0
Short). Thus, industries that buy more long lived equipment see a larger relative
price cut when bonus happens.
Our second hypothesis concerns how the investment response varies with costly external
finance.
Hypothesis 2 Investment responds more strongly to bonus depreciation for financially constrained
firms. That is, ∂2 I/∂θ∂λ > 0.
For financially constrained firms, bonus depreciation both reduces the price of investment
and reduces how much they have to borrow. The effective price change is thus larger
for constrained firms. We use several proxies for ex ante financial constraints—firm size,
dividend payment activity and liquid asset positions—to test for a difference in elasticities
between constrained and unconstrained firms. If financial constraints are unimportant, then
we should not find a consistent, systematic difference in elasticities for groups of firms
based on these proxies. We can use the difference in coefficients between constrained and
unconstrained firms to ask what the implied external finance spread. We formalize and
implement this intuition in Section 1.5.3.
Our third hypothesis concerns how the investment response varies with the firm’s
current tax position.
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Hypothesis 3 Investment responds more strongly to bonus depreciation for firms with current-year
taxable income. That is, ∂I/∂θ|γ=1 > ∂I/∂θ|γ=0.
Hypothesis three emerges in any model with some positive discounting, since future benefits
are worth less than immediate benefits. The main value of the comparison between taxable
and nontaxable groups derives from the calibration it offers. We can calibrate the expected
arrival of the taxable state for nontaxable firms and ask whether the difference between
elasticities for taxable and nontaxable firms requires some myopia (i.e., β < 1).
1.3 Business Tax Data
The analysis in this paper uses the most complete dataset yet applied to study business
investment incentives.22 The data include detailed information on equipment and structures
investment, offering a finer breakdown than previously available for a broad class of
industries. The sample includes many small, private firms and all of the largest US firms,
which enables the heterogeneity analysis we use to document financial constraints. Because
the data come from corporate tax returns, we can separate firms based on whether the next
dollar of investment affects this year’s taxes. This allows a split sample analysis that can
distinguish the myopia model from a simple model of costly external finance. In this section,
we describe where these data come from and the analysis sample, as well as how we map
the theory into empirical objects.
Sampling Process. Each year, the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the IRS Research,
Analysis and Statistics unit produces a stratified sample of approximately 100,000 unaudited
corporate tax returns.23 Stratification occurs by form type,24 total assets, and proceeds.
22Yagan (2013) uses these data to study the 2003 dividend tax cut. Kitchen and Knittel (2011) use these data
to describe general patterns in bonus and Section 179 take-up.
23Details come from http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08cosec3ccr.pdf.
24For example, C corporations file form 1120 and S corporations file form 1120S. Other form types include
real estate investment trusts, regulated investment companies, foreign corporations, life insurance companies,
and property and casualty insurance companies. Sampling frequencies reflect the distribution of these types in
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Each sample year includes returns with accounting periods ending between July of that
year and the following June. When necessary, we recode the tax year to align with the
implementation of the policies studied in this paper. In 2008, the sample represented about
1.8 percent of the total population of 6.4 million C and S corporation returns.
SOI uses these samples to generate annual publications documenting income character-
istics. The BEA uses them to finalize national income statistics. In addition, the Treasury’s
Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) uses the sample to perform policy analysis and revenue
estimation. To enable these aggregate statistics, SOI carefully reports sampling weights
which reflect each observation’s sampling frequency. Our aggregate estimates incorporate
these weights. Any corporation selected into the sample in a given year will be selected
again the next year, providing it continues to fall in a stratum with the same or higher
sampling rate. Shrinking firms are resampled at a lower rate, which introduces sampling
attrition. We address this attrition in several ways, including a nonparametric reweighting
procedure for figures and through assessing the robustness of our results in a balanced
panel.
Analysis Samples, Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics. We create a panel by
linking the cross sectional SOI study files using firm identifiers.25 The raw dataset has 1.84
million rows covering the years from 1993 to 2010. There are 355 thousand distinct firms in
this dataset, 19,711 firms with returns in each year of the sample and 62,478 firms with at
least 10 years of returns. Beginning with the sample of firms with valid data for each of the
main data items analyzed, we keep firm-years satisfying the following criteria: (a) having
non-zero total deductions or non-zero total income26 and (b) having an attached investment
the population. We focus on 1120 and 1120S, which cover the bulk of business activity in industries making
equipment investments.
25We thank OTA staff for providing the data crosswalk.
26Knittel et al. (2011) use a similar “de minimus” test to select business entities that engage in “substantial”
business activity.
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form.27 In addition, we exclude partial year returns, which occur when a firm closes or
changes its fiscal year. To analyze bonus depreciation, we exclude firms potentially affected
by Section 179, a small firm investment incentive which we analyze separately. Our main
bonus analysis sample consists of all firms with average eligible investment greater than
$100,000 during years of positive investment.28 This sample consists of 820,769 observations
for 128,151 distinct firms.
This section describes the economic concepts underlying the variables we study. Eli-
gible investment, our main variable of interest, includes expenditures for all equipment
investment put in place during the current year for which bonus and Section 179 incentives
apply.29 We conduct separate analyses for intensive and extensive margin responses. The
intensive margin variable is the logarithm of eligible investment. The extensive margin
variable is an indicator for positive eligible investment. We aggregate this indicator at the
industry level and transform it into a log odds ratio30 for our empirical analyses. In some
specifications, we use an alternative measure of investment, which is eligible investment
divided by lagged capital stock. Capital stock is the reported book value of all tangible,
depreciable assets. Sales equals operating revenue and assets equals total book assets. Total
debt equals the sum of non-equity liabilities excluding trade credit. Liquid assets equals
cash and other liquid securities. Payroll equals non-officer wage compensation. Rents
equals lease and rental expenses. Interest equals interest payments.
Our main policy variable of interest, zN,t, is the present discounted value of one dollar
of deductions for eligible investment. In each non-bonus year, we compute the share of
27Form 4562 is the tax form that corporations attach to their return to claim depreciation deductions on new
and past investments. An entity that claims no depreciation deductions need not attach form 4562. It is likely
that these firms do not engage in investment activity, and so their exclusion should not affect the interpretation
of results.
28The relevant threshold for Section 179 was $25,000 until 2003, when it increased to $100,000. In 2008, it
increased to $250,000 and then to $500,000 in 2010. Using alternative thresholds in the range from $50,000 to
$500,000 does not alter the results.
29Section 179 and bonus rules differ slightly, in that Section 179 also applies to used equipment purchases,
while bonus only applies to new equipment. The form does not require firms to list used purchases separately.
30I.e., we use log( p1−p ) as our measure of the extensive margin.
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eligible investment a firm reports in each category.31 We use these shares and the present
value of one dollar of eligible investment for each category to construct a weighted average,
firm-level z. Category z’s come from applying a seven percent discount rate to the pertinent
deduction schedule, while assuming a six-month convention for the purchase year.32,33
We follow compute zN at the four-digit NAICS industry level as the simple average of the
firm-level z’s across non-bonus years prior to 2001.34 In bonus years, we adjust z by the size
of the bonus. If θ is the additional expense allowed per dollar of investment (e.g., θ = .3 for
2001), then zN,t|θt = θt + (1− θt)× zN . The interaction between the time series variation in θ
and the cross sectional variation in zN delivers the identifying variation we use to test our
three hypotheses.
Table 1.1 collects summary statistics for the sample in our bonus depreciation analysis.
The average observation has $6.8 million in eligible investment, $180 million in sales and
$27 million in payroll. The size distribution of corporations is skewed, with median eligible
investment of just $370 thousand and median revenues of $26 million. The average net
present value of depreciation allowances, zN,t, is 0.88 in non-bonus years, implying that
eligible investment deductions for a dollar of investment are worth eighty-eight cents to
the average firm. zN,t increases to an average of 0.94 during bonus years. Cross sectional
differences in zN,t are similar in magnitude to the change induced by bonus, with zN,t
varying from 0.87 at the tenth percentile to 0.94 at the ninetieth. The first year deduction,
θN,t, increases from an average of 0.18 in non-bonus years to 0.58 in bonus years.
31Specifically, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) property
and listed property.
32The category deduction schedules are available in IRS publication 946. We use a seven percent rate as a
frictionless benchmark that is likely larger than the rate firms should be using, which will tend to bias our
results downward. Summers (1987) argues that firms should apply a discount rate close to the risk-free rate
for depreciation deductions. Seven percent is the largest discount rate House and Shapiro (2008) apply when
computing the value of bonus depreciation.
33The six-month convention is applied because on average the property is in place for only half of the first
year.
34Like Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994) and Edgerton (2010), we proxy for the firm-level benefit of
bonus depreciation with an industry measure of policy benefits. Unlike these studies, our measure derives
directly from tax data, reducing measurement error. It is possible to apply the same strategy at the firm level.
This approach does not alter our findings.
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The difference in z’s over time of just six cents per dollar before tax translates into
a benefit of just over two cents after tax, which is why some authors claim the effect of
bonus on investment should be small. However, if the discount rate firms apply to future
deductions includes a large external finance wedge or myopia, then this two cent difference
can increase to as much as the forty cent difference in average θ’s.
Table 1.1: Statistics: Bonus Analyses
Mean P10 Median P90 Count
Investment Variables
Investment (000s) 6,786.87 0.81 367.59 5,900.17 818,576
log(Investment) 6.27 4.10 6.14 8.81 735,341
Investment/Lagged Capital Stock 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.27 637,243
∆ log(Capital Stock) 0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.33 637,278
log(Odds RatioN) 1.28 0.54 1.34 2.05 818,107
Other Outcome Variables
∆ log(Debt) 0.04 -0.37 0.03 0.56 642,546
∆ log(Rent) 0.08 -0.38 0.04 0.66 574,305
∆ log(Wage Compensation) 0.06 -0.21 0.05 0.40 624,918
log(Structures Investment) 5.02 2.13 4.98 8.10 389,232
Policy Variables
zN,t 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.94 818,576
Characteristics
Assets (000s) 403,597.2 3,267.96 24,274.82 327,301.6 818,576
Sales (000s) 180,423.8 834.65 25,920.92 234,076.1 818,576
Capital Stock (000s) 89,977.09 932.00 7,214.53 80,122.69 818,576
Net Income Before
Depreciation (000s) 15,392.59 -2,397.92 1,474.65 17,174.55 818,576
Profit Margin 0.17 -0.07 0.05 0.68 777,968
Wage Compensation (000s) 26,826.36 372.09 4,199.88 38,526.46 818,576
Cash Flow/Lagged Capital Stock 0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.26 647,617
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for analysis of bonus depreciation. To preserve taxpayer anonymity,
“percentiles” are presented as means of all observations in the (P− 1, P + 1)th percentiles. Investment is bonus eligible
equipment investment. zN,t is the weighted present value for a dollar of eligible investment expense at the four-digit
NAICS level, with weights computed using shares of investment in each eligible category. The odds ratio is defined at the
four-digit NAICS level as the fraction of firms with positive investment divided by the fraction with zero investment. Cash
flow is net income before depreciation after taxes paid. Ratios are censored at the one percent level.
It is helpful to give a sense of the groups being compared, because our identification will
be based on assuming that industry-by-year shocks are not confounding the trends between
industry groups. The five most common three-digit industries (NAICS code) in the bottom
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three zN deciles are: motor vehicle and parts dealers (441), food manufacturing (311), real
estate (531), telecommunications (517), and fabricated metal product manufacturing (332). In
the top three deciles are: professional, scientific and technical services (541), specialty trade
contractors (238), computer and electronic product manufacturing (334), durable goods
wholesalers (423), and construction of buildings (236). Neither group of industries appears
to be skewed toward a spurious relative boom in the low z group. The telecommunications
industry suffered unusually during the early bonus period as did real estate in the later
period. Both industries are in the group for which we observe a larger investment response
due to bonus.
1.4 The Effect of Bonus Depreciation on Investment
We begin with a test of Hypothesis 1, which predicts that investment responds more strongly
to bonus depreciation for industries with more investment in longer lived eligible items.
In both bonus periods we study, we estimate large responses to bonus depreciation. The
estimates are similar in both periods. We assess the key risk of this design—that time-
varying industry shocks confound our estimates—using a variety of specifications, a placebo
test and differences in policy salience across space.
Policy Background. House and Shapiro (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the baseline
depreciation schedule35 and legislative history of the first round of bonus depreciation.
Kitchen and Knittel (2011) provide a brief legislative history of the second round.36 Appendix
A.2 summarizes the relevant legislation.
In 2001, firms buying qualified investments37 were allowed to immediately write off
30 percent of the cost of these investments. The bonus increased to 50 percent in 2003
35Known as the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System, or MACRS.
36See also the Treasury’s “Report to The Congress on Depreciation Recovery Periods and Methods” (2000).
37Depreciable tangible personal property with class life of twenty years or less, purchased for use in the
active conduct of a trade or business. Used equipment was excluded.
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and expired at the end of 2004. In 2008, 50 percent bonus depreciation was reinstated. It
was later extended to 100 percent bonus for tax years ending between September 2010 and
December 2011.38 The policies applied to equipment and excluded most structures.39
The policies were intended as economic stimulus. In the words of Congress, “increasing
and extending the additional first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment,
promote capital investment, modernization, and growth, and will help to spur an economic
recovery” (Committee on Ways & Means, 2003, p. 23). To avoid encouraging firms to delay
investment until the policy came online, legislators announced that the policy would apply
retroactively to include the time when the policy was under debate. Although the first
bonus legislation passed in early 2002, firms anticipating policy passage would have begun
responding in the fourth quarter of 2001. We therefore include firm-years with the tax year
ending within the legislated window in our treatment window.
Whether firms perceived the policy as temporary or permanent is a subject of debate.
The initial bill branded the policy as temporary stimulus, slating it to expire at the end of
2004, which it did. For this reason, House and Shapiro (2008) assume firms treat the policy as
temporary. In contrast, Desai and Goolsbee (2004) cite survey evidence indicating that many
firms expected the provisions to continue, and our empirical analysis in Section 1.6 offers
little evidence of intertemporal shifting.40 Expecting the policy to be temporary is critical to
House and Shapiro (2008), because their exercise relies upon how policies approximated as
instantaneous interact with the duration of investment goods approximated as infinitely
lived. Our design relies much less on this assumption. In our model, costly external finance
and myopia amplify the effects of both temporary and permanent policies. And our cross
38In the first bonus period, property had to be put in place after September 10, 2001 and before January 1,
2005. The start date for the second bonus period was December 31, 2007 and the end date was December 31,
2011.
39These provisions coincided with an increase in the Section 179 allowance for small investments from
$24,000 to $100,000 in 2003, from $125,000 to $250,000 in 2008, and from $250,000 to $500,000 in 2010. In our
main sample, we exclude firms with mean eligible investment greater than $100,000. Altering this threshold
does not change our results.
40Note that when production functions exhibit constant returns to scale, the effect of temporary and
permanent policies on investment will be the same (Abel, 1982).
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sectional identification relies much less on the response of the longest lived investment
goods.
Empirical Setup. Bonus depreciation provides a temporary reduction in the price and
a temporary increase in the first year deduction for eligible investment goods. Eligible
items are classified for deduction profiles over time based on their useful life. Identification
builds upon the idea that some industries benefited more from these cuts by virtue of
having longer duration investment patterns, that is, by having more investment in longer
class life categories. This cross-sectional variation permits a within-year comparison of
investment growth for firms in different industries.41 The policy variation is at the industry-
by-year level, so the key identifying assumption is that the policies are independent of other
industry-by-year shocks. Several robustness tests validate this assumption.
The regression framework implements the difference-in-differences (DD) specification,
f (Iit, Ki,t−1) = αi + βg(zN,t) + γXit + δt + ε it, (1.7)
where zN,t is measured at the four-digit NAICS industry level and increases temporarily
during the bonus years. The specific additive form we adopt in (1.7) for the unobserved
firm-level components, αi, can only be valid for a particular class of investment functions.
For example, if valid in levels, the design cannot be valid in logs. The investment data
summarized in Table 1.1 is highly skewed with a mean of $6.8 million and a median of
just $368 thousand. Thus, a multiplicative unobserved effect (that is, Ii = Ai I∗(z)) is the
most likely empirical model for investment levels. This delivers an additive model in
logarithms, which is the approach we pursue below. Because approximately eight percent
of our observations for eligible investment are equal to zero, we supplement the intensive
margin logs approach with a log odds model for the extensive margin. We measure the log
41This methodological approach was first applied in Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994). See also
Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1996), Desai and Goolsbee (2004), House and Shapiro (2008) and Edgerton
(2010).
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odds ratio as log(P[I > 0]/(1− P[I > 0])) at the four-digit industry level.42
Studies often use an alternative empirical specification for f (I, K), where investment
is scaled by lagged assets or lagged capital stock. We prefer log investment for four
reasons. First, small firms are not always required to disclose balance sheet information,
so requiring reported assets would reduce our sample frame. Second, and related to the
first reason, requiring two consecutive years of data for a firm-year reduces our sample
by fifteen percent. Third, there is some concern that balance sheet data on tax accounts
are not reported correctly for consolidated companies due to failure to net out subsidiary
elements.43 Measurement error in the scaling variable introduces non-additive measurement
error into the dependent variable. Last, with multiple types of capital, the scaling variable
might not remove the unobserved firm effect from the model. This is especially a concern
because we cannot measure a firm’s stock of eligible capital and because firms vary in the
share of total investments made in eligible categories.44 While we prefer the log investment
model, we also report results using investment scaled by lagged capital stock, which allows
comparison to past studies.
Graphical Evidence. Figure 1.1 presents a visual implementation of this research design.
To allow a comparison that matches a regression analysis with fixed effects and firm-
level covariates, we construct residuals from a two-step regression procedure. First, we
nonparametrically reweight (i.e., Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) reweight) the group-
by-year distribution within ten size bins based on assets crossed with ten size bins based on
sales.45 This procedure addresses sampling frame changes over time, which cause instability
42An alternative specification, with the odds ratio replaced by P[I > 0], works as well. However, the logs
odds ratio has better statistical properties (e.g., a more symmetric distribution).
43Mills, Newberry and Trautman (2002) analyze balance sheet accounting in tax data and document
difficulties in reconciling these accounts with book accounts.
44Abel (1990) notes that this issue and other violations of linear homogeneity can lead to spurious conclusions
(e.g., a reversed investment-Q relationship.
45The bins are set based on the size distribution in 2000.
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in the aggregate distribution.46 In the second step, we run cross sectional regressions each
year of the outcome variable on an indicator for treatment group—either long duration or
short duration—and a rich set of controls, including ten-piece splines in assets, sales, profit
margin and age. We plot the residual group means from these regressions.47
We compare mean investment in calendar time for the top and bottom three deciles of
the investment duration distribution.48 Long duration industries show growth well above
that of the short duration industries, with this difference only appearing in the bonus years.
The difference between the slopes of these two lines in any year gives the difference-in-
differences estimate between these groups in that year. The other years provide placebo
tests of the natural experiment and indicate no false positives.
Statistical Results and Economic Magnitudes. Table 1.2 presents regressions of the form
in (1.7), where f (Iit, Ki,t−1) equals log(Iit) in the intensive margin model, log(PN [Iit >
0]/(1− PN [Iit > 0])) in the extensive margin model, and Iit/Ki,t−1 in the user cost model;
and g(zN,t) equals zN,t in the intensive and extensive margin models and (1− τzN,t)/(1− τ)
in the user cost model.49 The baseline specification includes year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in the intensive margin and user cost models.50
Because log odds ratios are computed at the industry level, standard errors in the extensive
margin model are clustered at the industry level.
The first column reports an intensive margin semi-elasticity of investment with respect
46During the period we study, the size of the sample frame changed twice due to budgetary constraints.
47To align the first year of each series and ease comparison of trends, we subtract from each dot the group
mean in the first year and add back the pooled mean from the first year. All means are count weighted.
48Deciles are computed at the industry level.
49τ is set to 35 percent, the top statutory tax rate for all firms.
50This is consistent with recent work (e.g., Desai and Goolsbee (2004), Edgerton (2010), Yagan (2013)) and
enables us to compare our confidence bands to past estimates. The implicit assumption that errors within
industries are independent is strong, for the same reason that Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) criticize
papers that cluster at the individual level when studying state policy changes. Our results in this section are
robust to industry clustering, as are the tax splits in the next section. In the financial constraint splits regressions,
we discuss which inferences are robust to this more conservative structure. We are not aware of other studies
that restrict inference in this way and still show that taxes affect investment.
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Intensive Margin: Bonus I Intensive Margin: Bonus II
Extensive Margin: Bonus I Extensive Margin: Bonus II
Figure 1.1: Calendar Difference-in-Differences
Notes: Panel (a) plots the average logarithm of eligible investment over time for groups sorted according to their industry-
based treatment intensity. Treatment intensity depends on the average duration of investment, with long duration industries
(treatment groups) seeing a larger average price cut due to bonus than short duration industries (control groups). Panel
(b) plots the industry-level log odds ratio for the probability of positive eligible investment, thus offering a measure of the
extensive margin response. The treatment years for Bonus I are 2001 through 2004 and 2008 through 2010 for Bonus II. In
these years, the difference between changes in the red and the blue lines provides a difference-in-differences estimator for
the effect of bonus in that year for those groups. The earlier years provide placebo tests and a demonstration of parallel
trends. The averages plotted here result from a two-step regression procedure. First, we nonparametrically reweight the
group-by-year distribution (i.e., Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reweight) within ten size bins based on assets crossed
with ten size bins based on sales to address sampling frame changes over time. Second, we run cross sectional regressions
each year of the outcome variable on an indicator for treatment group and a rich set of controls, including ten-piece splines
in assets, sales, profit margin and age. We plot the residual group means from these regressions. To align the first year of
each series and ease comparison of trends, we subtract from each dot the group mean in the first year and add back the
pooled mean from the first year. All means are count weighted.
to z of 3.7, an extensive margin semi-elasticity of 3.8 and a user cost elasticity of −1.6. The
average change in zN,t was 4.7 cents during the early bonus period and 8 cents during
the later period, implying average investment increases of 17.3(= 3.69× 4.7) and 29.5(=
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3.69 × 8) log points, respectively. These predictions should not be confused with the
aggregate effect of the policy, because they are based on equal-weighted regressions which
include many small firms. They only provide an informative aggregate prediction under
the strong assumption that the semi-elasticity is independent of firm size.
In the second column, including a control for contemporaneous cash flow scaled by
lagged capital does not alter the estimates. Columns three and four show a similar semi-
elasticity for both the early and late episodes. Column five controls for fourth order
polynomials in each of assets, sales, profit margin and firm age, as well as industry average
Q measured from Compustat at the four-digit level. Column six adds quadratic time
trends interacted with two-digit NAICS industry dummies, which causes the estimated
semi-elasticity to increase.51 These alternative control sets do not challenge our main finding:
the investment response to bonus depreciation is robust across many specifications.
Appendix Table A.1.2 collects from other studies estimates that we can compare to
our user cost model. Like our study, each one uses tax reforms crossed with industry
characteristics to estimate the effect of taxes on investment. Panel (a) of Table 1.3 plots the
estimates from these studies with confidence bands, highlights the consensus range, and
compares them to our estimate. The average user cost elasticity across these studies is 0.69,
which falls within Hassett and Hubbard (2002)’s consensus range of 0.5 to 1, but is less than
half our estimate of 1.60.52
Additional Robustness and Policy Salience. The calendar time plot in Figure 1.1 provides
several visual placebo tests through inspection of the parallel trends assumption in non-
bonus years. Because bonus depreciation excludes very long lived items (i.e., structures),
51We can replace the quadratic time trends with increasingly nonlinear trends or two digit industry-by-time
fixed effects. We can also replace the time trends with two-digit industry interacted with log GDP or GDP
growth. In each case, the estimates increase. This suggests that omitted industry-level factors bias our estimates
downward. Consistent with this story, Dew-Becker (2012) shows that long duration investment falls more
during recessions than short duration investment.
52In an investment model, the elasticity of investment with respect to the net of tax rate, 1− τz, equals the
price elasticity and interest rate elasticity, derived in Appendix A.1. Our empirical model delivers an elasticity
of 7.2. We are not aware of easily comparable estimates for prices or interest rates.
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Table 1.2: Investment Response to Bonus Depreciation
Intensive Margin: LHS Variable is log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zN,t 3.69∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 4.69∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.57) (0.69) (0.81) (0.70) (0.62)
CFit/Ki,t−1 0.44∗∗∗
(0.016)
Observations 735341 580422 514035 221306 585914 722262
Clusters (Firms) 128001 100883 109678 63699 107985 124962
R2 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.71
Extensive Margin: LHS Variable is log(P(Investment > 0))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zN,t 3.79∗∗ 3.87∗∗ 3.12 3.59∗∗ 3.99∗ 4.00∗∗∗
(1.24) (1.21) (2.00) (1.14) (1.69) (1.13)
CFit/Ki,t−1 0.029∗∗
(0.0100)
Observations 803659 641173 556011 247648 643913 803659
Clusters (Industries) 314 314 314 274 277 314
R2 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.90
User Cost: LHS Variable is Investment/Lagged Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1−tcz
1−tc -1.60
∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗ -2.00∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗ -1.50∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10)
CFit/Ki,t−1 0.043∗∗∗
(0.0023)
Observations 637243 633598 426214 211029 510653 631295
Clusters (Firms) 103890 103220 87939 57343 90145 103565
R2 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.54 0.45 0.44
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes No
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table estimates regressions of the form
f (Iit, Ki,t−1) = αi + βg(zN,t) + γXit + δt + εit
where Iit is eligible investment expense and zN,t is the present value of a dollar of eligible investment computed at the
four-digit NAICS industry level, taking into account periods of bonus depreciation. Regression (2) augments the baseline
specification with current period cash flow scaled by lagged capital. Column (3) focuses on the early bonus period and
column (4) focuses on the later period. Column (5) controls for four-digit industry average Q for public companies and
quartics in assets, revenues, profit margin and firm age. Column (6) includes quadratic time trends interacted with
two-digit NAICS industry dummies. Ratios are censored at the one percent level. Standard errors clustered at the firm
level are in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: Investment Response to Bonus Depreciation: Robustness
Structures Net Investment Has Bonus Salience Split
Basic Trends Basic Trends Basic Trends High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
zN,t 0.52 1.10 1.07∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 1.56
(0.78) (0.98) (0.23) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16) (0.87) (0.94)
Observations 389232 381921 637278 631680 818576 804128 211390 215205
Clusters (Firms) 92351 90166 103447 103147 128150 125534 29627 30836
R2 0.59 0.60 0.27 0.27 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.70
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Notes: This table estimates regressions of the form
Yit = αi + βzN,t + δt + εit
where Yit is either the logarithm of structures investment (columns (1) and (2)), log growth in capital stock (columns (3)
and (4)), an indicator for take-up of bonus depreciation ((5) and (6)), or the logarithm of eligible investment ((7) and (8)).
zN,t is the present value of a dollar of eligible investment computed at the four-digit NAICS industry level, taking into
account periods of bonus depreciation. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and (8) implement the baseline specification in table 1.2.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) include quadratic time trends interacted with two-digit NAICS industry dummies. Columns (7)
and (8) split the sample into the top and bottom three deciles according to local geographic salience of the depreciation
schedule. We proxy for local salience using frequency of bunching by small firms at the Section 179 kink point in the
depreciation schedule. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
we can use ineligible investment as an alternative intratemporal placebo test. The first two
columns of Table 1.3 present two specifications of the intensive margin model, which replace
eligible investment with structures investment. The first specification is the baseline model,
and the second includes two-digit industry dummies interacted with quadratic time trends.
We cannot distinguish the structures investment response from zero. Thus, the results pass
this placebo test.
Another concern with our results is that they may merely reflect a reporting response,
with much less actual investment taking place. The third and fourth columns of Table 1.3
provide a reality check. We replace our measure of investment derived from Form 4562 with
net investment, which is the difference in logarithms of the capital stock between year t and
year t− 1. Both the baseline and industry trend regressions confirm our gross investment
results with net investment responding strongly as well.
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Columns five and six of Table 1.3 offer a sanity check of our findings. Here, the
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the firm reports depreciation expense in
the specific form item applicable to bonus. Effectively, this is a test for bonus depreciation
take-up. The table indicates that the probability of taking up bonus is strongly increasing in
the strength of the incentive.
We present direct evidence that firms take the tax code into account when making
investment decisions. With respect to equipment investment, they pay special attention to
the depreciation schedule and the nonlinear incentives it creates. These nonlinear budget
sets should induce bunching of firms at rate kinks. Consistent with this logic, we find sharp
bunching at depreciation kink points. This evidence supports our claim that temporary
bonus depreciation incentives were also salient.
To show policy salience, we study a component of the depreciation schedule, Section 179,
which applies mainly to smaller firms. Under Section 179, taxpayers may elect to expense
qualifying investment up to a specified limit. With the exception of used equipment,53 all
investment eligible for Section 179 expensing is eligible for bonus depreciation. Focusing
on Section 179 thus serves as an out of sample test of policy salience that remains closely
linked to the bonus incentives at the core of the paper.
Each tax year, there is a maximum deduction and a threshold over which Section 179
expensing is phased out dollar for dollar. The kink and phase-out regions have increased
incrementally since 1993.54 When the tax schedule contains kinks and the underlying
distribution of types is relatively smooth, the empirical distribution should display excess
mass at these kinks (Hausman, 1981; Saez, 2010). Figure 1.2 shows how dramatic the
bunching behavior of eligible investment is in our setting. These figures plot frequencies
of observations in our dataset for eligible investment grouped in $250 bins. Each plot
represents a year or group of years with the same maximum deduction, demarcated here by
53Used equipment accounts for approximately six percent of equipment investment (Kitchen and Knittel,
2011).
54Appendix Table A.1.1 summarizes the changes in Section 179 depreciation rules over the past twenty years.
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a vertical line. The bunching within $250 of the kink tracks the policy shifts in the schedule
exactly and reflects a density five to fifteen times larger than the counterfactual distribution
nearby.55
In general, evidence of bunching at kink points reflects a mix of reporting and real
responses.56 The bunching evidence is informative in either case because these are both
behavioral responses, which show whether firms understand and respond to the schedule.
In the next section, we study managerial myopia by comparing bunching activity across
different groups of firms. This test does not depend on whether the response is real or
reported.
We can interact the bunching evidence with the basic regression model identifying the
response to bonus. The design of the test generates control and treatment groups from the
notion that firms differ in their tax code knowhow.57 We compute geographic proxies of
investment schedule sophistication through measuring the local propensity to bunch at the
Section 179 kink point. We use the low information areas as cross-sectional counterfactuals
for the high information areas. We then separately estimate the baseline model for each
group, effectively providing a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate of the bonus
response.
55Excess mass ratios are computed using the algorithm and code in Chetty et al. (2011).
56See Saez (2010) for a discussion of this point. The bonus difference-in-differences (DD) design is less
vulnerable to misreporting. In that design, we can confirm the response by looking at other outcomes. In
addition, the DD estimator is much less sensitive to misreporting by a small fraction of total investment.
Moreover, the sample contains many firms who use external auditors, for whom misreporting investment
entails substantial risk and little benefit. Last, our conversations with tax preparers and corporate tax officers
suggest that misreporting investment is an inferior way to avoid taxes. This is because investment purchases are
typically easily verifiable, require receipts when audited, and usually reduce current taxable income by just a
fraction of each dollar claimed as spent. In the case of investment expenses depreciated over multiple years, the
audit risk of misreporting is also extended over the entire depreciation schedule.
57This test follows the design of Chetty, Friedman and Saez (2013), who use geographic differences in
individual bunching at a kink in the Earned Income Tax Credit schedule to study the labor supply response to
taxes.
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We group firms by two-digit ZIP code, which is the lowest level of aggregation that
permits a reliable measure of bunching. For each ZIP-2, we pool all years and compute the
fraction of firms within $10,000 of the kink who bunch within $250 of it. This provides the
sorting variable. In this design, more bunching in a region indicates more awareness of
the tax code for that region. So, we should expect the growth in investment during bonus
periods to be increasing in the level of bunching. Columns seven and eight of Table 1.3
show that indeed the high bunching areas display a stronger response to bonus than do the
low bunching areas.58
To recapitulate, bonus depreciation has a large effect on investment, and spurious time-
varying industry factors cannot explain this fact. Such factors would cause parallel trends
to fail in the years prior to bonus. They would lead to different estimates in recessions
marked by weakness in different industries. They would lead ineligible investment to
expand. They would attenuate the estimated effect when regressions include flexible
industry-by-time controls. And they would lead to a similar response across geographies
where firms pay more and less attention to the depreciation schedule. The facts do not
match these predictions. Section 1.5, which presents heterogeneous effects by firm size,
further contradicts the omitted industry factor story.
These investment responses directly correspond to take-up of depreciation incentives—
bonus take-up rates rise with the policy’s generosity and many firms sharply bunch around
the Section 179 kink point—in contrast to recent work on partial salience of sales taxes
(Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009) and the nonresponse of investment to dividend tax changes
(Yagan, 2013). Net investment responds to bonus depreciation as well, even though the
reported balance sheet items do not affect taxable income. Section 1.6 shows that debt
issuance increases because of bonus depreciation and that payroll and dividend payments—
which are double reported—respond as well. Thus the observed response is a policy
response that does not reflect a mere reporting response, but rather reflects real economic
actions.
58Specifically, we compare the top and bottom three deciles of local bunching.
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1.5 Explaining the Large Response with Financial Frictions
The large response of investment to bonus depreciation is not consistent with a frictionless
model of firm behavior: the magnitudes imply implausibly high discount rates. In this
section, we explore alternative models that generate high effective discount rates.
One alternative is costly external finance, which raises the total discount rate firms apply
to evaluate projects. Our rich data environment enables us to study how the investment
response to tax incentives interacts with costly external finance. We perform a series of split
sample tests, using several common markers of ex ante financial constraints.59 Consistent
with this story, firms more likely to depend on costly external finance—small firms, non-
dividend payers and firms with low levels of cash—respond more strongly to bonus. Split
sample analysis by size also leads to a more accurate prediction for the aggregate policy
response.
Another alternative model is managerial myopia, which raises effective discount rates
by sharply discounting the future relative to the present. Consistent with this story, firms
only respond to investment incentives when the policy immediately generates after-tax cash
flows. For firms with positive taxable income before depreciation, expanding investment
reduces this year’s tax bill and brings extra cash into firm coffers today. Firms without this
immediate incentive can still carry forward the deductions incurred but must wait to receive
the tax benefits.60 We present evidence that, for both Section 179 and bonus depreciation,
this latter incentive is weak, and differences in growth opportunities cannot explain this
fact.
59See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a) for an early application of this methodology and Almeida,
Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) for recent examples.
60In the code, current loss firms have the option to “carry back” losses against past taxable income. The IRS
then credits the firm with a tax refund. Our logic assumes that firms have limited loss carryback opportunities
because, in the data, we find low take-up rates of carrybacks. Furthermore, carrybacks create a bias against our
finding a difference between taxable and nontaxable firms, because carrybacks create immediate incentives for
the nontaxable group.
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1.5.1 Heterogeneous Responses by Ex Ante Financial Constraints
We divide the sample along several markers of ex ante financial constraints used elsewhere
in the literature. Even for private unlisted firms, we can still measure size, payout frequency
and proxies for balance sheet strength. Figure 1.3 plots elasticities and confidence bands
from regressions run for each of ten deciles based on average sales.61 We plot both the
intensive margin elasticities and the user cost elasticities. The smallest firms in the sample
show the largest response to bonus, regardless of the specification. The user cost estimates
help us reconcile our findings with those in past studies. Larger firms show user cost
elasticities in line with the findings surveyed in Hassett and Hubbard (2002). It is only the
smaller firms, for whom data were previously unavailable, that yield estimates outside the
consensus range.
Table 1.4 presents a statistical test of the difference in elasticities across three markers
of ex ante constraints. For the sales regressions, we split the sample into deciles based
on average sales and compare the bottom three to the top three deciles.62 The average
semi-elasticity for small firms is twice that for large firms and statistically significantly
different with a p-value of 0.03.63 The second two columns present separate estimates
for firms who paid a dividend in any of the three years prior to the first round of bonus
depreciation.64 Here, the non-paying firms are significantly more responsive.
Our third sample split is based on whether firms enter the bonus period with relatively
low levels of liquid assets. We run a regression of liquid assets on a ten-piece linear spline
in total assets plus fixed effects for four-digit industry, time, and corporate form. We sort
firm-year observations based on the residuals from this regression lagged by one year, and
61Specifically, we use average sales from the three years before each bonus period. We use as many of these
six years as are available for each firm.
62When we measure size with total assets or payroll, the size results are unchanged.
63Cross equation tests are based on seemingly unrelated regressions with a variance-covariance matrix
clustered at the firm level.
64We only use the first round of bonus for the dividend split. The dividend tax cut of 2003, which had a
strong effect on corporate payouts (Yagan, 2013), may have influenced the stability of this marker for the later
period.
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(a) Past Estimates
−β
Time
1.0
0.5
0
CHH (1994)
CHH (1996)
DG (2004)
Edge (2010)
Hassett and Hubbard (2002) range
Us
(b) Estimates by Firm Size, Bonus Sample
Hassett and Hubbard (2002) range
Compustat
Figure 1.3: Heterogeneous Effects by Firm Size
Notes: These figures plot coefficients and confidence bands from user cost specifications (see the third row of Table 1.2) for
past studies of tax reforms and our sample. The sources for the coefficients in Panel (a) are in Appendix Table A.1.2. Panel
(b) splits the sample into deciles based on mean pre-policy sales. The average firm in Compustat during this time period
falls in the tenth size bin (with sales equal to $1.8B), which coincides with the Hassett and Hubbard (2002) survey range of
user cost elasticity estimates (-0.5 to -1).
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then report in the last two columns of Table 1.4 separate estimates for the top and bottom
three deciles. These are reported in the last two columns of Table 1.4. The results using this
marker of liquidity parallel those in the size and dividend tests, with the low liquidity firms
yielding an estimate of 7.2 as compared to 2.8 for the high liquidity firms.
Table 1.4: Heterogeneity by Ex Ante Constraints
Sales Div Payer? Lagged Cash
Small Big No Yes Low High
zN,t 6.29∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 5.98∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 7.21∗∗∗ 2.76∗∗
(1.21) (0.76) (0.88) (0.97) (1.38) (0.88)
Equality Test P = .030 P = .079 P = .000
Observations 177620 255266 274809 127523 176893 180933
Clusters (Firms) 29618 29637 39195 12543 45824 48936
R2 0.44 0.76 0.69 0.80 0.81 0.76
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table estimates regressions from the baseline intensive margin specification presented in Table 1.2. Here, we
split the sample based on pre-policy markers of financial constraints. For the size splits, we divide the sample into deciles
based on the mean value of revenues, with the mean taken over years 1998 through 2000.Small firms fall into the bottom
three deciles and big firms fall into the top three deciles. For the dividend payer split, we divide the sample based on whether
the firm paid a dividend in any of the three years from 1998 through 2000. The dividend split only includes C corporations.
The lagged cash split is based on lagged residuals from a regression of liquid assets on a ten piece spline in total assets and
fixed effects for four-digit industry, year and corporate form. The comparison is between the top three and bottom three
deciles of these lagged residuals. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
These constraint markers are imperfect.65 First, they do not directly measure the external
finance cost faced by new firms. This concern would tend to bias any differences existing
between groups toward zero, and thus against the results we present. A second concern
with sample splitting is that the splitting criteria are correlated with the investment error
term and so may bias the estimated coefficient of interest (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007).
This issue is important for investment-cash flow sensitivity tests because cash flow is likely
correlated with other components of the investment error term. Because our setting features
plausibly exogenous policy variation at the industry level, this concern is less important
65Criticism of split sample markers dates back to Poterba’s comments in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988a). See Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013) for a more recent assessment of their value in samples of public
and private companies.
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here. The key assumption we make is that interacting our splitting criterion, measured
prior to the policy change, with the policy variable and the year effects enables a valid
difference-in-differences design for each group.
1.5.2 Heterogeneous Responses by Tax Position
The Section 179 bunching environment presents an elegant setting to document the im-
mediacy of investment responses to tax policy. The simple idea is to separate firms based
on whether their investment decisions will fully offset current year taxable income, or
whether deductions will have to be carried forward to future years. We choose net income
before depreciation expense as our sorting variable. Firms for which this variable is positive
have an immediate incentive to invest and reduce their current tax bill. If firms for which
this variable is negative show an attenuated investment response and these groups are
sufficiently similar, we can infer that the immediate benefit accounts for this difference.
The panels of Figure 1.4 starkly confirm our intuition. In panel (a), we pool all years
in the sample, recenter eligible investment around the year’s respective kink, and split
the sample according to a firm’s taxable status. Firms in the left graph have positive net
income before depreciation and firms in the right graph have negative net income before
depreciation. For firms below the kink on the left, a dollar of Section 179 spending reduces
taxable income by a dollar in the current year. Retiming investment from the beginning of
next fiscal year to the end of the current fiscal year can have a large and immediate effect on
the firm’s tax liability. For firms below the kink on the right, the incentive is weaker because
the deduction only adds to current year losses, deferring recognition of this deduction until
future profitable years. As the figure demonstrates, firms with the immediate incentive to
bunch do so dramatically, while firms with the weaker, forward-looking incentive do not
bunch at all.
One objection to the taxable versus nontaxable split is that nontaxable firms have poor
growth opportunities and so are not comparable to taxable firms. We address this objection
in two ways. First, we restrict the sample to firms very near the zero net income before
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depreciation threshold to see whether the difference persists when we exclude firms with
large losses. Panel (a) of Figure A.1.1 plots bunch ratios for taxable and nontaxable firms,
estimated within a narrow bandwidth of the tax status threshold. The difference in bunching
appears almost immediately away from zero, with the confidence bands separating after
we include firms within $50 thousand dollars of the threshold. For loss firms, the observed
pattern cannot be distinguished from a smooth distribution, even for firms very close to
positive tax position. The bunching difference for nontaxable firms is not driven by firms
making very large losses.
(a) By Current Year Tax Status (b) By Lagged Loss Carryforward Stock
Figure 1.4: Bunching Behavior and Tax Incentives
Notes: These figures illustrate how bunching behavior responds to tax incentives. Firms bunch less when eligible investment
provides less cash back now. Panel (a) splits the sample based on whether firm net income before depreciation is greater
than or less than zero. Firms with net income before depreciation less than zero can carry back or forward deductions from
eligible investment but have no more current taxable income to shield. Panel (b) groups firms with current year taxable
income based on the size of their prior loss carryforward stocks. The x-axis measures increasing loss carryforward stocks
relative to current year income. The y-axis measures the excess mass at the kink point for that group. Firms with more
alternative tax shields find investment a less useful tax shield and therefore bunch less.
Table 1.5 replicates the tax status split idea in the context of bonus depreciation. We
modify the intensive margin model from Table 1.2 by interacting all variables with a
taxable indicator based on whether net income before depreciation is positive or negative.66
According to these regressions and consistent with bunching results, the positive effect of
66That is, we interact z, any controls, and the time fixed effects with the taxable indicator. We do not interact
the firm effects with the taxable indicator.
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bonus depreciation on investment is concentrated exclusively among taxable firms. The
semi-elasticity is statistically indistinguishable from zero for nontaxable firms, while it is 3.8
for taxable firms. In panel (b) of Figure A.1.1, we repeat the narrow bandwidth test for bonus
depreciation. The figure plots the coefficients on the interaction of taxable and nontaxable
status with the policy variable. The difference in coefficients in Table 1.5 emerges within $50
thousand of the tax status threshold, and these coefficients are statistically distinguishable
within $100 thousand of the threshold. Here as well, the results are not driven by differences
for firms far from positive tax positions.
Table 1.5: Heterogeneity by Tax Position
LHS Variable is Log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Taxable 3.83∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 1.95∗ 6.43∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗∗
× zN,t (0.79) (0.93) (0.92) (1.46) (0.96) (0.82)
zN,t -0.15 0.60 0.38 -3.03∗ -0.69 0.88 5.68∗∗∗
(0.90) (1.05) (1.06) (1.55) (1.15) (0.94) (1.70)
Medium LCF -2.56
× zN,t (1.46)
High LCF -3.70∗
× zN,t (1.55)
CFit/Ki,t−1 0.14∗∗∗
(0.028)
Taxable 0.27∗∗∗
× CFit/Ki,t−1 (0.035)
Observations 735341 580422 514035 221306 585914 722262 119628
Clusters (Firms) 128001 100883 109678 63699 107985 124962 40282
R2 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.72 0.84
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes No No
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes No
Notes: This table estimates regressions from each intensive margin in columns (1) through (6) specification presented in
Table 1.2. For each firm year, we generate an indicator based on whether a firm is in taxable position prior to depreciation
expense. We fully interact this indicator with all controls and the time effects. Column (7) splits taxable firms into three
groups based on the size of their lagged loss carryforward stocks relative to net income before depreciation. We interact
these group indicators with zN,t and the time effects. Only firms with nonzero stocks of lagged loss carryforwards are
included. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses.
To address the concern about nontaxable firms, Panel (b) of Figure 1.4 uses differences
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within the group of taxable firms. This plot shows again that bunching is due to tax
planning with regard to the immediate potential benefit. Here, we divide profitable firms
by their stock of loss carryforwards in the previous year. Each dot in this plot represents a
bunching histogram where the y-axis measures the degree of bunching using the excess
mass estimator in Chetty et al. (2011). The groups are sorted according to the ratio of lagged
loss carryforward stock to current year net income before depreciation, which proxies for
the availability of alternative tax shields. The scatter clearly indicates a negative relationship
between the presence of this alternative tax shield and the extent of eligible investment
manipulation.
We confirm this pattern in the bonus setting. Column (7) of Table 1.5 focuses on the
group of taxable firms with non-zero stocks of lagged loss carryforwards. We split this
group into three subgroups based on the size of their carryforward stock. Firms with large
stocks of loss carryforwards display a semi-elasticity with respect to z of 2 compared to a
semi-elasticity of 5.7 for firms with low loss carryforward stocks.
The finding for nontaxable firms contradicts a simple model of costly external finance,
because firms neglect how the policy affects borrowing in the future. On the other hand,
firms cannot be too myopic because the investment decision itself only pays off in the future.
Thus for myopia to be the explanation, firms must use different accounts to think about
investment decisions and the tax implications. Moreover, the myopia story needs complexity
to explain the finding for financially constrained firms—are small firms, non-dividend
payers and firms with low levels of cash more myopic? While plausible, there is no evidence
of this.
The facts presented in this section—the stronger response for financially constrained
firms and the nonresponse for nontaxable firms—do not match the predictions of a friction-
less model. The facts point instead toward models in which costly external finance matters
and current benefits outweigh future benefits, with neither alternative being obviously
redundant.
In the next section, we use an investment model and the estimates to calibrate a parameter
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for each alternative model.
1.5.3 Discount Rates and the Shadow Cost of Funds
Taken together, our empirical findings emphasize a financial frictions channel for how
investment incentives work. We use a standard investment model to quantify the importance
of this channel. Specifically, we ask what is the marginal value of cash, λ, implied by our
financial constraint split sample analysis, and what is the discount term, β, implied by our
tax status split sample analysis. The answers combine to tell us what discount rates firms
apply when making investment decisions.
In Appendix A.1, we derive the comparative static for investment with respect to the
bonus depreciation term θ:
I · ε I,θ ≡ ∂I
∂θ
=
(1+ λ)pI
ψI I
∂z
∂θ
> 0, (1.8)
where ε I,θ is the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to θ, pI is the price of investment,
ψI I is the second derivative of the adjustment cost function, and z is defined as in (1.3).
In the Appendix, we state assumptions under which I · ψI I will be equal across groups.67
Under these assumptions, we can derive two empirical moments that combine our estimates
for constrained and unconstrained firms and for taxable and nontaxable firms and yield
simple formulas for λ and β.
The first empirical moment we use compares the estimated response with respect to
bonus for constrained and unconstrained firms. Assuming constrained firms face shadow
price λC and unconstrained firms face shadow price λU , we take the ratio of comparative
statics:
εCI,z
εUI,z
≡ m1 =
∂I/∂θ|λC
∂I/∂θ|λU
=
1+ λC
1+ λU
= 1+
∆λ
1+ λU
, (1.9)
which reveals an implied credit spread between constrained and unconstrained firms. Table
1.6 presents m1 for each pair of estimates in Table 1.4. λ is the shadow price of relaxing the
67That is, we assume linear homogeneity of the marginal adjustment cost function. Nearly all studies in the
literature make this assumption, which is necessary for example for marginal q to equal average Q.
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Table 1.6: Calibrated Moments
Shadow Cost of Funds Calibration
Mean Sales Dividend Payers Lagged Cash Average
m1 1.95 1.63 2.61 2.06
λC|λU=0 0.95 0.63 1.61 1.06
Discount Factor Calibration
p φ r β
High φ .5 .88 .07 0.84
Low φ .1 .59 .07 0.92
Notes: This table computes empirical estimates for m1 and m2, as defined in the text. m1 reveals an implied credit spread
between constrained and unconstrained firms. m2 reveals the discount factor firms apply to all future cash flows relative to
current flows.
firm’s borrowing constraint. An alternative interpretation is that every after-tax dollar inside
the firm is worth 1+ λ dollars outside the firm. Our estimates reveal that, for financially
constrained firms, a dollar inside the firm is worth $2.06 on average outside the firm.
Is this estimate reasonable? There are not many existing benchmarks. Faulkender and
Wang (2006) attempt a calculation with a very different methodology, but that ultimately
arrives at a similar conclusion. They estimate the value of changes in cash in excess return
regressions, while attempting to control for a host of omitted factors. They find that for low
payout firms and for small firms the value of a dollar of after-tax cash is worth $1.67 and
$1.62, respectively. For these firms’ unconstrained counterparts, a dollar is only worth $1.07
and $1.12. The spreads in their study are comparable to ours, especially considering their
exercise operates within a group of firms we consider to be relatively unconstrained.68
We define a second empirical moment that compares taxable and nontaxable firms:
ε
γ=0
I,z
ε
γ=1
I,z
≡ m2 =
∂I/∂θ|γ=0
∂I/∂θ|γ=1
= βφ
1− z0t (1)
1− z0t (β)
, (1.10)
where φ is a discounter that reflects the average arrival of the taxable status event for
68Similarly, Koijen and Yogo (2012) find that a relaxed borrowing constraint for life insurers is worth $2.32
per dollar of inside capital.
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nontaxable firms. We proxy for φ by assuming a fixed transition probability p for nontaxable
firms and an infinite horizon for carryforward realization.69 This implies φ = p/(p + r).70
We calibrate the transition probability using the probability that an actually nontaxable firm
transitions into tax status in the next period. In our data, this probability is approximately
0.5.71 The sample we compare restricts the nontaxable group to include only firms that are
nearly taxable, so this p offers a conservative estimate of φ. We compute the implied β for
this p and for an extreme p equal to 0.1.
Note the external finance wedge falls out of this expression. This is true as long as
average shadow costs are the same across taxable and nontaxable groups. To maintain this
assumption, we use our loss carryforward group estimates to calibrate m2. That is, we
estimate semi-elasticities within the group of taxable firms sorted according to their past
stocks of alternative tax shields. For firms with large loss carryforward stocks relative to
current income, the marginal dollar of investment is unlikely to affect this year’s tax bill. At
the same time, we have less reason to believe these firms face substantially worse growth
opportunities or tighter financial constraints. This biases our estimates of β toward the
neoclassical benchmark of β equal to one.
Applying the estimates from the last column of Table 1.5 yields a value for m2 of
0.35(= (5.68− 3.7)/5.68). For p = 0.5, this maps to an implied discount factor (β) of 0.84.
Ignoring for the moment the other discount terms, β equal to 0.84 implies a discount rate of
approximately 17 percent. We are not aware of studies that attempt to measure discount
factors such as this for firms. Prior studies on individual decision making have found
similar magnitudes for short term discount rates in both lab and field experiments.72
69The actual expiration period for carryforwards is twenty years.
70That is, the expected arrival is p/(1 + r) + (1− p)p(1 + r)−2 + (1− p)2 p(1 + r)−3 + · · · = p/(1 + r) ·
[1/(1− (1− p)/(1+ r))] = p/(p + r).
71Auerbach and Poterba (1987) note more persistence of nontaxable positions than we do. Our measure is
based on net income before depreciation, in order to capture the state of having the next dollar of investment
affect this year’s tax bill. Their measure is based on whether firms exhaust their carryforward stocks. Below, we
assess the robustness of our results to varying φ.
72Laibson D. Repetto and Tobacman (2007) estimate short term discount rates of 40 percent in the context of
individual saving decisions. In a more general model, they estimate a short run discount rate of 15 percent and
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The discounting implied by β says that one dollar next year is worth 84 cents, before
taking into account risk or the shadow cost of funds. If we then apply the assumed risk
adjusted rate of 7 percent and the estimated shadow cost of funds of 1.06, we find that a
dollar next year is worth approximately 38 cents today for the credit constrained firms in our
sample. This substantial discount is not surprising, given the starkness of the reduced form
empirical results: nontaxable firms seem to ignore the future benefits and small, financially
constrained firms seem to value highly the immediate cash back due to bonus depreciation.
In the model, we use costly external finance and myopia to describe the deviations from a
rational benchmark we observe, but the exercise performed here provides just one of several
plausible calibrations of this basic fact. In general, models of firm behavior that do not
generate high discount rates are unlikely to fit the data for most firms.
1.6 Substitution Margins and External Finance
We ask whether increased investment involves substitution away from payroll or equipment
rentals, how firms finance their additional investment, and whether the increased investment
reflects intertemporal substitution or new investment. Studying external finance responses
helps us understand how firms paid for new investments. Understanding substitution
margins is critical for assessing the macroeconomic impact of these policies.
Table 1.7 presents estimates of the intratemporal and intertemporal substitution margins.
These regressions follow the baseline specification in equation 1.7, with a different left hand
side variable. For rents, payroll and debt, we focus on flows73 as outcomes that match
investment (i.e., capital stock flows) most closely. For payouts, we study the logarithm of
dividend payments and an indicator for whether dividends are non-zero, which separates
the intensive and extensive margins.
How flexible is the rent-versus-own margin for equipment investment? This is a crucial
a long run rate of 3 percent.
73Namely, differences in logs.
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question for assessing the real effect of these stimulus policies. If firms simply shift away
from leasing to take advantage of the tax benefits of buying, then the aggregate impact of
these policies will be minimal. In their tax returns, firms separately report rental payments
for computing net income. Unfortunately, this item does not permit decomposition into
equipment and structures leasing. Given this limitation, we can still ask what effect bonus
depreciation had on changes in rental payments. The first column of Table 1.7 shows that
growth in rental payments did not slow due to bonus, but rather increased somewhat.
Thus, we do not find evidence of substitution away from equipment leasing. The second
column of Table 1.7 reports the effect of bonus on growth in non-officer payrolls. Again, we
find no evidence of substitution, but rather coincident growth of payroll. Finding limited
substitution in both leasing and employment makes it more likely that bonus incentives
caused more output.
While increased depreciation deductions do allow firms to reduce their tax bills and keep
Table 1.7: Substitution Margins and External Finance
Dependent Variable
∆Rents ∆Payroll ∆Debt Dividends Payer? Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zN,t 0.75∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ -2.14∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.20) (0.21) (0.54) (0.089) (0.62)
zN,t−2 -0.86
(0.69)
Observations 574305 624918 642546 133161 818576 476734
Clusters (Firms) 98443 102043 103868 28891 128150 84777
R2 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.90 0.68 0.76
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table estimates regressions of the form
Xit = αi + βzN,t + Xit + δt + εit
where Xit equals the difference in the logarithm of the dependent variable in columns (1) through (3). In columns (4)
and (5), the dependent variable is the logarithm of dividends paid or an indicator for positive dividend payments. zN,t is
the present value of a dollar of eligible investment computed at the four-digit NAICS industry level, taking into account
periods of bonus depreciation. Column (6) includes contemporaneous and twice lagged zN,t. Standard errors clustered at
the firm level are in parentheses.
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more cash inside the firm, they must still raise adequate financing to make the purchases in
the first place. This point is especially critical if, as the data suggest, firms thought to be in
tight financial positions respond more. Here, we test whether bonus incentives affect net
issuance of debt and payout policy. Columns three through five of Table 1.7 provide some
insight. Increased equipment investment appears to coincide with significantly expanded
borrowing and reduced payouts both on the extensive and intensive margins.
We assess the extent of intertemporal substitution using a model that includes both
contemporaneous z and lagged z. Our data often do not include the fiscal year month, so it
is possible that we are marking some years as t when they should be t− 1 or t+ 1. For most
of our tests, this issue introduces an attenuation but no systematic bias. However, when
testing for intertemporal substitution, we want to be sure that lagged z measures past policy
changes. Thus, column (6) of Table 1.7 includes regressions with twice lagged z added to
the baseline bonus model. The coefficient on lagged z is negative but not distinguishable
from zero and including lagged z does not alter the coefficient on contemporaneous z. This
implies limited intertemporal shifting of investment.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper combines methods from public and applied economics with insights from
finance to answer a first order macroeconomic question: how do taxes affect investment
behavior in the presence of financial frictions? We find that firms respond strongly to
incentives that directly target investment decisions. Our heterogeneity results—that the
investment response is larger for financially constrained firms, but only when the benefit is
immediate—show that financial frictions are critical for understanding investment behavior.
The results point toward a set of models in which costly external finance matters
and firms place more weight on current benefits than they would in a frictionless model.
Whether the high implied discount rate reflects an external finance wedge, managerial
myopia, agency considerations or a mix of these is an important question for future research.
Further study of the external finance mechanism would be valuable. A deeper study of the
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employment effects of these policies is of direct interest to macroeconomic modelers.
A related question for future research concerns the effects of tax planning. How do tax
preparers affect the decision to take up these policies? More generally, do firms focus on
minimizing current taxes at the possible expense of future payoffs? The answer to these
questions might shed light on the role of agency problems and firm learning about optimal
management practices.
The empirical results imply that policies which target investment directly and yield
immediate payoffs are most likely to influence investment activity. Policies that target
financial constraints, such as direct loans, might have a similar effect if conditional on the
investment decision. In comparison to studies of consumer durable goods, we find less
evidence of intertemporal shifting, but more work on this question is needed. Data from the
period following the recent stimulus, once available, will be very useful.
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Chapter 2
Arrested Development: Theory and
Evidence of Supply-Side Speculation
in the Housing Market1
2.1 Introduction
How do prices aggregate information? We take up this question in a setting of particular
macroeconomic importance: housing markets. Housing is a key driver of the business
cycle (Leamer, 2007), and the causes of the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession
originated in housing markets (Mian and Sufi, 2009, 2011). An enduring feature of these
markets is booms and busts in prices that coincide with widespread disagreement about
fundamentals (Shiller, 2005). This paper argues that these cycles are caused by how housing
markets aggregate beliefs.
Studying belief aggregation allows us to address some of the most puzzling aspects of
the U.S. housing boom that occurred between 2000 and 2006. According to the standard
model of housing markets, elastic housing supply prevents house price booms by allowing
1Co-authored with Charles G. Nathanson
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new construction to absorb rising demand.2 But the episode from 2000 to 2006 witnessed
several major anomalies, in which historically elastic cities experienced house price booms
despite continuing to build housing rapidly. And house prices rose more in many of
these cities—located in Arizona, Nevada, inland California, and Florida—than in cities
where it was difficult to build new housing. Further complicating the puzzle, house prices
remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing. Why was rapid
construction able to hold down house prices in some cities and not others?
We solve this puzzle by adding two ingredients to the standard model. The first is a
friction that makes owner-occupancy more efficient than renting. The second is disagreement
about long-run growth paths. In this framework the way housing markets aggregate beliefs
depends on a city’s land availability. Prices appear more optimistic when land is plentiful
and building houses is easy, reversing the standard model’s intuition for how land supply
influences prices. Crucially, optimism amplifies prices most when a city nears but has not
yet reached a long-run development constraint. This mechanism matches the data. The
anomalous cities are those that, as the boom began, found themselves in just this state of
“arrested development.”
We model a city of developers and residents with a fixed amount of land available for
development. Developers decide how many houses to build and how much land to buy.
Residents decide how much housing to consume and whether to buy or rent. They prefer
owning their houses over renting because of frictions in the rental market.3 Residents can
invest in the equity of developers, which provides exposure to land prices. Short-selling
land and housing is impossible, but residents can short-sell developer equity. Over time,
new residents arrive in the city, leading developers to build houses using their holdings of
undeveloped land. Because of this growth, the city gradually exhausts its land supply. What
today’s investors believe about future inflows determines the price of undeveloped land.
2See, for example, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008), Gyourko (2009), and Saiz (2010).
3Such frictions include the effort spent monitoring tenants to prevent property damage (Henderson and
Ioannides, 1983), tax disadvantages (Poterba, 1984), and difficulty renting properties like single-family homes
that are designed for owners (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2009).
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House construction is instantaneous and developers bear a constant unit cost per house.
As a result, all variation in house prices is caused by movements in land prices and not
construction costs. Data from the U.S. boom support this feature of the model. Rapidly
rising land prices account for most of the house price increases across cities. In contrast,
construction costs remained relatively stable throughout the boom, and cost changes hardly
varied across cities. These aspects of the data distinguish our theory from those that stress
“time-to-build” factors such as input shortages or delivery lags (Mayer and Somerville, 2000;
Gao, 2014).
We study a demand shock that raises the current inflow of new residents and also
creates uncertainty about future inflows. Disagreement about long-run demand leads to
disagreement about future house prices. The most optimistic residents seek to speculate
through buying housing and through buying the equity of optimistic developers who are
buying land.
Our first result is that speculation is crowded out of the housing market and into the
land market. Consider an optimistic resident who wishes to speculate on future house
prices. Buying a house and renting it out is difficult because of the widespread preference
for owner-occupancy. And buying more housing for personal consumption is unappealing
because of diminishing marginal utility. Land however offers a pure, frictionless bet on real
estate. The optimistic resident chooses to invest in land through buying developer equity.
With data from the U.S. housing boom, we confirm several of the model’s predictions
about land speculation. In the model, developers run by optimistic CEOs use resident
financing to amass large land portfolios, buying land from less optimistic developers.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that supply-side speculation figures prominently
in the data. Between 2000 and 2006, the eight largest U.S. public homebuilders tripled
their land investments, an increase far exceeding their additional construction needs. Their
market equity then fell 74%, with most of the losses coming from write-downs on their land
portfolios. The model also predicts that short-selling of developer equity increases during a
boom because pessimistic residents disagree with the high valuations of the developer land
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portfolios. Matching this prediction, the short interest in homebuilder stocks rose from 2%
in 2001 to 12% in 2006. Rising short interest provides evidence of disagreement over the
value of homebuilder land portfolios and thus over future house prices.
Our second result concerns how house prices aggregate beliefs. Speculators are crowded
into the land market, while homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
Therefore, house prices reflect a weighted average of the optimistic belief of speculators
and the average owner-occupant belief. The weight on the optimistic belief equals the share
of the housing market on the margin that consists of the land market. Prices look most
optimistic where land is plentiful and building easy—that is, in cities where the short-run
elasticity of housing supply is large.
This optimism bias affects prices most when the city’s housing supply will become
inelastic soon. This observation, which constitutes our third result, explains why house
price booms occur in some elastic cities and not others. Consider a city in which the land
available for development is large relative to the city’s current size. Here, new construction
fully absorbs the demand shock now and in the foreseeable future, and so beliefs about
future house prices remain unchanged. The shock raises future price expectations only in
cities where construction will be difficult in the near future.
Speculation amplifies house price booms most in cities that exist in a state of arrested
development: they have ample land for construction today, but also face land barriers
that will restrict growth in the near future. This theoretical supply condition characterizes
the anomalous elastic cities during the U.S. housing boom. For instance, Las Vegas faces
a development boundary put in place by Congress in 1998 and depicted in Figure 2.1.
During the 2000-2006 housing boom, many investors believed the city would soon run out
of land.4 Likewise, Phoenix’s long-run development is constrained by Indian reservations
4Las Vegas provides a particularly clear illustration of our model. The ample raw land available in the
short-run allowed Las Vegas to build more houses per capita than any other large city in the U.S during the
boom. At the same time, speculation in the land markets caused land prices to quadruple between 2000 and
2006, rising from $150,000 per acre to $650,000 per acre, and then lose those gains. This in turn led to a boom and
bust in house prices. The high price of $150,000 for desert land before the boom and after the bust demonstrates
the binding nature of the city’s long-run development constraint. A New York Times article published in 2007
cites investors who believed the remaining land would be fully developed by 2017 (McKinley and Palmer, 2007).
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and National Forests that surround the metropolitan area (Land Advisors, 2010). In inland
California, much of the farmland around cities is protected by a state law that penalizes real
estate development on these parcels (Onsted, 2009).
When disagreement is strong enough, house prices increase more in these nearly de-
veloped cities than in a fully developed city. In the nearly developed cities, the extreme
optimistic beliefs of land speculators determine house prices, amplifying the house price
boom. Prices remain more stable in the fully developed city because they reflect the average
belief. This result explains the puzzling house price booms in elastic areas that motivate
this paper. Supply conditions in these places—elastic current supply, inelastic long-run
supply—lead disagreement to have the largest possible amplification effect on a house price
boom.
Our theory differs from several other explanations for the strong house price booms
that occurred in elastic areas between 2000 and 2006. One possibility is that these cities
experienced much larger demand shocks than the rest of the United States.5 Our analysis
assumes a constant demand shock across cities; the heterogeneity in city house prices
booms results entirely from differences in supply conditions. An additional possibility
is that uncertainty increased land values due to the embedded option to develop land
with different types of housing (Titman, 1983; Grenadier, 1996), and that this option value
increase was largest in cities with an intermediate amount of land. In our model, all housing
is identical, so this option does not exist. A final explanation is that developers hoarded
land to gain monopoly power, and the incentive to do so was strongest in cities about to
run out of land. This effect does not appear in our model because homebuilding is perfectly
The dramatic rise in land prices during the boom resulted from optimistic developers taking large positions
in the land market. In a striking example of supply-side speculation, a single land development fund, Focus
Property Group, outbid all other firms in every large parcel land auction between 2001 and 2005 conducted by
the federal government in Las Vegas, obtaining a 5% stake in the undeveloped land within the barrier. Focus
Property Group declared bankruptcy in 2009.
5For instance, the expansion of credit described by Mian and Sufi (2009) may have been largest in these cities.
Alternatively, historical increases in house prices in nearby areas may have spread to these cities, either through
behavioral contagion (DeFusco et al., 2013) or long-distance gentrification (Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst, 2013).
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51Regional Transportation Plan, 2013-2035
1980 1990
Figure 2-9: Las Vegas Valley Development: 1980-2030
20302008
Figure 2.1: Long-Run Development Constraints in Las Vegas
Notes: This figure comes from Page 51 of the Regional Transportation Commission of Southern Nevada’s Regional
Transportation Plan 2009-2035 (RTCSNV, 2012). The first three pictures display the Las Vegas metropolitan area in
1980, 1990, and 2008. The final picture represents the Regional Transportation Commission’s forecast for 2030. The
boundary is the development barrier stipulated by the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act. The shaded gray
region d notes developed la d.
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competitive, as is the case empirically at the metro-area level.6 Unlike these stories, our
approach explores the cross-sectional implications of disagreement, an understudied aspect
of housing cycles for which we provide direct evidence.
In addition to explaining the city-level cross-section, our model offers new predictions on
the cross-section of neighborhoods within a city. We allow some residents to prefer renting
over owner-occupancy, so that both rental and owner-occupied housing exist in equilibrium.
During periods of disagreement, optimistic speculators hold the rental housing, just as
they hold land. Prices appear more optimistic, and hence house price booms are larger, in
neighborhoods where a greater share of housing is rented. This prediction matches the data:
house prices increased more from 2000 to 2006 in neighborhoods where the share of rental
housing in 2000 was higher.
A long literature in macroeconomics and finance has studied how prices aggregate
information. When markets are complete and investors share a common prior, prices
usually are efficient and reflect the information of all market participants (Fama, 1970;
Grossman, 1976; Hellwig, 1980). Our paper sits among a body of work showing that
prices reflect only a limited and potentially biased subset of information when investors
persistently disagree with each other, and markets are incomplete. Many of these papers
focus on strategic considerations that arise in this setting, and the implications for asset
prices (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). A related literature, starting
with Miller (1977), demonstrates that prices can be biased even in the absence of strategic
considerations because optimists end up holding the asset.7 We show that this optimism
6Somerville (1999) demonstrates the high level of homebuilder competition at the metro-area level, although
he points out that construction is less competitive at the neighborhood level. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) argue
that price booms often occur in competitive industries because firms mistakenly believe they will obtain future
monopoly power.
7In these papers, all market participants are fundamental investors who ignore other investors’ beliefs
(Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002; Geanakoplos, 2009; Hong and Sraer, 2012; Simsek, 2013a,b). Pástor and Veronesi
(2003, 2009) also study environments in which investors care only about long-run fundamentals during booms
and busts, but their focus is on learning, and all investors agree as they are all identical. Piazzesi and Schneider
(2009) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2013) also apply models of disagreement to the housing market.
Papers in which strategic behavior matters include Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Allen, Morris and Shin
(2006), and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006).
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bias is strongest in housing markets when land is plentiful or when much of the housing
stock is rented. In contrast, prices aggregate beliefs well in cities where the housing stock is
fixed and owner-occupied. In these areas, house prices reflect the average of all resident
beliefs, even though they are agreeing to disagree and short-selling housing is impossible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we document the puzzling aspects of the
cross-section of the U.S. housing boom, as well as the importance of supply-side speculation
in land markets. Section 2.3 models the housing market environment. Section 2.4 contains
our analysis of how house prices aggregate beliefs. In Section 2.5, we derive implications of
the model to explain the empirical cross-section of housing markets during the U.S. boom.
Section 2.6 contains new predictions on the cross-section of neighborhoods within a city,
and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Stylized Facts of the U.S. Housing Boom and Bust
2.2.1 The Cross-Section of Cities
The Introduction mentions three puzzles about the cross-section of city experiences during
the boom. First, large house price booms occurred in elastic cities where new construction
historically had kept prices low. Second, the price booms in these elastic areas were as large
as, if not larger than, those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Finally, house
prices remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing.
We document these puzzles using city-level house price and construction data. House
price data come from the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s metropolitan statistical area
quarterly house price indices. We measure the housing stock in each city at an annual
frequency by interpolating the U.S. Census’s decadal housing stock estimates with its annual
housing permit figures. Throughout, we focus on the 115 metropolitan areas for which the
population in 2000 exceeds 500,000. The boom consists of the period between 2000 and 2006,
matching the convention in the literature to use 2006 as the end point (Mian, Rao and Sufi,
2013).
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Figure 2.2: The U.S. Housing Boom and Bust Across Cities
Notes: Anomalous Cities include those in Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and inland California. Inelastic Cities are Boston,
Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and all cities on the west coast of the United States. We measure the housing stock
in each city at an annual frequency by interpolating the U.S. Census’s decadal housing stock estimates with its annual
housing permit figures. House price data come from the second quarter FHFA house price index deflated by the CPI-U. The
figure includes all metropolitan areas with populations over 500,000 in 2000 for which we have data. (a) The cumulative
price increase is the ratio of the house price in 2006 to the house price in 2000. The annual housing stock growth is the log
difference in the housing stock in 2006 and 2000 divided by six. (b), (c) Each series is an average over cities in a group
weighted by the city’s housing stock in 2000. Construction is annual permitting as a fraction of the housing stock. Prices
represent the cumulative returns from 1980 on the housing in each group.
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Figure 2.2(a) plots construction and house price increases across cities during the boom.
The house price increases vary enormously across cities, ranging from 0% to 125% over this
brief six-year period. The largest price increases occurred in two groups of cities. The first
group, which we call the Anomalous Cities, consists of Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and inland
California. The other large price booms happened in the Inelastic Cities, which comprise
Boston, Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and the west coast of the United States.
The history of construction and house prices in the Anomalous Cities before 2000
constitute the first puzzle. As shown in Figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(c), from 1980 to 2000 these
cities provided clear examples of elastic housing markets in which prices stay low through
rapid construction activity. Construction far outpaced the U.S. average while house prices
remained constant. The standard model of housing cycles would have predicted the surge
in U.S. housing demand between 2000 and 2006 to increase construction in these cities but
not to raise prices. Empirically, the shock did increase construction, as shown in Panel (b).
The puzzle is that house prices rapidly increased as well.
The second puzzle is that the price increases in the Anomalous Cities were as large as
those in the Inelastic Cities. The Inelastic Cities consist of markets where house prices rise
because regulation prohibits construction from absorbing higher demand. We document this
relationship in Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.2, which show that construction in these cities
was lower than the U.S. average before 2000 while house price growth greatly exceeded the
U.S. average. The standard housing cycle model would have predicted the Inelastic Cities
to lead the nation in house price growth in the boom after 2000. Although house prices
did sharply rise, the price increases in the Inelastic Cities were no larger than those in the
Anomalous Cities where the boom led to rapid construction.
The final puzzle is that some elastic cities built housing quickly during the boom but,
unlike the Anomalous Cities, experienced stable house prices. These cities appear in the
bottom-right corner of Figure 2.2(a), and are located in the southeastern United States (e.g.
Texas and North Carolina). Their construction during the boom quantitatively matches that
in the Anomalous Cities, but the price changes are significantly smaller. Why was rapid
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construction able to hold down house prices in some cities and not others?
One response to these three puzzles is that the Anomalous Cities simply experienced
much larger demand shocks than the rest of the nation during the boom. Although
differential demand shocks surely explain part of the cross-section, they cannot account for
all aspects of the Anomalous Cities just documented. These cities had been experiencing
abnormally large demand shocks for years before 2000. Figure 2.2(b) shows that they were
some of the fastest growing cities in the United States. Yet the surging demand to live in
these areas did not increase prices. The departure from this pattern after 2000 requires
a more nuanced theory than the hypothesis that housing demand increased particularly
strongly in the Anomalous cities during the boom.
2.2.2 The Central Importance of Land Prices
This paper argues that speculation in land markets explains the variation in the house
price boom across cities just documented. Our model demonstrates that land market
speculation amplifies house price increases by making prices look more optimistic, and that
this amplification is strongest in areas at the same level of development as the Anomalous
Cities. In our framework, all movements in house prices arise from changes in land prices
that reflect optimistic beliefs. Matching this premise, land price increases empirically account
for nearly all of the increase in house prices during the boom, as we now show.
Tracing house price increases to land prices distinguishes our argument from “time-to-
build” theories. According to the time-to-build hypothesis, house prices rise during a boom
because of a temporary failure of homebuilders to expand construction. This delivery lag
derives from obstacles erected by local regulators or from temporary shortages of inputs
such as drywall and skilled labor. Under this theory, the price of undeveloped land should
remain constant during the boom. Because land prices reflect the long-run, temporary
housing shortages have no effect on the price of undeveloped land. These shortages instead
raise construction costs and the shadow price of regulatory building permission.
To assess the importance of land prices, we gather data on land prices and construction
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costs at the city level. Data on land prices come from the indices developed by Nichols,
Oliner and Mulhall (2013) using land parcel transaction data. They run hedonic regressions
to control for parcel characteristics and then derive city-level indices from the coefficients
on city-specific time dummies. We measure construction costs using the R.S. Means
construction cost survey. This survey asks homebuilders in each city to report the marginal
cost of building a square foot of housing, including all labor and materials costs. Survey
responses reflect real differences across cities in construction costs. In 2000, the lowest cost is
$54 per square foot and the highest is $95; the mean is $67 per square foot and the standard
deviation is $9.
Competition among homebuilders implies that, when construction is positive, house
prices must equal land prices plus construction costs: pht = p
l
t + Kt. Log-differencing this
equation between 2000 and 2006 yields
∆ log ph = α∆ log pl + (1− α)∆ log K,
where ∆ denotes the difference between 2000 and 2006 and α is land’s share of house prices
in 2000. The factor that matters more should vary more closely with house prices across
cities. Because α and 1− α are less than 1, the critical factor should also rise more than
house prices do.
Figure 2.3 plots for each city the real growth in construction costs and land prices
between 2000 and 2006 against the corresponding growth in house prices. Construction
costs rose relatively little during this period, and growth in these costs does not vary in
relation to the size of house price increases. Land prices display the opposite pattern, rising
substantially during the boom and exhibiting a high correlation with house prices. Each
city’s land price increase also exceeds its house price increase. This evidence underscores
the central importance of land prices for understanding the cross-section of house price
booms.
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Figure 2.3: Input Price and House Price Increases Across Cities, 2000-2006
Notes: We measure construction costs for each city using the R.S. Means survey figures for the marginal cost of a square
foot of an average quality home, deflated by the CPI-U. Gyourko and Saiz (2006) contains further information on the
survey. Land price changes come from the hedonic indices calculated in Nichols, Oliner and Mulhall (2013) using land
parcel transactions, and house prices come from the second quarter FHFA housing price index deflated by the CPI-U. The
figure includes all metropolitan areas with populations over 500,000 in 2000 for which we have data.
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2.2.3 Land Market Speculation by Homebuilders
The land price booms just documented were driven by speculation in land markets. The
term “speculation” refers to the process in which optimists buy up an asset that cannot
be shorted, biasing its price. Our model describes two implications of this behavior. First,
the owners of the land during the boom increase their positions as they crowd out less
optimistic landowners. Second, when their beliefs are revealed to be more optimistic than
reality, optimists suffer capital losses. We document both of these features among a class
of landowners for whom rich data are publicly available: public homebuilders. We focus
on the eight largest firms and hand-collect landholding data from their annual financial
statements between 2001 and 2010.
Consistent with speculative behavior, these firms nearly tripled their landholdings
between 2001 and 2005, as shown in Figure 2.4(a). These land acquisitions far exceed
additional land needed for new construction. Annual home sales increased by 120,000
between 2001 and 2005, while landholdings increased by 1,100,000 lots. One lot can produce
one house, so landholdings rose more than nine times relative to home sales. In 2005, Pulte
changed the description of its business in its 10-K to say, “We consider land acquisition one
of our core competencies.” This language appeared until 2008, when it was replaced by,
“Homebuilding operations represent our core business.”
Having amassed large land portfolios, these firms subsequently suffered large capital
losses. Figure 2.4(b) documents the dramatic rise and fall in the total market equity of these
homebuilders between 2001 and 2010. Homebuilder stocks rose 430% and then fell 74%
over this period. The majority of the losses borne by homebuilders arose from losses on the
land portfolios they accumulated from 2001 to 2005. In 2006, these firms began reporting
write-downs to their land portfolios. At $29 billion, the value of the land losses between
2006 and 2010 accounts for 73% of the market equity losses over this time period. The
homebuilders bore the entirety of their land portfolio losses. The absence of a hedge against
downside risk supports the theory that homebuilder land acquisitions represented their
optimistic beliefs.
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Figure 2.4: Supply-Side Speculation Among U.S. Public Homebuilders, 2001-2010
Notes: (a), (b) Data come from the 10-K filings of Centex, Pulte, Lennar, D.R. Horton, K.B. Homes, Toll Brothers,
Hovnanian, and Southern Pacific, the eight largest public U.S. homebuilders in 2001. “Lots Controlled” equals the sum of
lots directly owned and those controlled by option contracts. The cumulative writedowns to land holdings between 2006
and 2010 among these homebuilders totals $29 billion. (c) Short interest is computed as the ratio of shares currently sold
short to total shares outstanding. Monthly data series for shares short come from COMPUSTAT and for shares outstanding
come from CRSP. Builder stocks are classified as those with NAICS code 236117.
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Further evidence of homebuilder optimism comes from short-selling of their market
equity. If the homebuilders buying land are more optimistic than most investors, then other
investors should bet against them by shorting their stock. Figure 2.4(c) plots monthly short
interest ratios, defined as the ratio of shares currently sold short to total shares outstanding,
for homebuilder stocks and non-homebuilder stocks between 2001 and 2010. Throughout
the boom, short interest of homebuilder stock sharply increased, rising from 2% in 2001
to 12% in 2006. It further increased as homebuilders began to announce their land losses
in 2006. Rising short interest provides direct evidence of disagreement over the value of
homebuilder land portfolios and thus over future house prices.
2.3 A Housing Market with Homeowners and Developers
Housing Supply. The city we study has a fixed amount of space S. This space can either
be used for housing, or it remains as undeveloped land. The total housing stock in the city
at time t is Ht and the remaining undeveloped land is Lt, so S = Ht + Lt for all t.
A continuum of real estate developers invest in land and construct housing from the land
at a cost of K per unit of housing. The aggregate supply of new housing is ∆Ht. Construction
is instantaneous, and housing does not depreciate: Ht = ∆Ht + Ht−1. Construction is also
irreversible: ∆Ht ≥ 0. Both housing and land are continuous variables, and one unit of
housing requires one unit of land.
The developers rent out land on spot markets at a price of rlt. Rental demand for
undeveloped land comes from firms, such as farms, that use the city’s land as an input.
These firms buy their inputs and sell their products on the global market. Therefore, their
aggregate demand for land depends only on rlt and not on any other local market conditions.
This aggregate rental demand curve is Dl(rlt), where D
l(·) is decreasing positive function
such that Dl(0) ≥ S.
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The profit flow of a developer j at time t is
pij,t = rltLj,t + p
l
t(Lj,t−1 − Lj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
development profit
+ (pht − plt − K)∆Hj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
homebuilding profit
, (2.1)
where pht is the price of housing and p
l
t is the price of land. The real estate development
industry faces no entry costs, so the industry is perfectly competitive. Because homebuilding
is instantaneous and does not depend on prior land investments, profits from this line of
business must be zero due to perfect competition. We denote the aggregate homebuilding
profit by pihbt = (p
h
t − plt − K)∆Ht.
Each developer begins with a land endowment and issues equity to finance its land
investments. It maximizes its expected net present value of profits Ej ∑∞t=0 βtpij,t. The
operator Ej reflects firm j’s expectation of future land prices. Firm-specific beliefs represent
the beliefs of the firm’s CEO, who owns equity, cannot be fired, and decides the firm’s
land investments. The number of each developer’s equity shares equals the amount of
land it holds, and each developer pays out its land rents as dividends. The market price of
developer equity therefore equals the market price plt of land.
Individual Housing Demand. A population of residents live in the city and hold its
housing. These residents receive direct utility from consuming housing. Lower-case
h denotes the flow consumption of housing, whereas upper-case H denotes the asset
holding. Flow utility from housing depends on whether housing is consumed through
owner-occupancy or under a rental contract. Residents also derive utility from non-local
consumption c. Each resident i maximizes the expected present value of utility, given by
Ei
∞
∑
t=0
βtui(ct, hownt , h
rent
t ),
where β is the common discount factor.
Flow utility ui(·, ·, ·) has three properties. First, it is separable and linear in non-real
estate consumption c. This quasi-linearity eliminates risk aversion and hedging motives.
Second, owner-occupied and rented housing are substitutes, and residents vary in which
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type of contract they prefer and to what degree. Substitutability of owner-occupied and
rented housing fully sorts residents between the two types of contracts; no resident consumes
both types of housing simultaneously. Finally, residents face diminishing marginal utility
of owner-occupied housing. This property leads homeownership to be dispersed among
residents in equilibrium.
The utility specification we adopt that features these three properties is
ui(c, hown, hrent) = c + v(aihown + hrent) (2.2)
where ai > 0 is resident i’s preference for owner-occupancy, and v(·) is an increasing,
concave function for which limh→0 v′(h) = ∞. The distribution of the owner-occupancy
preference parameter ai across residents is given by a continuously differentiable cumulative
distribution function Fa, which is stable over time. Owner-occupancy utility is unbounded:
dFa has full support on R+. The functional form of the owner-occupancy preference in (2.2)
results from a moral hazard problem we describe in the Appendix.
Resident Optimization. Residents hold three assets classes: bonds B, housing H, and
developer equity Q. Global capital markets external to the city determine the gross interest
rate on bonds, which is Rt = 1/β, where β is the common discount factor. Residents may
borrow or lend at this rate by buying or selling these bonds in unlimited quantities.
In contrast, housing and developer equity are traded within the city, and equilibrium
conditions determine their prices plt and p
h
t . Homeowners earn income by renting out the
housing they own in excess of what they consume. The spot rental price for housing is rht ;
landlord revenue is therefore rht (Hi,t − howni,t − hrenti,t ). Shorting housing is impossible, but
residents can short developer equity. Doing so is costly. Residents incur a convex cost ks(Q)
to short Q units of developer stock, where ks(0) = 0 and k′s, k′′s > 0. These costs reflect fees
paid to borrow stock, as well as time spent locating available stock (D’Avolio, 2002).
Short-sale constraints in the housing market result from a lack of asset interchangeability.
Although housing is homogeneous in the model, empirical housing markets involve large
variation in characteristics across houses. This variation in characteristics makes it essentially
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impossible to cover a short. Unlike in the housing market, asset interchangeability holds in
the equity market, where all of a firm’s shares are equivalent.
The Bellman equation representing the resident optimization problem is
V(Bi,t−1, Hi,t−1, Qi,t−1) = max
Bi,t,Hi,t,Qi,t
ci,t,howni,t ,h
rent
i,t
ci,t + v(aihowni,t + h
rent
i,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow utility
+ βEi,tV(Bi,t, Hi,t, Qi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value
, (2.3)
where the maximization is subject to the short-sale constraint
0 ≤ Hi,t,
the ownership constraint
howni,t ≤ Hi,t,
and the budget constraint
RtBi,t−1 − Bi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing costs
+ ci,t︸︷︷︸
consumption
≤ pht (Hi,t−1 − Hi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing returns
+ rht (Hi,t − howni,t − hrenti,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing rental income
+ plt(Qi,t−1 −Qi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity returns
+ rltQi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividends
− max(0, ks(−Qi,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
shorting costs
.
Aggregate Demand and Beliefs. Aggregate demand to live in the city equals the number
of residents Nt. This aggregate demand consists of a shock and a trend:
log Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand
= zt︸︷︷︸
shock
+ log Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
trend
.
The trend component grows at a constant positive rate g: for all t > 0,
log Nt = g + log Nt−1.
The shocks zt have a common factor x. The dependence of the time-t shock on the common
factor x is µt, so that
zt = µtx.
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Without loss of generality, µ0 = 1: the time 0 shock z0 equals the common factor x. We
denote µ = {µt}t≥0.
At time 0, residents observe the following information: the current and future values of
trend demand Nt, the trend growth rate g, the current demand N0, the current shock z0,
and the common factor x of the future shocks. They do not observe µ, the data needed to
extrapolate the factor x to future shocks. Residents learn the true value of the entire vector
µ at time t = 1. The resolution of uncertainty at time t = 1 is common knowledge at t = 0.
Residents agree to disagree about the true value of µ. At time 0, resident i’s subjective
prior of µ is given by Fi, an integrable probability measure on the compact space M of all
possible values of µ. These priors vary across residents. The resulting subjective expected
value of each µt is µi,t =
∫
M µtdFi, and the vector of resident i’s subjective expected values
of each µt is µi = {µi,t}t≥0. The subjective expected value µi uniquely determines the prior
Fi. The distribution of µi itself across residents admits an integrable probability distribution
Fµ on M, which is independent from the distribution Fa of owner-occupancy preferences.
The CEOs of the development firms are city residents, so their beliefs are drawn from the
same distribution Fµ.
Resident disagreement reflects the unprecedented nature of the demand shock z. As
argued by Morris (1996), this heterogeneous prior assumption is most appropriate when
investors face an unprecedented situation in which they have not yet had a chance to collect
information and engage in rational updating. The events surrounding housing booms are
precisely these types of situations. Glaeser (2013) meticulously shows that in each of the
historical booms he analyzes, reasonable investors could agree to disagree about future real
estate prices. In the case of the U.S. housing boom between 2000 and 2006, we follow Mian
and Sufi (2009) in thinking of the shock as the arrival of new securitization technologies that
expanded credit to low-income borrowers. The initial shock to housing demand is x, and µ
represents the degree to which this expansion of credit in 2000-2006 persists after 2006.
Equilibrium. Equilibrium consists of time-series vectors of prices pL(µ), pH(µ), rl(µ),
rh(µ) and quantities L(µ), H(µ) that depend on the realized value of µ. These pricing and
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quantity functions constitute an equilibrium when housing, land, and equity markets clear
while residents and developers maximize utility and profits:
Consider pricing functions ph(µ), pl(µ), rh(µ), rl(µ) and quantity functions H(µ), L(µ).
Let H∗i,t, Q
∗
i,t, (h
own
i,t )
∗, and (hrenti,t )
∗ be resident i’s solutions to the Bellman equation (2.3) given his
owner-occupancy preference ai, his beliefs µi, and these pricing functions. Let L∗j,t be developer j’s
land holdings that maximize expected net present value of profits in equation (2.1), given the pricing
functions; L∗t is the sum of these land holdings across developers. The pricing and quantity functions
constitute a recursive competitive equilibrium if at each time t:
1. The sum of undeveloped land and housing equals the city’s endowment of open space:
S = Lt(µ) + Ht(µ).
2. Flow demand for land equals investment demand from developers, which equals the resident
demand for their equity:
Lt(µ) = L∗t = Dl(rlt(µ)) =
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
Q∗i,tdFµdFa.
3. Resident stock and flow demand for housing clear:
Ht(µ) = Nt(µ)
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
H∗i,tdFµdFa = Nt(µ)
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
((howni,t )
∗ + (hrenti,t )
∗)dFµdFa.
4. Construction maximizes developer profits:
Ht(µ)− Ht−1(µ) ∈ arg max
∆Ht
pihbt .
5. Developer profit from homebuilding is zero:
max
∆Ht
pihbt = 0.
Elasticity of Housing Supply. The housing supply curve is the city’s open space S less
the rental demand for land Dl(rlt). We denote the elasticity of this supply curve with respect
to housing rents rht by e
S
t . The supply elasticity determines the construction response to the
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shocks {zt}. It will also serve as a sufficient statistic for the extent to which land speculation
affects house prices. This section describes the supply elasticity eSt along the city’s trend
growth path, which obtains when x = 0.
The relationship between land rents rlt and house rents r
h
t allows us to calculate this
elasticity. Because trend growth g > 0, new residents perpetually arrive to the city, and
developers build new houses each period. Perpetual construction ties together land and
house prices. In particular, as developers must be indifferent between building today or
tomorrow, house rents equal land rents plus flow construction costs:
rht = r
l
t + (1− β)K.
The supply of housing is open space net of flow land demand: S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K). The
elasticity of housing supply is thus eSt ≡ −rht (Dl)′/(S− Dl). When the flow land demand
Dl features a constant elasticity el , the elasticity of housing supply takes on the simple form
eSt =
rht
rht − (1− β)K
(
S
Ht
− 1
)
el , (2.4)
where Ht is the housing stock at time t. The arrival of new residents increases both rents rht
and the level of development Ht/S. The supply elasticity given in (2.4) unambiguously falls
(see Appendix for proof):
Lemma 1 Define housing supply to be the residual of the city’s open space S minus the flow
demand for land: S − Dl . The elasticity eSt of housing supply with respect to housing rents rht
decreases with the level of city development Ht/S along the city’s trend growth path.
2.4 Supply-Side Speculation
At time 0, residents disagree about the future path of housing demand. Speculative trading
behavior results from this disagreement. This section describes how owner-occupancy
frictions crowd speculators out of owner-occupied housing and into rental housing and
land. Demand and supply elasticities determine how prices aggregate the beliefs of owner-
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occupants and of optimistic speculators holding rental housing and land.
2.4.1 Land Speculation and Dispersed Homeownership
We first consider the developer decision to hold land at time 0. Developer j’s first-order
condition on its land-holding Lj,0 is
1/β︸︷︷︸
risk-free rate
≥ Ej pl1/(pl0 − rl0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected land return
,
with equality if and only if Lj,0 > 0. A developer invests in land if and only if it expects land
to return the risk-free rate. At time 0, developers disagree about this expected return on
land because they disagree about the future path of housing demand. The developers that
expect the highest returns invest in land, while all other developers sell to these optimistic
firms and exit the market. We denote the optimistic belief of the developers who invest in
land by E˜pl1 ≡ maxµj E(pl1 | µj).
Optimistic residents finance developer investments in land through purchasing their
equity. Less optimistic residents choose to short-sell developer stock. Developer stock allows
residents to hold land indirectly: its price is pl0 and it pays a dividend of r
l
0. Resident i holds
this equity only if he agrees with the land valuation of the optimistic developers, in which
case Ei pl1 = E˜p
l
1. Otherwise, he shorts the equity, and his first-order condition is
k′s(−Q∗i,0) = β(E˜pl1 − Ei pl1).
Disagreement increases the short interest in the equity of the developers holding the land.
Without disagreement, E˜pl1 = Ei p
l
1 for all residents, so no one shorts.
Only the most optimistic residents hold housing as landlords. A resident is a landlord
if he owns more housing than he consumes through owner-occupancy: Hi > howni . The
first-order condition of the Bellman equation (2.3) with respect to Hi,0 when it is in excess of
howni,0 is
1/β︸︷︷︸
risk-free rate
≥ Ei ph1/(ph0 − rh0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected housing return
, (2.5)
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with equality if and only if Hi,0 > howni,0 . Only the most optimistic residents invest in
rental housing, just as only the most optimistic developers invest in land. Land and rental
housing share this fundamental property. During periods of uncertainty, the most optimistic
investors are the sole holders of these asset classes.
Owner-occupancy utility crowds these optimistic investors out of owner-occupied hous-
ing, which remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs. The decision to own or rent
emerges from the first-order conditions of the Bellman equation (2.3) with respect to howni,0
and hrenti,0 . We express these equations jointly as
v′(ai(howni,0 )
∗ + (hrenti,0 )
∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal utility of housing
= min
a−1i (ph0 − βEi ph1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
owning
, rh0︸︷︷︸
renting
 . (2.6)
The left term in the parentheses denotes the expected flow price of marginal utility v′ from
owning a house; the right term denotes the flow price of renting. A resident owns when
the owner-occupancy price is less than the rental price. As long as the owner-occupancy
preference ai is large enough, resident i decides to own even if his belief Ei ph1 is quite
pessimistic. Homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
We gain additional intuition about the own-rent margin by substituting (2.5) into (2.6).
We denote the most optimistic belief about future house prices, the one held by landlords
investing in rental housing, by E˜ph1 ≡ maxµi E(ph1 | µi). The decision to own rather than
rent reduces to
ai ≥ 1+ β(E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1)
rh0
. (2.7)
Without disagreement, a resident owns exactly when he intrinsically prefers owning to
renting, so that ai ≥ 1. Disagreement sets the bar higher. Some pessimists for whom ai ≥ 1
choose to rent because they expect capital losses on owning a home. Other pessimists
continue to own because their owner-occupancy utility is high enough to offset the fear of
capital losses. Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 Owner-occupancy utility crowds speculators out of the owner-occupied housing
market and into the land and rental markets. The most optimistic residents—those holding the highest
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value of Ei ph1—buy up all rental housing and finance optimistic developers who purchase all the land.
In contrast, owner-occupied housing remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
Proposition 1 yields two corollaries that match stylized facts presented in Section 2.2.
The most optimistic developers buy up all the land. Unless they start out owning all the
land, these optimistic developers increase their land positions following the demand shock.
They hold this land as an investment rather than for immediate construction.
Implication 1 The developers who hold land at time 0 increase their aggregate land holdings at
time 0. They buy land in excess of their immediate construction needs.
This implication explains the land-buying activities of large public U.S. homebuilders
documented in Figure 2.4(a).
The second corollary concerns short-selling. Residents who disagree with the optimistic
valuations of developers short their equity.
Implication 2 Disagreement increases the short interest of developer equity at time 0.
Figure 2.4(c) documents the rising short interest in the stocks of U.S. public homebuilders
who were taking on large land positions during the boom. This short interest provides
direct evidence of disagreement during the boom.
2.4.2 Belief Aggregation
Prices aggregate the heterogeneous beliefs of residents and developers holding housing
and land. The real estate market consists of three components: land, rental housing, and
owner-occupied housing. The most optimistic residents hold the first two, while the third
remains dispersed among owner-occupants. House prices reflect a weighted average of the
optimistic belief and the average belief of all owner-occupants. The weight on the optimistic
belief is the share of the real estate market consisting of land and rental housing; the weight
on the average owner-occupant belief is owner-occupied housing’s share of the market.
To derive these results, we take a comparative static of the form ∂ph0/∂x. The shock
z = µx scales with the common factor x. We differentiate with respect to x at x = 0 to
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explore how prices change as the shocks, and hence the ensuing disagreement, increase.
Our partial derivative holds current demand N0 constant to isolate the aggregation of future
beliefs.
We first use (2.5) to write ph0 = r
h
0 + βE˜p
h
1. The shock increases the optimistic belief βE˜p
h
1,
directly increasing prices. It also changes the market rent rh0 . This rent is determined by the
intersection of housing supply and housing demand:
S− Dl
(
rh0 − (1− β)K
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing supply
= Dh0(r
h
0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing demand
, (2.8)
where
Dh0(r
h
0) = N0
∫
M
∫ 1+β(E˜ph1−Ei ph1)/rh0
0
(v′)−1(rh0)dFadFµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
rental housing
(2.9)
+ N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1+β(E˜ph1−Ei ph1)/rh0
a−1i (v
′)−1
(
a−1i (r
h
0 + β(E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1))
)
dFadFµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
owner-occupied housing
.
The housing demand equation follows from (2.6) and (2.7). We determine the shock’s
effect on rents by totally differentiating (2.8) with respect to x at x = 0, keeping current
demand N0 constant. When the elasticity of housing demand eD is constant, the resulting
comparative static ∂ph0/∂x adopts the simple form given in the following proposition, which
we prove in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Consider the partial effect of the shock in which current demand N0 stays constant
but future house price expectations Ei ph1 change. The change in house prices averages the changes in
the optimistic resident belief and the average belief:
∂ph0
∂x
=
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
∂βE˜ph1
∂x
+
χeD
eS0 + e
D
∂βEph1
∂x
, (2.10)
where E˜ph1 = maxi Ei p
h
1 is the most optimistic belief, Ep
h
1 =
∫
M Ei p
h
1dFµ is the average belief,
eS0 is the elasticity of housing supply at time 0, e
D is the elasticity of housing demand, and χ =∫ ∞
0 (h
own
i,0 )
∗dFa/H0 is the share of housing that is owner-occupied when x = 0.
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The weight on the optimistic belief in Proposition 2 represents the share, on the margin,
of the real estate market owned by speculators. The supply elasticity eS0 represents land, and
(1− χ)eD represents rental housing. The remaining χeD represents owner-occupied housing
and is the weight on the average owner-occupant belief. The average owner-occupant belief
coincides with the unconditional average belief because at x = 0, beliefs and tenure choice
are independent.
Proposition 2 yields four corollaries on the difference in belief aggregation across cities
and neighborhoods. Prices look more optimistic when the weight (eS0 +(1−χ)eD)/(eS0 + eD)
is higher. This ratio is greater when the supply elasticity eS0 is higher:
Implication 3 Prices look more optimistic when the housing supply elasticity is higher, i.e. in less
developed cities.
Disagreement reverses the common intuition relating housing supply elasticity and move-
ments in house prices. Elastic supply keeps prices low by allowing construction to respond
to demand shocks. But land constitutes a larger share of the real estate market when supply
is elastic. Speculators are drawn to the land markets, so elastic supply amplifies the role of
speculators in determining prices during periods of disagreement. When supply is perfectly
elastic, eS0 = ∞ and prices reflect only the beliefs of these optimistic speculators:
Implication 4 When housing supply is perfectly elastic, house prices incorporate only the most
optimistic beliefs; they reflect the beliefs of developers and not of owner-occupants.
Recent research has measured owner-occupant beliefs about the future evolution of house
prices.8 In cities with elastic housing supply, such as the cities motivating this paper,
developer rather than owner-occupant beliefs determine prices. Data on the expectations of
homebuilders would supplement the research on owner-occupant beliefs to explain prices
in these elastic areas.
Prices aggregate beliefs much better when housing supply is perfectly inelastic (eS0 = 0)
8See Landvoigt (2011), Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2013), Soo
(2013), Suher (2013), and Cheng, Raina and Xiong (2014).
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and all housing is owner-occupied (χ = 1). In this case, the price change depends only on
the average belief Eph1:
Implication 5 When the housing stock is fixed and all housing is owner-occupied, prices reflect the
average belief about long-run growth.
In many settings, such as when investor information equals a signal plus mean zero noise,
prices reflect all information when they incorporate the average private belief of all investors.
Owner-occupied housing markets with a fixed housing stock display this property, even
though short-selling is impossible and residents persistently disagree. These frictions fail to
bias prices because homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs, due to
the utility flows that residents derive from housing.
The weight (eS0 + (1− χ)eD)/(eS0 + eD) on optimistic beliefs is also higher when χ is
lower:
Implication 6 Prices look more optimistic when a greater share of housing is rented.
Speculators own a greater share of the real estate market when the rental share 1− χ is
higher. Prices bias towards optimistic beliefs in market segments where more of the housing
stock is rented.
2.5 The Cross-Section of City Experiences During the Boom
This section explains three puzzling aspects of the U.S. housing boom that occurred between
2000 and 2006. First, large house price booms occurred in elastic cities where new construc-
tion historically had kept prices low. Second, the price booms in these elastic areas were
as large as, if not larger than, those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Finally,
house prices remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing.
To explain these cross-sectional facts, we derive a formula for the total effect of the
shock z on house prices. This formula expresses the house price boom as a function of
the city’s level of development when the shock occurs. Our analysis up to this point has
76
explored the partial effect of how prices aggregate beliefs Ei ph1, without specifying how
these beliefs are formed. To derive the total effect of the shock, we express the changes in
these beliefs in terms of city characteristics and the exogenous demand process. Specifically,
we calculate the partial derivative ∂ log ph0/∂x holding all beliefs fixed at µi = µ, and then
use Proposition 2 to derive the total effect of the shock x on house prices. As before, we
evaluate derivatives at x = 0.9
At time 0, each resident expects the shock zt to raise log-demand at time t by µtx. The
resulting expected change in rents rht depends on the elasticities of supply and demand at
time t:
∂ log E0rht
∂x
=
µt
eSt + e
D
.
This equation follows from price theory. When a demand curve shifts up, a good’s price
increases by the inverse of the total elasticity of supply and demand. The total effects of
the shocks {zt} on the current house price ph0 follows from aggregating the above equation
across all time periods, using the relation p0 = E0 ∑∞t=0 βtrht :
∂ log ph0
∂x
=
µ
e˜S + eD
. (2.11)
The mean persistence of the shock is µ = ∑∞t=0 µtβtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1/∑∞t=0 βtrht (eSt + eD)−1, and
e˜S is the long-run supply elasticity given by the weighted harmonic mean of future supply
elasticities in the city:
e˜S ≡ −eD + ∑
∞
t=0 βtrht
∑∞t=0 βtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1
.
The higher this long-run supply elasticity, the smaller the shock’s impact on current house
prices, holding µ fixed.
We now put together the two channels through which the shock changes prices. Equation
(2.11) expresses the price change that results when µ is known, and (2.10) describes how
prices aggregate residents’ heterogeneous beliefs about µ. Proposition 3 states the total
9Evaluating derivatives at x = 0 describes the model when construction occurs in each period. When x is
large enough and the shock z might mean-revert, a construction stop at t = 1 is possible and anticipated by
residents at t = 0. This feature of housing cycles distracts from our focus on housing booms and how they vary
across cities.
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effect d log ph0/dx, which we formally calculate in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 The total effect of the shock x on current house prices is
d log ph0
dx
=
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeD
eS0 + e
D
µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate belief
1
e˜S + eD︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass-through
, (2.12)
where eS0 is the current elasticity of housing supply, e˜
S is the long-run supply elasticity, eD is
the elasticity of housing demand, χ is the share of housing that is owner-occupied, µ˜ is the mean
persistence of the most optimistic belief about µ, and µ is the mean persistence of the average belief.
The first puzzle (2.12) explains is how a city with perfectly elastic housing supply can
experience a house price boom. Housing supply is perfectly elastic when eS0 = ∞. In this
case, the house price boom is µ˜x/(e˜S + eD). This price increase is positive as long as the
long-run supply elasticity e˜S is not also infinite.
Implication 7 A house price boom occurs in a city where current housing supply is completely
elastic, construction costs are constant, and construction is instantaneous. Supply must be inelastic
in the future for such a price boom to occur.
In the Appendix, we prove that a limiting case exists in which eS0 = ∞ while e˜
S < ∞.
A house price boom results from a shock to current demand accompanied by news of
future shocks. When supply is inelastic in the long-run, these future shocks raise future
rents, and prices rise today to reflect this fact. This price change occurs even if supply is
perfectly elastic today, because residents anticipate the near future in which supply will not
be able to adjust as easily.
This supply condition—elastic short-run supply, inelastic long-run supply—occurs in
cities at an intermediate level of development. Figure 2.5(a) demonstrates the possible
combinations of short-run and long-run supply elasticities in a city. We plot the pass-
through 1/(eS + eD); a higher pass-through corresponds to a lower elasticity. Lightly
developed cities have highly elastic short-run and long-run supply, and heavily developed
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Figure 2.5: Model Simulations For Different Cities
Notes: The parameters we use are µ˜ = 1, µ = 1, x = 0.06, g = 0.013, eD = 1, β = 0.936, and el = 1. We hold the
amount of space S fixed and vary the initial trend demand N0. The x-axis reports annualized trend demand given by
log N0/g. (a) Short-run pass-through is 1/(eS0 + e
D); long-run pass-through is 1/(e˜S + eD). We calculate the rent and
housing stock at each level of development using (A1) in the Appendix, and then calculate the supply elasticities using
(2.4). (b) Each curve reports the derivative in (2.12) times x, which we calculate using the elasticities shown in panel (a).
The “without disagreement” counterfactual uses µ˜ = µ = 0.2 instead of µ˜ = 1 > µ = 0.2. (c) We plot the construction
equation (A2) using the elasticities shown in panel (a), as well as rents at each stage of development from (A1) and prices
at each development stage from p0 = ∑∞t=0 β
trht , which we calculate at x = 0.
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cities have inelastic short-run and long-run supply. In the intermediate case, current supply
is elastic while long-run supply is inelastic, reflecting the near future of constrained supply.
As we discussed in the Introduction, this theoretical supply condition describes the
elastic markets that experienced large house price booms between 2000 and 2006. These
cities found themselves in a state of arrested development as the boom began in 2000.
Although ample land existed for current construction, long-run barriers constrain their
future growth.
The second puzzle (2.12) explains is why the price booms in these elastic cities were as
large as those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Disagreement amplifies the
house price boom the most in exactly these nearly developed elastic cities. The amplification
effect of disagreement equals the extent to which optimists bias the price increase given
in (2.12). When owner-occupancy frictions are present (χ = 1), the difference between the
price boom under disagreement and under the counterfactual in which all residents hold
the average belief µ is
eS0
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
.
This amplification is largest in nearly developed elastic cities, where eS0 is large and e˜
S is
small. Because this amplification increases in eS0 and decreases in e˜
S, nearly developed
elastic cities provide the ideal condition for disagreement to amplify a house price boom.
Implication 8, which we prove in the Appendix, states this result formally.
Implication 8 Disagreement amplifies house price booms most in cities at an intermediate level of
development, as long as owner-occupancy frictions are large enough. Define ∆ to be the difference
between the price boom given in (2.12) and the counterfactual in which all residents hold the average
belief µ. Then there exists χ∗ < 1 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1, ∆ is strictly largest at an intermediate
level of initial development N∗0 < ∞.
Figure 2.5(b) plots the house price boom given by (2.12) across different levels of city
development, for both the case of disagreement and the case in which all residents hold
the average belief. The amplification effect of disagreement is the difference between the
two curves. Optimistic speculators amplify the price boom the most in the intermediate city.
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Highly elastic short-run supply facilitates speculation in land markets, biasing prices towards
their optimistic belief. This bias significantly increases house prices because housing supply
is constrained in the near future. The optimism bias is smaller in the highly developed city.
As a result, price increases in intermediate cities are as large as the price boom in the highly
developed areas.
In fact, the price boom in some intermediate cities can exceed that in the highly developed
cities. The parameters we use in Figure 2.5(b) generate an example of this phenomenon.
This surprising result reverses the conclusion of standard models of housing cycles, in
which the most constrained areas always experience the largest price increases. This reversal
occurs as long as owner-occupancy frictions are high and the extent of disagreement is
sufficiently large:
Implication 9 If disagreement and owner-occupancy frictions are large enough, then the largest
house price boom occurs in a city at an intermediate level of development. There exists χ∗ < 1 and
δ > 0 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1 and µ˜− µ ≥ δ, the price boom d log ph0/dx is strictly largest at an
intermediate level of development N∗0 < ∞.
Our model has succeeded in explaining the large house price booms in the elastic cities
without arguing that these cities experienced abnormally large housing demand shocks.
These markets experienced some of the largest house price booms in the country because of
their supply conditions, not in spite of them.
The final puzzle explained by (2.12) is why large house price booms occurred in some
elastic cities but not in others. Elastic cities are those for which eS0 ≈ ∞. As shown in Figure
2.5(a), these cities differ in their long-run supply elasticity e˜S. When e˜S = ∞, the house
price boom d log ph0/dx = 0. Prices remain flat because construction can freely respond to
demand shocks now and for the foreseeable future. House prices increase in elastic cities
only when the development constraint will make construction difficult in the near future.
The elastic American cities which experienced stable house prices between 2000 and
2006 possess characteristics that lead long-run supply to be elastic. These cities, located in
Texas and other central American areas, are characterized by flat geography, a lack of future
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regulation, and homogeneous sprawl (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004;
Burchfield et al., 2006; Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008; Saiz, 2010). These conditions allow
the cities to expand indefinitely, leading S to be infinite or very high. Unlimited land leads
the elasticity of supply to remain infinite forever, according to (2.4).
The level of house prices before the shock identifies the difference between the elastic
cities that can expand indefinitely and elastic cities that face constraints in the near future.
House prices increase with development. Therefore, the elastic cities nearing their develop-
ment constraints should have higher house prices before the shock than the other elastic
cities. The following implication summarizes these results.
Implication 10 Consider two cities that experience the same demand shock and in which current
housing supply is perfectly elastic (eS0 = ∞). House prices rise more in the city in which the long-run
supply elasticity e˜S is lower. Before the shock occurs, a greater share of the land in this city is already
developed, and the level of house prices is higher.
In practice, calculating a metro-area house price level is difficult because characteristics
such as construction costs vary widely within and across metro areas, although valiant
attempts have been made (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; Nichols,
Oliner and Mulhall, 2013). With the appropriate data, we would be able to distinguish the
low-developed from the medium-developed cities.
We have used (2.12) to explain the large house price increases in certain elastic housing
markets in the U.S. between 2000 and 2006. An additional salient feature of these booms
is that they coincided with rapid construction. As we document in Section 2.2, these
cities experienced some of the most intense permitting activity in the nation during this
period. Our model captures this phenomenon. Figure 2.5(c) plots the construction response
to the shock in different cities. In cities where current housing supply is elastic , new
construction accommodates the shock. The elastic cities include both the lightly developed
and intermediate developed areas.
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2.6 Variation in House Price Booms Within Cities
The model also makes predictions on the variation in house price increases within a given
city. Optimistic speculators hold rental housing, just as they hold land. Prices appear more
optimistic, and hence house price booms are larger, in market segments where a greater
share of housing is rented.
This result emerges from (2.12). Recall that χ is the share of the housing stock that is
owner-occupied rather than rented when x = 0. It is a sufficient statistic for the distribution
Fa of owner-occupancy utility. When χ is larger, the price increase d log ph0/dx is smaller:
∂
∂χ
d log ph0
dx
= − e
D
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
< 0.
This derivative is negative because the optimistic belief µ˜ exceeds the average belief µ.
A city’s housing market consists of a number of market segments, which are subsets of
the housing market that attract distinct populations of residents. Because they attract distinct
populations, we can analyze them using (2.12), which was formulated at the city-level. All
else equal, housing submarkets in which χ is higher experience smaller house price booms:
Implication 11 Suppose market segments within a city differ only in χ, the relative share of renters
versus owner-occupants they attract: the shock x and the short-run and long-run supply elasticities
eS0 and e˜
S are constant within a city. Then house price booms are smaller in market segments where
χ is larger.
2.6.1 Location
We first consider variation in χ across neighborhoods. Neighborhoods provide an example
of market segments because they differ in the amenities they offer. For instance, some
areas offer proximity to restaurants and nightlife; others are characterized by access to good
public schools. These amenities appeal differentially to different populations of residents.
Variation in amenities hence leads χ to vary across space. Neighborhoods whose amenities
appeal relatively more to owner-occupants (high a residents) than to renters (low a residents)
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are characterized by a higher value of χ.
Consistent with Implication 11, house prices increased more between 2000 and 2006 in
neighborhoods where χ was higher in 2000. We obtain ZIP-level data on χ from the U.S.
Census, which reports the share of occupied housing that is owner-occupied, as opposed
to rented, in each ZIP code in 2000. The fraction χ varies considerably within cities. Its
national mean is 0.71 and standard deviation is 0.17, while the R2 of regressing χ on city
fixed-effects is only 0.12. We calculate the real increase in house prices from 2000 to 2006
using Zillow.com’s ZIP-level house price indices. We regress this price increase on χ and city
fixed-effects, and find a negative and highly significant coefficient of −0.10 (0.026), where
the standard error is clustered at the city level.
However, this negative relationship between χ and price increases may not be causal.
Housing demand shocks in this boom were larger in neighborhoods with a lower value of χ.
The housing boom resulted from an expansion of credit to low-income households (Mian
and Sufi, 2009; Landvoigt, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2013), and ZIP-level income strongly
covaries with χ.10
The appeal of χ is that it predicts price increases in any housing boom in which there is
disagreement about future fundamentals. In general, χ predicts price increases because it
is negatively correlated with speculation, not because it is correlated with demand shocks.
Empirical work can test Implication 11 by examining housing booms in which the shocks
are independent from χ.
2.6.2 Structure Type
The second approach to measuring χ is to exploit variation across different types of housing
structures. According to the U.S. Census, 87% of occupied detached single-family houses in
2000 were owner-occupied rather than rented. In contrast, only 14% of occupied multifamily
housing was owner-occupied. According to Implication 11, the enormous difference in χ
10The IRS reports the median adjusted gross income at the ZIP level. We take out city-level means, and the
resulting correlation with χ is 0.40.
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between these two types of housing causes a larger price boom in multifamily housing, all
else equal.
This result squares with accounts of heightened investment activity in multifamily
housing during the boom.11 For instance, a consortium of investors—including the Church
of England and California’s pension fund CalPERS—purchased Stuyvesant Town & Peter
Cooper Village, Manhattan’s largest apartment complex, for a record price of $5.4 billion in
2006. Their investment went into foreclosure in 2010 as the price of this complex sharply
fell (Segel et al., 2011). Multifamily housing attracts speculators because it is easier to rent
out than single-family housing. Optimistic speculators bid up multifamily house prices and
cause large price booms in this submarket during periods of uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that speculation explains an important part of housing cycles.
Speculation amplifies house price booms by biasing prices toward optimistic valuations. We
document the central importance of land price increases for explaining the U.S. house price
boom between 2000 and 2006. These land price increases resulted from speculation directly
in the land market. Consistent with this theory, homebuilders significantly increased their
land investments during the boom and then suffered large capital losses during the bust.
Many investors disagreed with this optimistic behavior and short-sold homebuilder equity
as the homebuilders were purchasing land.
Our emphasis on speculation allows us to explain aspects of the boom that are at odds
with existing theories of house prices. Many of the largest price increases occurred in cities
that were able to build new houses quickly. This fact poses a problem for theories that stress
inelastic housing supply as the source of house price booms. But it sits well with our theory,
which instead emphasizes speculation. Undeveloped land facilitates speculation due to
rental frictions in the housing market. In our model, large price booms occur in elastic cities
11Bayer, Geissler and Roberts (2013) develop a method to identify speculators in the data. A relevant
extension of their work would be to look at the types of housing speculators invest in.
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facing a development barrier in the near future—cities in arrested development.
Our approach also makes some new predictions. Price booms are larger in submarkets
within a city where a greater share of housing is rented. Although we presented some
evidence for this prediction, further empirical work is needed to test it more carefully.
In all, we have presented a different but complementary story of the sources of housing
cycles than the literature has offered. Our theory explains several puzzles and suggests new
directions for empirical research.
86
Chapter 3
Regulators vs. Zombies: Loss
Overhang and Lending in a Long
Slump
3.1 Introduction
Why are economies slow to recover from recessions that coincide with financial crises?
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document the recurrence of this pattern in macroeconomic data
going back to the thirteenth century. Its latest return followed the U.S. financial crisis of
2008, in what Hall (2011) refers to as the Great Slump. The fact has inspired much debate
among researchers and policymakers.
This paper presents micro-level evidence of one possible mechanism responsible for the
persistence of long slumps. The banking sector suffers from loss overhang, in which the need
to write down losses in the future against impaired loans on the balance sheet today reduces
the value of making new, positive NPV loans. The standard debt overhang mechanism of
Myers (1977) is part of this story, since a suffering bank with unmarked losses would be
severely undercapitalized were those losses recognized. But an additional constraint comes
from bank incentives to deter regulatory action. When a healthy loan matures and pays
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off, a bank can improve its risk capital ratio by investing the proceeds in less risky assets,
such as deposits in other banks. This insight helps clarify the ambiguous predictions of the
debt overhang model about a bank’s incentive to take risks when near insolvency. I refer to
banks afflicted with loss overhang as zombie banks, or zombies.
I use a sample of several hundred FDIC-induced resolutions during the Great Slump to
show how loss overhang impairs and distorts lending prior to a zombie’s failure. The FDIC
and its companion regulators have the legal right to take banks into receivership in order to
protect the claims of depositors. Remaining creditors and shareholders take losses while
the FDIC arranges the assumption of insured deposits and the sale of underlying assets. In
the process, what remains of the bank’s balance sheet is refreshed, with future losses being
separated from rolled-over deposit funding.
Prior to failure, zombies operate with a significant portion of their loan book marked well
above market value. Subsequent to resolution, the FDIC sells these loans in the secondary
market at a discount between 40 and 70 percent of book value. This loss overhang restricts
lending in relatively healthy loan categories and leads zombies to hoard safe assets. Thus,
loss overhang may also offer a micro-level theory of excess savings in the liquidity trap that
is directly related to ongoing problems in the banking sector.
Because I cannot observe the zombies in isolation after resolution, my main empirical
strategy involves generating synthetic banks by merging the records for zombie and eventual
acquirer banks and assessing the treatment effect of resolution on lending activity in these
synthetic banks. The FDIC is most likely to close banks that are in the worst shape, so post
resolution growth is probably lower than if zombies were treated at random. This also
implies that any selection bias should work against finding a resumption in lending post
resolution.
I use zombie characteristics and losing bidder banks to address concerns about omitted
acquirer traits driving my results. When the zombie bank is large relative to the synthetic
bank, the reversal of pre-failure trends in lending is larger. Thus acquirer activity post
resolution depends on the new funding from the acquired bank. A second approach uses
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the post failure lending paths for losing bidder banks to generate counterfactual lending
paths for the acquiring bank. I combine this counterfactual path with the true acquirer’s
post failure path to infer the counterfactual lending path for the zombie bank alone. Again I
find that lending resumes for zombies following resolution.
As the crisis evolved, the FDIC may have run into resource constraints—in both liquidity
and manpower—that limited its ability to deal with the growing number of zombies. The
number of banks operating under regulatory notice soared relative to the number of banks
being closed. As a consequence, a substantial number of banks were left in a stultifying
zombie state for months and perhaps years. In the first quarter of 2010, one in eight
commercial banks were classified as problem banks by the FDIC.
Not only does loss overhang restrict lending in these surviving zombies, healthy banks in
the same area appear unable to pick up the slack. The result is slower growth. Most zombies
are small to medium-sized banks suffering from losses in residential and commercial
construction and land development loans. These losses appear to spill over into unrelated
sectors, such as services, mining, and manufacturing. Employment in zombie counties—
counties with a high fraction of local deposits in zombie banks—recovers more slowly in
these sectors.
The label zombies carries with it the suggestion that the only appropriate policy for
healing these banks is to kill them, the goal being to allow the zombies to shed their bad
assets. In 2008, policymakers dealt with struggling banks mainly by recapitalizing them,
rather than working to remove impaired loans from bank balance sheets. While both policies
might have the same direct effect on bank capital ratios, the latter may still leave banks with
an expected future capital loss. Thus, my evidence on loss overhang suggests a reason why
a good bank/bad bank resolution may be preferred to direct equity injections, if speeding
the resumption of lending is an objective.
Section 3.2 places this paper in the context of related work. Section 3.3 provides an
overview of the pertinent U.S. banking regulations and the bank resolution process. Section
3.4 introduces the data. Section 3.5 introduces the synthetic bank series, analyzes these
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series around the failure event, and documents substantial discounts on zombie loan pools.
Section 3.6 explores the effect of FDIC-induced failure on lending relative to the universe
of banks, to surviving zombies, and to counterfactual lending paths generated from losing
bidders. Section 3.7 explores how the county-level incidence of deposits in zombie banks
affects growth. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This study has a conceptual analogue in Bernanke (1983), who argues that a credit crunch
induced by bank failures severely exacerbated the Great Depression. However, data availabil-
ity limits his ability to identify the mechanism through which bank balance sheets impede
growth.
The motivating macroeconomic facts follow from the macro empirical literature on
economic recoveries following financial crises, typified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Using
cross-country and mainly informal historical analyses, these papers emphasize the persistent
weakness in asset and labor markets and dramatic increases in government indebtedness
following financial crises. Empirical study stays at the level of slow-moving, macroeconomic
aggregates. As a consequence the mechanism through which financial contraction frustrates
recovery and the appropriate policy response remain unclear,
This paper makes a complementary argument to those in Peek and Rosengren (2000)
and Ashcraft (2005), in which weakening or closing a healthy bank worsens local economic
outcomes. Here, closing a sick bank improves local economic outcomes.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the bank lending channel spawned by
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and assessed empirically by Kashyap and Stein (2000). The
theoretical foundation for these papers relies on contractions in bank balance sheets caused
by monetary policy shocks. Unlike these papers, my focus is on balance sheets impaired by
unrecorded or anticipated losses rather than policy-induced reductions in bank reserves.
In a sense, I am applying the mechanism from Bernanke and Gertler (1989), which focuses
on borrower balance sheets, to understand how lender balance sheets can influence the
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economy through the bank lending channel.
My findings relate to those in Mian and Sufi (2009) and Mian and Sufi (2012), who show
how household indebtedness led to reduced demand in some parts of the country during
the Great Slump. By documenting an alternative source of reduced demand—constrained
supply of new loans by local banks—I show how demand may have impeded growth
in those regions that did not see dramatic expansions in subprime lending. Mian and
Sufi (2012) focus on non-tradable goods, while I show how this force may have restricted
employment growth in tradable goods industries.
Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) show how struggling banks misdirected loans to
otherwise insolvent, zombie firms and how this “evergreening” distorted competition in
product markets. In the Great Slump, American bank regulators anticipated this kind of
activity and used regulatory agreements and bank examinations to try and prevent it. For
example, most agreements include a clause proscribing the extension of credit to borrowers
not current on existing loans. In addition, while the Japanese government encouraged banks
to keep lending through its crisis, the American government appears to have been more
concerned with preserving financial stability.1
3.3 Overview of U.S. Banking Regulation
The key institutional details relevant to this study concern how regulators monitor and
control struggling banks and how the FDIC administers resolution of failed banks.
3.3.1 Prompt Corrective Action
Standards for adequate bank capitalization were legislated in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (FDIA). When a bank is not adequately capitalized, the FDIA requires regulators to take
“prompt corrective action” to address the situation. The act established five capital tiers: “well
capitalized,” “adequately capitalized,” “undercapitalized,” “significantly undercapitalized,”
1See Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) for an elaboration of this difference.
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and “critically undercapitalized.” Banks are classified based on standards for the total
capital ratio, the Tier 1 capital ratio, and the leverage ratio. For example, a “well capitalized”
bank has a total risk-based capital ratio of at least 10 percent, a Tier 1 ratio of at least 6
percent and a leverage ratio of at least 5 percent. A “critically undercapitalized” bank has
tangible equity equal to or less than 2 percent of average quarterly tangible assets.
Undercapitalized institutions are subject to growth limitations and required to submit
a capital restoration plan. Additional requirements for “significantly” and more severely
undercapitalized banks include requirements to issue additional stock, to reduce total
assets, and to stop taking deposits from other banks. When a bank becomes “critically
undercapitalized,” the FDIA requires a receiver to be appointed within 90 days, unless
another documented path to recovery has been identified. Section 38 of the FDIA authorizes
the FDIC to delay mandatory resolution for an additional 180 days to prevent risk of loss to
the deposit insurance fund.
3.3.2 FDIC Resolutions
The FDIC2 has two roles in every bank failure: to protect the depositors in the amount of
their insured deposits and to administer the receivership for the failed institution following
resolution. The chartering authority for a bank typically closes it when it has become
insolvent, critically undercapitalized, or unable to meet requests for deposit withdrawals.
There are three basic resolution methods: purchase and assumption transactions, deposit
payoffs, and open bank assistance transactions.3 Activities begin with the receipt of a
Failing Bank Letter, after which the FDIC sends in a team of specialists to assemble an
information package (including a statistical sampling-based asset valuation review). The
FDIC determines all possible resolution methods and moves to market the failing bank by
2This section draws on the FDIC resolutions handbook, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/reshandbook/index.html. It describes each FDIC strategy for dealing with a failed bank
and outlines receivership operating protocols. The handbook was originally written to collect and preserve the
wisdom accumulated following the savings and loan crisis, so it is possible that some of these details are stale.
3Not used since 1992.
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inviting bidders and providing them with the information package.
Bids are submitted as (1) a premium for the franchise value of the failed bank’s deposits
and (2) a bid for all or part of the institution’s assets. Since 1991, the FDIC has been
required to choose the resolution alternative (including bid) that is least costly to the deposit
insurance fund. The FDIC transfers cash to an acquiring institution in an amount equal
to liabilities assumed less assets purchased less franchise premium. The entire resolution
process takes 90 to 100 days.
Purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions are the most common resolution method.
Within this category, there are variations as to how assets are transferred. These variations
include loan purchase, put option, asset pool, whole bank, loss sharing, and bridge bank
P&As. In a loss sharing transaction, the FDIC absorbs typically 80 percent of credit losses,
usually on business and commercial real estate loans.
In basic P&As, assets passing to acquirers are generally limited to cash and cash
equivalents. These were more common prior to the codification of bidder due diligence
practices in the early nineties. In loan purchase P&As, the winning bidder assumes a small
portion of the portfolio, usually only the installment loans, more generally between 10 and
25 percent of assets. A modified P&A is a loan purchase P&A plus some of the mortgage
loan portfolio, more generally between 25 and 50 percent of failed bank assets. Optional
asset pool P&As allow the FDIC to market homogeneous loan pools to other acquirers.
Whole bank P&As transfer all assets, but at a substantial discount. Loss sharing P&As
transfer assets, but not at a premium. Instead, cash moves to the acquirer as charges are
taken and from the acquirer as recoveries are realized. During the S&L period in the early
nineties, as the crisis became more acute, the FDIC moved towards resolutions that passed
more of the assets to the acquirer.
3.4 Data
I assemble data from several sources, briefly described here. Bank balance sheet data
for the years 2001 through 2011 come from the FFIEC quarterly Consolidated Reports of
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Condition and Income (Forms 031/041), informally referred to as the Call Reports. Data
on the deposits and geographical locations of bank branches come from the FDIC’s annual
Summary of Deposits. For measuring local employment, payrolls, and establishment counts
at the county level, I use the Census Bureau’s quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.
I draw a variety of items from the FDIC’s web site. These include the identity and dates
of bank failures, the names of acquiring banks, the names of losing bidder banks, estimated
losses from resolution, and transaction details for sales of loan pools out of receivership. In
addition, I draw details on the Deposit Insurance Fund from the Chief Financial Officer’s
quarterly reports to the FDIC’s board.
There is no official public record of problem, or zombie, banks. The FDIC’s Quarterly
Banking Profile only reports aggregate statistics on banks with CAMELS ratings of three,
four, or five. However, CalculatedRisk, an economics web log, assembles an unofficial
record of all banks operating under Prompt Corrective Actions and Cease and Desist orders.
Regulators are required to publish these agreements. I use the unofficial list to identify
zombie banks beginning in 2007 and running through 2011. The unofficial list matches the
official numbers closely.
3.5 Bank Failures in the Great Slump
Figure 3.1 documents the sample of bank deletions studied in this paper. I focus on FDIC-
assisted mergers because those are the bank failures for which we can observe post-failure
lending activity. Assisted mergers account for the majority of failures during this period.
The crisis episode begins in 2008 with 44 failures that year, half of which were assisted
mergers. In 2009, 133 banks failed with 114 of those being assisted mergers. In 2010, there
were 130 assisted mergers accounting for all of the assisted failures. During this time, a
number of unassisted mergers occurred as well, though at a slower rate than during the
expansion. In 2008, there were 260 unassisted mergers. In 2009 and 2010, there were 158
and 183 unassisted mergers, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Bank Deletions since 2000
Notes: Data come from the FDIC CB tables.
For each zombie,4 I generate synthetic bank time series by combining the quarterly Call
Reports for the zombie prior to closure with the Call Reports for the acquiring bank. I then
match these synthetic series to the Call Reports for the acquiring bank after the closing
date. The result is a record of assets, liabilities, loans, and losses in a hypothetical bank
that can be treated with FDIC resolution and compared to the population using a standard
differences-in-differences (DD) approach.
Figure 3.2 displays these synthetic time series along with the pre closure, zombie time
series, shown in event time around the failure date. For visual convenience, I normalize each
series to equal one six quarters prior to failure. On average, 20 percent of synthetic bank
loans pass from the zombie’s balance sheet to the FDIC or to remarked loss-share assets.5
4I use the term zombie to refer to any bank operating with potential losses large enough to induce insolvency.
Here, these are banks deemed by regulators to be too weak to recover without an FDIC-assisted merger.
5Loss-share assets are recorded in a separate field in the Call Reports. Because the FDIC bears 80 percent of
the risk of these assets, the acquiring institution can carry them at a maximum of 20 percent of prior book value.
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Loans staying with the receivership are concentrated in the commercial and industrial (C&I),
construction, and commercial real estate (CRE) categories, indicated by the sharp drops in
Figure 3.2. This motivates my analysis of lending activity in these categories following an
FDIC-assisted resolution.
Total Loans Commercial and Industrial Loans
Construction Loans Commercial Real Estate Loans
Figure 3.2: Loan Paths for Zombie and Synthetic Banks
Notes: The x-axis tracks event time by quarter around the date a bank is absorbed into an acquiring bank, with time 0
being the first call report date after the event. Variables are normalized by their value 6 quarters prior to the event date.
Total lending in the average synthetic bank grows much more slowly in the pre period
and actually contracts in the case of C&I loans. Sharp contractions in these categories for
the zombie banks drive this pattern. The paths for construction and CRE loans are similar
in the pre and post periods.
Figure 3.3 provides evidence that loans passing from zombies into receivership are
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substantially impaired. The FDIC web site offers details about loan pools which it has sold
out of receivership. Using this data, I compute the typical discount to book value applied
to these pools upon sale. Non-performing loans take a 60 percent discount on average,
while even performing loans appear to take a 30 percent discount. Lost relationship capital
appears insufficient to explain these discounts, since non-performing loans presumably
carry less valuable relationship capital when on the originator’s balance sheet. Further
anecdotal evidence that zombies carry loans at generous book values comes directly from
the FDIC’s resolution handbook, which states in passing that “asset values are generally
overstated in a failing bank or thrift.”
Figure 3.3: Loan Sale Discounts by Loan Category
Notes: Data from the FDIC on loan pool sales since 2005. The discount is computed relative to book value reported by the
FDIC.
More direct evidence of bad loans passing out of the banking system comes from the
synthetic time series. Figure 3.4 plots the seriously delinquent and non-accrual loan shares
across loan categories around the failure date. As a fraction of bank assets, residential and
commercial construction loans are the most impaired with more than three percent of the
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synthetic bank’s loan book in this category pre failure. This share falls by 50 percent in the
quarter immediately following resolution. The CRE and C&I non-performing loan shares
also fall after resolution.
Figure 3.4: Problem Loan Shares for Synthetic Banks
Notes: The x-axis tracks event time by quarter around the date a bank is absorbed into an acquiring bank, with time 0
being the first call report date after the event. Shares are computed by adding the non-accrual and 90+ days delinquent
bins and dividing by total loans.
Figure 3.5 tracks bank capital, bank deposit holdings in other banks, charge-offs, and
the loan loss provision balance for the average zombie and synthetic banks. The average
bank is nearly insolvent at the time of failure, reporting an equity ratio of two percent in
its final Call Report. Leading to failure, zombie holdings of deposits in other depository
institutions triple. Taken with the evidence on lending in Figure 3.2, zombies appear not to
be engaged in risk-shifting behavior but rather to be stockpiling safe assets in an attempt
to deter regulatory action. Of course, this pattern may be a mechanical consequence of
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increased loan loss provisioning. Were this the case, we would expect the same pattern to
appear for the acquiring bank, as loan loss provisions do trend up following the acquisition.
However, acquiring bank holdings of other bank deposits only increase slightly post merger.
Capital Ratio Deposits Held in Other Banks
Log(Charge-Offs) Loan Loss Provision Balance
Figure 3.5: Capital and Loss Paths for Zombie and Synthetic Banks
Notes: The x-axis tracks event time by quarter around the date a bank is absorbed into an acquiring bank, with time 0
being the first call report date after the event. Variables are normalized by their value 6 quarters prior to the event date.
Table 3.1 compares the three groups of banks in this study: synthetic banks, zombie
banks, and the remaining commercial banks. I mark a bank as a zombie if it is operating
under a PCA or Cease and Desist agreement with its regulator. My sample of synthetic
banks includes 252 failed bank/acquirer pairs. In Table 3.1, we can see that zombie banks
are less capitalized, have assets allocated more toward loans, and their loans are more
concentrated in construction and CRE. These patterns come through in the synthetic column,
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though the median zombie is one fifth the size of its synthetic counterpart.
3.6 Resurrected Lending following Resolution
The ideal experiment for testing the loss overhang channel would randomly assign a group
of zombies to have their bad loans swapped for cash at face value. Comparing the lending
paths and asset allocations pre and post treatment to a group of control zombies would
allow me to measure the causal effect of this swap and to infer how losses restrict and
distort the financing of new projects. I map this ideal to the data by studying FDIC-assisted
mergers and the paths of synthetic zombie-acquirer pairs around the merger event.
FDIC-assisted mergers allow zombies to shed much of their current and future non-
performing loan portfolios by absorbing these assets into an FDIC-operated receivership.
Thus, they provide the closest empirical analog to a hypothetical bad loan swap. The 266
assisted mergers that occurred between 2007 and 2010 provide the largest sample of such
events in the U.S. since the savings and loan crisis.
These resolutions are not a perfect test because I can only observe the zombie’s activity
prior to resolution. As a result, I focus on the synthetic balance sheets created by combining
the zombies with their eventual acquirers. The design is a generalized difference-in-
differences (DD) approach, in which FDIC resolution is the treatment variable. The universe
of healthy banks and the set of surviving zombies act as alternative control groups.
3.6.1 Results from the Basic Regression
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present panel regressions of quarterly growth rates on a treatment indicator
for FDIC-assisted merger and a series of controls, including the mean bank size, year-by-
quarter fixed effects, and state fixed effects. I exclude the quarter immediately following
resolution in order to avoid counting mechanical changes occurring during the merger
as real activity. Because the left hand variable is a first difference, I do not include bank
fixed effects, under the assumption that the error term in first differences is independent of
time-invariant factors. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) warn that serial correlation
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Table 3.1: Bank Statistics during the Great Slump
(a) First Quarter 2008
Bank Type Synthetic Zombie Universe
Assets (Median, 000s) 1,043,870 190,434 128,816
Assets (000s) 7,421,626 441,919 1,513,299
Total Loans/Assets 0.724 0.737 0.652
Deposits in Other Banks/Assets 0.030 0.031 0.048
Book Equity/Assets 0.111 0.098 0.132
Construction Loans/Total Loans 0.219 0.304 0.122
CRE Loans/Total Loans 0.288 0.255 0.237
Count 252 165 7664
(b) First Quarter 2009
Bank Type Synthetic Zombie Universe
Assets (Median, 000s) 1,097,194 165,751 139,036
Assets (000s) 8,311,734 427,474 1,669,090
Total Loans/Assets 0.702 0.711 0.658
Deposits in Other Banks/Assets 0.051 0.068 0.067
Book Equity/Assets 0.099 0.076 0.115
Construction Loans/Total Loans 0.182 0.196 0.102
CRE Loans/Total Loans 0.306 0.276 0.247
Count 252 299 7448
(c) First Quarter 2010
Bank Type Synthetic Zombie Universe
Assets (Median, 000s) 1,091,840 193,036 148,149
Assets (000s) 8,865,004 451,767 1,738,028
Total Loans/Assets 0.662 0.691 0.637
Deposits in Other Banks/Assets 0.086 0.089 0.085
Book Equity/Assets 0.100 0.075 0.110
Construction Loans/Total Loans 0.127 0.139 0.079
CRE Loans/Total Loans 0.334 0.332 0.256
Count 246 674 7178
Notes: Data come from quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports). Synthetic banks are the
consolidated Call Reports for failed banks and their prospective acquirers. Zombie banks are banks operating under an
active Prompt Corrective Action or Cease & Desist notice. Construction loans combine residential and non-residential
construction and land development loans. CRE loans combine owner-occupied and non-owner-occupied commercial real
estate loans.
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in DD designs can severely bias inference toward finding an effect. As a result, I cluster
standard errors at the bank level.
The average zombie is 20 percent the size of the combined entity, so the actual treatment
effect will be significantly diluted by being pooled with a healthy bank’s outcome path.
Despite this bias against my experimental design, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that resolution
leads to a substantial recovery in lending in the synthetic bank. When compared to the full
universe of healthy banks in Table 3.2, the post period shows synthetic lending expanding in
the post period by between 1.4 and 3.9 log points on a quarterly basis. This is a substantial
recovery, considering the pre period growth rate for synthetics is 0.4 log points, while the
system-wide lending growth rate is 2.8 log points over this period. This recovery is most
evident and robust for C&I loans, where lending growth rates increase between 1.4 and 3.4
log points for synthetics. Construction and CRE loans show a lending recovery relative to
the universe only in some specifications.
When compared to the sample of surviving zombies in Table 3.3, the change in lending
growth is even more dramatic. The post period increase in total lending is between 3.9 and
7.0 log points and the increase in C&I is between 5.0 and 7.4 log points. This is equivalent to
a relative annual increase in total lending growth of between 15.6 and 28.0 log points. CRE
lending increases substantially, between 2.0 and 3.5 log points per quarter, and construction
lending contracts significantly less quickly with a relative increase of 4.9 to 5.8 log points.
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Synthetic banks reduce their rates of allocation to the safest, most liquid assets, with
other bank deposit growth contracting by between 3.4 and 6.5 log points post resolution.
This contraction coincides with an aggregate expansion for the universe of healthy banks in
deposits held in other banks. Loan loss provisioning continues to increase post resolution.
At first blush, this seems inconsistent with most bad loans passing into the receivership and
off of the synthetic bank’s balance sheet. However, we would expect this pattern if prior to
resolution, either zombies were underprovisioning in order to preserve capital or if a higher
rate of charge-offs due to defaulting loans counteracted provisioning growth.
3.6.2 Alternative Explanations and Secondary Tests
Without a natural experiment, endogeneity concerns cannot be assumed away and must
be addressed directly. I consider three important endogeneity risks. First is the claim that
lending would have recovered even without resolution. Second is the related claim that
because resolution reduces the size of the loan book, some amount of mechanical mean
reversion should be expected. Third is the claim that recovery is driven exclusively by
acquirer characteristics and plans.
What is the counterfactual lending path for zombies?
Prior to resolution, the problem loans in zombie bank balance sheets are concentrated in
residential and commercial land development and construction loans. These loans are
largely problematic because of diminished local opportunities. For this reason, we might
expect zombies to be geographically concentrated in areas with limited projects to finance
going forward. Relative to other banks, these banks should see the slowest resumption of
lending following the Great Slump. Resolution and the new bank’s balance sheet clearly
alter this course.
A second response pertains to the FDIC’s motives. The FDIC’s key objective is to
protect insured depositors through the lowest cost option from the point of view of the
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). If opportunities are expected to improve in a bank’s area,
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the least costly alternative from the FDIC’s point of view is forbearance, not resolution and
assisted merger. Regulators should only shut down the worst performing banks in the worst
performing geographies. So, if there is a selection bias in the sample, it should bias these
results against an increase in lending post failure.
Furthermore, the timing of the regulator’s decision to close a bank is unlikely to coincide
with the exact nadir of lending for the failing bank. Regulators are constrained both by the
legislated timeline for dealing with struggling banks and by limited human resources. Once
a bank is marked as critically undercapitalized and enters into an action agreement with
its regulator, the FDI Act requires the FDIC to begin planning for closure and to close the
bank within 270 days, conditional on the agreement not being terminated. In addition, the
FDIC tries to group multiple failures in geographically close areas to avoid spreading its
human resources too thinly. More fundamentally, the FDIC is less concerned with lending
activity than it is with protecting insured deposits and the insurance fund. Thus, observing
a collapse in lending would not be sufficient to induce regulatory action.
Can we distinguish mechanical mean reversion from new lending?
Assume that both the zombie and acquirer are properly funding all postive NPV projects
prior to resolution. Now, the zombie runs into some bad luck unrelated to the quality of
lending opportunities, such as a particularly large individual default or a general deposit
run. Regulators might close the zombie and arrange a merger, which would reduce the size
of the synthetic loan book since some loans pass into the receivership. Then, the synthetic
bank resumes lending at exactly the same gross rate. Because the base loan book is now
temporarily smaller, the post resolution rate of growth will look larger even though the
bank’s set of new projects has not changed.
First, this criticism can not explain a pattern where there is a sign change in activity
around the closure date, such as for C&I lending. In this case, the mechanical contraction
biases the difference toward zero through increasing the pre failure rate. Second, a compari-
son of different categories of asset allocation holds constant the contraction in the loan book.
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Since some categories contract and some do not grow faster post resolution, my overall
findings cannot be a mechanical result of the smaller loan book.
What is the counterfactual lending path for acquirers?
I do not observe the separate activities of the zombie and acquirer banks post merger. More
aggressive lending by the acquirer might be sufficient to generate the observed pattern of
lending growth. Of course, if this more aggressive lending were due to the new funding to
the combined institution that results from resolution, this would be part of the mechanism
argued for in this paper. Still, a close reading of my ideal experiment and hypothesis requires
that zombie lending recover post treatment, holding acquirer characteristics constant.
Table 3.4 presents one attempt to study recovery while holding acquirer characteristics
constant. It implements the following thought experiment. If zombie characteristics matter
for recovery, then we should see a larger recovery when the zombie is larger relative to
the synthetic bank and when the zombie’s loan portfolio was worse prior to resolution. I
measure zombie size with the ratio of zombie deposits to synthetic bank deposits in the
quarter prior to failure. I measure the quality of the zombie’s loan portfolio with the ratio of
FDIC’s estimated losses from the receivership to the size of the zombie’s loan book in the
quarter prior to failure. The key coefficient of interest is the interaction of zombie size with
loss size for the post failure period.
The evidence is broadly consistent with zombie characteristics being important for
the post resolution results. A larger zombie bank relative to the synthetic bank coincides
with a larger recovery in lending and a larger reduction in lending to other banks. Going
from the 25th to the 75th percentile increases the post failure total lending rate by 1.0
(= 3.6× (0.33− 0.05)) log points, the C&I lending rate by 1.4 (= 4.9× (0.33− 0.05)) log
points, and reduces the post failure bank lending rate by 0.3 (= 1.0× (0.33− 0.05)) log
points. Conversely, the loss size coefficients go in the opposite direction, suggesting that
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worse performing zombies did significantly more lending prior to failure and show more
sluggish lending recovery post failure. However, the interaction coefficients imply that the
net effect of these zombie characteristics is to reinforce the recovery. Moving from the 25th
to the 75th percentile in the interaction term increase the post failure total lending rate by
1.0 (= 8.4× (0.14− 0.02)) log points, the C&I lending rate by 1.32 (= 11.0× (0.14− 0.02))
log points, and reduces the post failure bank lending rate by 2.6 (= 22.0× (0.14− 0.02)) log
points.
An alternative approach to partialing out the expected path for acquirer activity is to use
the bidding process to identify a comparable would-be acquirer. The FDIC invites multiple
bids during the resolution process in order to minimize the cost to the insurance fund.
Subsequent to the merger, the FDIC publishes the list of losing bidder banks and the list of
bids. In order to keep the exact bids confidential, the FDIC does not map the bids to the
bidders and only publishes the list of bidders when there are two or more alternatives. I
use these disclosures to match bidders to actual acquirers. Disclosure restrictions limit my
sample to 100 failed banks.
For each failed bank, I generate counterfactual growth rates post failure in the key
balance sheet variables by averaging the rates for the bidder banks. Assuming the synthetic
growth rates are weighted averages of the zombie and acquirer rates, I can solve for the post
failure zombie rate of growth using the formula,
rSynthetic = wZombie · rZombie + (1− wZombie) · rAcquirer, (3.1)
where the zombie weight is the zombie size variable described above and the acquirer
growth rate is proxied with the average bidder rates. This imputation procedure does not
impose restrictions on the sign of the zombie rate relative to the synthetic rate. If bidder
banks grow fast enough relative to the synthetic bank, the imputed lending rate for the post
failure zombie can be negative.
Table 3.5 presents a panel regression comparing these imputed zombie paths to the path
for problem banks. While my other specifications map to experiments in which the synthetic
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bank is treated with resolution, this specification measures treatment effects for the sample
of zombies. The smaller sample introduces more noise into the estimates, especially in the
case with state fixed effects where the number of treated zombies per cell becomes quite
small. I present these regressions to preserve consistency.
The results suggest that zombie lending recovers post resolution, even after partialing
out a plausible counterfactual lending path for the acquiring bank. Total lending increases
by between 5.2 and 15 log points. C&I lending increases between 5.6 and 7.3 log points.
The construction lending contraction slows by between 4.9 and 5.8 log points. Though not
statistically significant, lending to other banks decreases by between 8.1 and 22 log points.
3.7 Reduced Growth in Zombie-Afflicted Counties
Taken together, the evidence presented so far suggests that by clearing bad loans from
zombie balance sheets, the process of FDIC-assisted merger and receivership enables new
lending and asset reallocation by zombie banks. Prior to resolution, these banks suffer from
an overhang of anticipated losses on past loans and must forgo new lending opportunities
as a result. What remains to be shown is whether the phenomenon of loss overhang was
pervasive enough to impede economic outcomes during the Great Slump. This conclusion
rests on two premises. First, the banking system suffered enough losses to overwhelm the
regulatory apparatus for resolving troubled institutions. This allowed a number of banks to
continue operating in a stultifying zombie state for months and years. Second, the presence
of zombie banks in some counties was large enough to prevent healthy banks from picking
up the slack in positive NPV projects. To address the criticism that these were precisely the
geographies expected to grow most slowly, I focus on activity in tradable goods industries,
which should be responding to macro factors.
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3.7.1 FDIC Constraints
When the FDIC closes an institution and initiates a sale, it is obligated to cover the difference
between the deposits assumed and assets purchased by the acquirer. Therefore, whether
the FDIC has sufficient liquidity to resolve a large number of banks is a first order concern.
The FDIC has a Congressionally approved credit line with the US Treasury, which in theory
should protect it from a liquidity squeeze. However, FDIC actions during the crisis indicate
that they demurred from drawing on this resource.
Historical evidence of FDIC liquidity constraints comes directly from the FDIC’s resolu-
tion handbook, in its discussion of lessons learned from the savings and loan crisis:
To efficiently resolve a banking crisis, it is critical to have an adequate insurance
fund reserve. If such funds are not available, the problems may become worse
as a result of delay. As the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) began to experience a greater outflow of funds than it had coming in, it
took steps to conserve cash. Although many of its programs were designed to
give failing institutions time to work out their problems, some programs had the
unintended effect of postponing the problems and actually increasing resolution
costs. The FSLIC lacked the financial liquidity to promptly close insolvent institutions,
and many of them remained open to compete with healthy institutions.
During the banking crisis that began in 2007, it is unclear whether the FDIC heeded its own
earlier warning. Figure 3.6 shows that the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) quickly exhausted
its resources as the crisis escalated in 2008 and 2009. Prior to the crisis, the level of the fund
balance was approximately $50 billion or a little over one percent of insured deposits. The
deficit that emerged in the third quarter of 2009 owed to a significant accretion of contingent
liabilities set aside for future failures. Receivables from resolutions increased as well, but
not at a pace sufficient to match the rise in fund liabilities.
To address this deficit, the FDIC was required to outline a restoration plan in the third
quarter of 2008. In the fourth quarter of 2009, the FDIC attempted to address its liquidity
problem by drawing $42 billion of future assessments into its account. Arguably, this was
not an ideal time for the FDIC to be shoring up the DIF.
More evidence that the resolution pipeline backed up during the crisis is shown in Figure
112
Figure 3.6: Zombie and Failed Banks against the DIF Balance
Notes: Data come from the FDIC quarterly CFO reports to the Board of Directors and from the Quarterly Banking Profile.
3.7. I use book equity and risk capital to plot the mean capitalization for zombies just prior to
receiving a Prompt Corrective Action notice and just prior to being resolved. The oversight
apparatus shows no signs of strain, as capital ratios at the time a bank receives notice
remain constant through the crisis. In contrast, it appears that troubled banks remained in
trouble for longer as the crisis evolved, possibly due to limited regulatory resources. Early
failures have mean capital ratios greater than two percent of assets, while later failures have
average capital ratios of just one percent and frequently fail with negative reported book
equity. Given the likelihood that many of the assets in these failing banks are optimistically
marked at the time of failure, these data suggest it was possible for a deeply insolvent bank
to continue operating for months and perhaps years without regulators stepping in.
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Quarter Before Prompt Corrective Action Quarter Before FDIC Resolution
Figure 3.7: Capital Ratios for Zombie Banks over Time
Notes: Dates for Prompt Corrective Action come from public disclosures of action notices.
3.7.2 Local Economic Effects of Zombie Banks
Evidence that many zombie banks were allowed to survive despite being unable to extend
new loans does not imply that good projects were being ignored. This is because the
supply of funds from healthy banks and other capital sources may have been robust
enough to absorb the unfunded projects of surviving zombie banks. The surviving zombie
phenomenon may have only led to a reallocation of the same projects, perhaps with some
destruction of relationship capital, but ultimately with limited real consequences.
How important were zombie banks in their local economies? I use the FDIC’s Summary
of Deposits to map out the quarterly branch-level incidence of banks operating under
regulatory actions. I aggregate these time series to the county level and ask what fraction of
local deposits are housed in a zombie bank at a given point in time. Figure 3.8 plots a heat
map of zombie deposits as of the fourth quarter of 2010. In the colored counties, at least
four percent of bank deposits are held by zombie banks.
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The map of zombie counties yields two insights. First, the geographic incidence of
problem banks is surprisingly spread around the country, with most regions outside the
Northeast being marked by zombie banks. Several regions not commonly associated with
the housing and subprime booms — the Pacific Northwest, Colorado, Illinois, and Georgia
— have many zombie counties. Second, there are many counties in which the concentration
of zombie deposits is above ten percent of total area deposits. In these counties, it may
be quite possible that the remaining banks are unable to pick up all of the slack left by
their zombie competitors. Thus, it is plausible that the persistence of zombie banks has real
consequences at the local economic level. The diffuse geographic incidence of these zombies
implies that these consequences may even appear in aggregate data.
Table 3.6 presents an attempt at measuring the relationship between the presence of
zombie banks and economic outcomes at the county level. I use the establishment survey in
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to measure for each county the level of
employment disaggregated into sectors. I mark zombie counties using the concentration of
county deposits in zombie banks as of the fourth quarter of 2009, which is the first quarter
the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund turns net worth negative. At this point, with the FDIC’s
constraints potentially binding, the persistence of surviving zombies is likely to influence
subsequent economic activity.
To mitigate the risk of reverse causality, I focus on the mining, services, and manufac-
turing sectors, which were not directly responsible for the banking problems. In addition,
for the mining and manufacturing sectors, national and international demand are likely to
influence activity more than local conditions. This helps address concerns about omitted
differential demand factors driving the results.
The results in Table 3.6 provide mixed evidence of spillovers from suffering banks into
industries not responsible for the crash. In 2010, zombie counties have services employment
between 1.7 and 2.5 log points lower than non-zombie counties. Mining employment is
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between 3.5 and 5.9 log points lower, and manufacturing employment is between 1.2 and
1.9 log points lower. However, the results for manufacturing and mining are not statistically
distinguishable from non-zombie counties.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper addresses a prominent puzzle in macroeconomics and finance: why are
economies slow to recover from recessions that coincide with financial crises? It offers
evidence consistent with the idea that loss overhang in the banking sector is an important
explanation. Zombie banks impaired by unrecognized losses restrict new lending in healthy
categories, prop up lending in unhealthy categories, and overallocate to safe, liquid assets.
FDIC-induced failure reverses this pattern by carving out bad loans and trading them for
cash. This allows lending to recover.
The second part of the paper shows that regulatory constraints, in particular the FDIC’s
limited deposit insurance fund, slowed the recovery and prolonged the Great Slump. These
constraints led to slower employment and establishment growth in counties afflicted with
unhealed zombies. These results underscore the importance of ensuring that regulators
have sufficient capacity during a crisis to execute their duties.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Investment with Adjustment Costs and a Borrowing Constraint
We develop an infinite horizon, non-stochastic investment model, deriving the testable
hypotheses in Section 1.2 and the empirical moments for calibration in Section 1.5.3. The
model nests the standard neoclassical investment model with adjustment costs (Hayashi,
1982), a model with credit constraints and a model with managerial myopia.
A.1.1 General Setup
We begin with a discrete time version of Hayashi (1982). Firm value, V0, is given by an
infinite series of discounted net receipts, Rt. The discount rate, rt, is risk-adjusted and
possibly time varying. The expression for firm value is
V0 =
∞
∑
t=0
1
Πts=0(1+ rs)
Rt. (A.1)
Net receipts in each period reflect net revenues after taxes, investment costs, adjustment
costs and depreciation deductions for current and past investments:
Rt = [1− τt]pit − [1− kt] pI,t It − ψt(It, Kt) + τt
∞
∑
x=0
Dt−x(x)pI,t−x It−x, (A.2)
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where τt is the corporate tax rate, pit is pretax profits, pI,t is the price of investment goods,
kt is the investment tax credit, It is investment, ψt is adjustment costs and Dt−x(x) is the
depreciation deduction for capital of age x, based on the schedule from time t− x. Pretax
profits are pit, which equals gross revenues, ptFt(Kt, Nt), with capital, Kt, and labor, Nt,
inputs, less the cost of labor inputs. Net revenues are thus given by
pit = ptFt(Kt, Nt)− wtNt. (A.3)
Firms are price takers so output prices, pt, and wages, wt, are exogenous. Ft is weakly
concave. The firm maximizes (A.1) subject to a capital accumulation law of motion:
Kt+1 = Kt − δKt + It, (A.4)
where δ is the rate of economic depreciation. The adjustment cost function is convex and
reflects after-tax resource losses due to production disruptions and installation.1
It is useful to have an expression for the stream of future depreciation deductions owed
for investment in time t:
z0t (β) = τtD0 + β
∞
∑
x=1
1
Πxs=1(1+ rt+s)
τt+xDt(x). (A.5)
z0t (β) reflects the present discounted value of one dollar of investment deductions after tax.
2
If the firm can immediately deduct the full dollar, then z0t equals τt. In general, the stream
of future deductions will depend on future tax rates and interest rates. β is an additional
discount term between zero and one, which reflects the possibility of myopia. We use our
heterogeneity analysis to identify this term separately.
1Hayashi (1982) models adjustment costs through influencing the law of motion in (A.4), rather than as a
net receipts flow. Abel (1982) models adjustment costs through augmenting pretax profits in (A.3). There is no
strong a priori argument for one versus the other. We adopt this notation to simplify the borrowing constraint
in our calibration exercise. Intuitively, it means adjustment costs are not verifiable and thus the firm cannot
borrow to offset them. It makes sense to further assume that such costs would not be deductable as well. The
hypotheses we derive do not depend on the assumption.
2In the main text, we define z without incorporating the tax rates, in order to isolate the direct effect of
bonus. Here, we define z with tax rates because it matches Hayashi (1982)’s notation and highlights the general
dependence of the term on future tax rates.
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Bonus depreciation, the policy we study in our empirical analysis, allows the firm
to deduct a per dollar bonus, θt, at the time of the investment and then depreciate the
remaining 1− θt according to the normal schedule:
zt(β) = τtθt + (1− θt)z0t (β) (A.6)
At different points in time, Congress set θt equal to 0.3, 0.5 or 1. We use these policy shocks
to identify the effect of bonus depreciation on investment.
We further generalize zt by incorporating a nontaxable state. When the next dollar
of investment does not affect this year’s tax bill, then the firm must carry forward the
deductions to future years. Our general zt reflects this case:
zt(β,γ) = γzt(β) + (1− γ)βφzt(1), (A.7)
where γ ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for current tax state and φ is a discounter that reflects both
the expected arrival time and the discount rate, rT, applied to the future period when the
firm switches. Note that for the nontaxable firm, β will apply to all future deductions.3
Hayashi (1982) considers the case with β and γ equal to one. We consider this case first.
Define zt ≡ zt(1, 1). We can rewrite the objective in (A.1) as
V0 =
∞
∑
t=0
1
Πts=0(1+ rs)
[(1− τt)pit − ψt(It, Kt)− (1− kt − zt)pI,t It] + A0, (A.8)
where A0 is the present value of depreciation deductions on past investments.4 We assume r
is fixed over time and that k equals zero, since the investment tax credit is not active during
our sample frame. We isolate the terms where period t investment enters and rewrite the
3This formula is not exactly correct because additional periods will lead to additional accumulated losses
for subsequent deductions. The firm will deduct these at an accelerated rate relative to the schedule in zt(1).
This formulation simplifies the algebra and biases our empirical findings toward the neoclassical benchmark.
4The A0 term is important for Hayashi (1982) because it influences the average value of the firm and one
purpose of his study is to show when average Q and marginal q are equal. A0 does not affect the investment
decision problem.
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relevant part of the problem:
max
I
{
−ψ(I, K)− (1− z)pI I + qt+1 I1+ r
}
, (A.9)
where qt+1 is the multiplier on the law of motion for capital.
We write the first order condition for investment as
qt+1 = (1+ r) [ψI + (1− z)pI ] , (A.10)
which emphasizes that optimal investment equates the marginal product of capital, qt+1,
with the hurdle rate (1+ r) applied to the marginal costs of investment. These costs include
adjustment costs and the price of investment less the value of investment as a tax shield.
qt+1 is the marginal value of a unit of capital, which accumulates over many future periods.
We can apply the envelope condition and differentiate V0(Kt) = maxI V0(Kt, I) to show that
qt =
∞
∑
s=t
1
Πsv=t(1+ rv + δ)
[(1− τs)piK,s − ψK,s] , (A.11)
which says that qt includes the present discounted value of future after-tax marginal products
for capital, accounting for the rate of economic depreciation.5 In a two period model without
adjustment costs, we could rewrite (A.10) as
r =
(
1− τ
1− z
)
piK,t+1
pI
− 1, (A.12)
which shows that the general condition is just a dynamic statement of the simple idea that
optimal investment should equate returns and the risk-adjusted discount rate.6
We augment the problem to introduce the possibility of imperfect capital markets, which
leads to a generalized version of (A.10). Firms face a credit limit on gross borrowing, Bt,
which accumulates according to
Bt+1 = Bt + (1− τt)pit − (1− zt)pI,t It. (A.13)
5Note that capital also has an effect on future adjustment costs.
6Also, note that with immediate expensing, z = τ and so taxes do not affect investment. This also holds in
certain versions of the more general model. See Abel (1982).
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Firms must borrow to cover tax obligations and investment outlays, to the extent these
exceed current cash flows. Note that zt and not just τθt enters here. This is because future
borrowing constraints also matter.
From Summers (1981) to Edgerton (2010), modern empirical studies of investment apply
a parameterized version of (A.10), typically under the conditions shown in Hayashi (1982)
to yield marginal q equal to average Q.7 The financial constraint augmented first order
condition is
qt+1 = (1+ r) [ψI + (1+ λ)(1− z)pI ] , (A.14)
where λ ≥ 0 is the shadow price associated with the borrowing constraint (A.13).8 The
shadow price on the borrowing constraint works in this model much like a discount rate.
To see this, note that without adjustment costs and in the one shot model we can rewrite
(A.12) as
r + λ =
(
1− τ
1− z
)
piK,t+1
pI
− 1, (A.15)
where we have assumed for illustration that rλ is small. The hurdle rate for an investment
project reflects both the discount rate and the borrowing spread. In our empirical analysis,
we assume that firms use the same r but may differ in λ, in order to back out an implied λ
spread between constrained and unconstrained firms.9
A.1.2 Testable Hypotheses
We can derive the three testable hypotheses outlined in Section 1.2. Each hypothesis results
from defining optimal investment in (A.14) as a function of an exogenous parameter, a, and
then implicitly differentiating. The general condition is
ψI I
∂I
∂a
+
∂q
∂a
= (1+ λ)pI
∂z
∂a
, (A.16)
7These assumptions include making firms price takers in all markets and linear homogeneity for production
(i.e., constant returns to scale) and adjustment costs.
8The general version of (A.9) is maxI
{
−ψ(I, K)− (1− z)pI I + qt+1 I1+r − λ(1− z)pI I
}
.
9When thinking about the discount rates firms apply to depreciation tax shields, this assumption feels
appropriate. In general, our estimated λ spread will also include discount rate differences.
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where z includes nontaxable states and possibly myopia, as in (A.7) and q now satisfies the
general version of (A.11):
qt =
∞
∑
s=t
1
Πsv=t(1+ rv + δ)
[(1+ λs)(1− τs)piK,s − ψK,s] . (A.17)
The only difference between (A.11) and (A.17) is that increasing capital leads to higher
future after-tax profits, which relax future financial constraints.
We consider comparative statics with respect to θ, z0t , λ, and γ. Except for λ, none of
these terms directly affect q. They only affect q through investment’s effect on future capital.
We assume this latter effect is negligible. While nontrivial, this assumption is justified
for two reasons. First, while the policies we study have a substantial temporary effect on
investment, the change in investment is small relative to the existing capital stock. Thus, the
long run marginal product of capital, which q measures, is likely unaffected.10 The second
reason is that nearly all empirical studies of investment incentives assume that production
exhibits constant returns to scale and linear homogeneity in adjustment costs, which leads
to constant q as a function of capital.11
Given the assumption that ∂q/∂θ = 0, our testable hypotheses build on the comparative
static with respect to the bonus parameter θ:
∂I
∂θ
=
(1+ λ)pI
[
γ(τ − z0t (β)) + (1− γ)βφ(τ − z0t (1))
]
ψI I
> 0. (A.18)
Bonus depreciation increases the present value of deductions, reducing the price of invest-
ment. Thus bonus depreciation should increase investment. Alternatively, we could study
the effect of a general increase in z. The comparative static here is
∂I
∂z
=
(1+ λ)pI
ψI I
> 0, (A.19)
10This is the assumption House and Shapiro (2008) make to replace short run approximations to capital and
q with their steady state values. (See p. 740.)
11Bond and Van Reenen (2007) survey the investment literature and argue that “conclusive evidence that
linear homogeneity should be abandoned in the investment literature has not yet been presented.” This is
because the assumption has both theoretical appeal and fits with evidence that changes in firm size are hard to
predict (implying that firms do not have a sharp, optimal firm size).
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which yields a useful equivalence between the depreciation elasticity, the price elasticity and
the interest rate elasticity. In particular, ε I,1−z = ε I,pI ≤ ε I,1+λ, where ε I,x = (∂I/∂x)(x/I)
and the last inequality reflects the fact that ∂q/∂λ ≥ 0. We begin our empirical analysis by
estimating different versions of (A.19), enabling easier comparisons to past work.
Hypothesis one concerns the differential effect of bonus depreciation on long and short
duration industries. Long duration industries will have more delayed baseline deduction
schedules and hence lower z0t . The hypothesis thus derives from the cross partial of (A.18)
with respect to z0t :
∂2 I
∂θ∂z0t
= − (1+ λ)pI [γ+ (1− γ)βφ]
ψI I
< 0. (A.20)
Bonus results in relatively more acceleration for long lived items and so the investment
response should be greater for these items. Note this is not a statement about the relative
price elasticities for goods of different durations, which depend on the curvature of produc-
tion and adjustment cost functions. Rather, it is a statement that bonus mechanically leads
to larger price reductions for long duration items, even holding underlying technologies
constant.
Hypothesis two concerns the differential effect of bonus depreciation for constrained
and unconstrained firms. This depends on the cross partial of (A.18) with respect to λ:
∂2 I
∂θ∂λ
=
γ(τ − z0t (β)) + (1− γ)βφ(τ − z0t (1))
ψI I
pI > 0. (A.21)
For constrained firms (i.e., when λ > 0), bonus both reduces the price of investment goods
and relaxes the borrowing constraint.This is true even if the investment-cash flow sensitivity
is zero, that is, if cash flow does not affect the marginal external finance cost, λ. The logic is
similar to the foregoing logic about long versus short duration goods. The effective price cut
due to bonus is larger for constrained firms, even if the cost of borrowing does not change.
Under fairly general conditions therefore, financial constraints tend to amplify the effects of
bonus.
Hypothesis three concerns the differential effect of bonus by taxable status. We can
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compare the elasticities for γ equal to zero and γ equal to one:
∂I
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1
− ∂I
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= (1+ λ)pI
(τ − z0t (β))− βφ(τ − z0t (1))
ψI I
> 0 (A.22)
Because nontaxable firms must wait to take bonus deductions, bonus is less valuable to them.
This might be due to neoclassical reasons. Namely, taking into account a possibly long delay
and applying a reasonable discount rate might lead the response for nontaxable firms to be
quite low, even without myopia (i.e., with β = 1). We use the empirical distribution of loss
transition probabilities to calibrate φ in the model and ask whether the results still require
β < 1.
A.1.3 Empirical Moments for Calibration
We perform a calibration exercise to distinguish between models, based on their predictions
about the external finance wedge, λ, and the discount rate applied to future flows, β. This
exercise requires comparing estimates across subgroups. For this comparison to be useful,
we need to make certain homogeneity assumptions about technologies across these groups.
In particular, we want the curvature of adjustment costs to be equal across groups.
One way to satisfy this requirement is to make second derivatives effectively constant
across groups. We make a weaker assumption, based on the common quadratic form used
elsewhere in the literature. One feature of relying on this assumption is that nearly all other
empirical studies of investment do so as well. Specifically, we write the adjustment cost
function as
ψ(I, K) =
α
2
[log(I)− log(δK)]2 pI I, (A.23)
so that adjustment costs are increasing quadratically as investment deviates from the
replacement rate. As long as α is constant and average investment equals δK across groups,
then the following results will hold.12
The first empirical moment we use compares the estimated response with respect to
12With our functional form for adjustment costs, we have IψI I = αpI(1+ log(I/δK)), which is equal across
groups under these assumptions.
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bonus for constrained and unconstrained firms. Define the semi-elasticity of investment with
respect to θ as ε I,θ ≡ (∂I/∂θ)(1/I), where ∂I/∂θ is defined in (A.18). Assuming constrained
firms face shadow price λC and unconstrained firms face shadow price λU , we take the ratio
of semi-elasticities:
εCI,θ
εUI,θ
≡ m1 = 1+ λC1+ λU = 1+
∆λ
1+ λU
. (A.24)
We estimate m1 and solve (A.24) for ∆λ/(1+ λU), which can be viewed as an implied credit
spread. Our empirical analysis estimates the semi-elasticity with respect to z, rather than
θ. Because z is linear in θ (see (A.6)), the ratio of z semi-elasticities equals the ratio of θ
semi-elasticities.
We define a second empirical moment analogously by comparing taxable and nontaxable
firms:
ε
γ=0
I,θ
ε
γ=1
I,θ
≡ m2 = βφ τ − z
0
t (1)
τ − z0t (β)
(A.25)
Note the external finance wedge falls out of this expression. This is true as long as average
shadow costs are the same across taxable and nontaxable groups.13 Under a constant τ
assumption, we can drop tax rates from this formula, which we do in Section 1.5.3. We
estimate m2 and calibrate φ in order to estimate β.
A.2 Legislative Background
This appendix describes legislation affecting the bonus and Section 179 depreciation provi-
sions studied in this paper.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
The act set the Section 179 allowance at $5,000 and established a timetable for gradually
increasing the allowance to $10,000 by 1986. Few firms took advantage of the allowance
13We can relax this assumption, since we expect nontaxable firms to be more constrained on average.
Alternatively, we can narrow our taxable/nontaxable comparison to groups that differ only by how likely it is
for the next dollar of investment to affect this year’s taxes. We pursue this latter approach and use the stock of
alternative tax shields to sort firms.
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initially. Some attributed the low response to limitations on the use of the investment tax
credit. A business taxpayer could claim the credit only for the portion of an eligible asset’s
cost that was not expensed; so the full credit could be used only if the company claimed no
expensing allowance. For many firms, the tax savings from the credit alone outweighed the
tax savings from combining the credit with the allowance.14
Depreciation Policies Affected – Section 179
Date Signed – August 13, 1981
Bill Number – H.R. 4242
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
The act postponed from 1986 to 1990 the scheduled increase in the Section 179 allowance
to $10,000. Use of the allowance rose markedly following the repeal of the investment tax
credit by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Section 179
Date Signed – July 18, 1984
Bill Number – H.R. 4170
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
The act increased the Section 179 allowance from $10,000 to $17,500, as of January 1, 1993.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Section 179
Date Introduced – May 25, 1993
Date of First Passage Vote – May 27, 1993
Date Signed – August 10, 1993
Bill Number – H.R. 2264
14Source: http://www.section179.org/stimulus_acts.html
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Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
The act increased the Section 179 allowance and established scheduled annual (with one
exception) increases over six years. Specifically, the act raised the maximum allowance to
$18,000 in 1997, $18,500 in 1998, $19,000 in 1999, $20,000 in 2000, $24,000 in 2001 and 2002,
and $25,000 in 2003 and thereafter.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Section 179
Date Introduced – May 14, 1996
Date of First Passage Vote – May 22, 1996
Date Signed – August 20, 1996
Bill Number – H.R. 3448
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002
The act created the first bonus depreciation allowance, equal to 30 percent of the adjusted
basis of new qualified property acquired after September 11, 2001, and placed in service no
later than December 31, 2004. A one-year extension of the placed-in-service deadline was
available for certain property with a MACRS recovery period of 10 or more years and for
transportation equipment.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation
Date Introduced – October 11, 2001
Date of First Passage Vote – October 24, 2001
Date Signed – March 9, 2002
Bill Number – H.R. 3090
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Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
The act (JGTRRA) raised the bonus allowance to 50 percent for qualified property acquired
after May 5, 2003, and placed in service before January 1, 2005. The act raised the Section
179 allowance to $100,000 (as of May 6, 2003), set it to stay at that amount in 2004 and 2005,
and then reset in 2006 and beyond at its level before JGTRRA ($25,000). JGTRRA also raised
the phase out threshold to $400,000 from May 2003 to the end of 2005, indexed the regular
allowance and the threshold for inflation in 2004 and 2005, and added off-the-shelf software
for business use to the list of depreciable assets eligible for expensing in the same period.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 extended the Section 179 changes made by
JGTRRA through the end of 2007. The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of
2005 extended the changes in the allowance under JGTRRA through 2009.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation and Section 179
Date Introduced – February 27, 2003
Date of First Passage Vote – May 9, 2003
Date Signed – May 28, 2003
Bill Number – H.R. 2
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Appropriations
Act of 2007
Congress extended the changes in the allowance made by JGTRRA through 2010, raised the
maximum allowance to $125,000 and the phaseout threshold to $500,000 for 2007 to 2010,
and indexed both amounts for inflation in that period.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Section 179
Date Introduced – May 8, 2007
Date of First Passage Vote – May 10, 2007
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Date Signed – May 25, 2007
Bill Number – H.R. 2206
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
The act provided for 50 percent bonus depreciation. To claim the allowance, a taxpayer had
to acquire qualified property after December 31, 2007 and place it in service before January
1, 2009. The previous $125,000 limit on the Section 179 allowance was increased to $250,000,
and the $500,000 limit on the total amount of equipment purchased became $800,000.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation and Section 179
Date Introduced – January 28, 2008
Date of First Passage Vote – January 29, 2008
Date Signed – February 13, 2008
Bill Number – H.R. 5140
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
The act extended the deadlines by one year, to the end of 2009, for the 50 percent bonus
depreciation allowance.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation
Date Introduced – January 26, 2009
Date of First Passage Vote – January 28, 2009
Date Signed – February 17, 2009
Bill Number – H.R. 1
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Small Business Jobs Act of 2010
The act extended the 50 percent bonus depreciation to qualifying property purchased and
placed in service during the 2010 tax year. The act increased the amount a business could
expense under Section 179 from $250,000 to $500,000 of qualified capital expenditures. These
deductions were subject to a phase-out for expenditures exceeding $2,000,000. The provision
covered tax years for 2010 and 2011.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation and Section 179
Date Introduced – May 13, 2010
Date of First Passage Vote – June 17, 2010
Date Signed – September 27, 2010
Bill Number – H.R. 5297
Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act
of 2010
The bonus depreciation allowance increased to 100 percent for qualified property acquired
after September 8, 2010, and placed in service before January 1, 2012. The act also established
a 50 percent allowance for property acquired and placed in service in 2012.
Depreciation Policies Affected – Bonus Depreciation
Date Introduced – March 16, 2010
Date Signed – September 27, 2010
Bill Number – H.R. 5297
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Table A.1.1: Section 179 and Bonus Depreciation Policy Changes
Year S179 Max Value S179 Phase-out Region Bonus
1993-96 $17,500 $200,000-$217,500
1997 $18,000 $200,000-$218,000
1998 $18,500 $200,000-$218,500
1999 $19,000 $200,000-$219,000
2000 $20,000 $200,000-$220,000
2001-02 $24,000 $200,000-$224,000 30% Tax years ending after 9/10/01
2003 $100,000 $400,000-$500,000 50% Tax years ending after 5/3/03
2004 $102,000 $410,000-$512,000 50%
2005 $105,000 $420,000-$525,000
2006 $108,000 $430,000-$538,000
2007 $125,000 $500,000-$625,000
2008-09 $250,000 $800,000-$1,050,000 50% Tax years ending after 12/31/07
2010-11 $500,000 $2,000,000-$2,500,000 100% Tax years ending after 9/8/10
a. 2008 was retroactive.
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(a) Bunching with Narrow Bandwidth
(b) Bonus with Narrow Bandwidth
Figure A.1.1: Investment Behavior and Tax Incentives: Narrow Bandwidth
Notes: These figures replicate the taxable position splits in the bunch and bonus settings, while restricting the sample to
within a narrow bandwidth of the tax status threshold. Panel (a) replicates the analysis in panel (a) of Figure 1.4, which
compares bunching behavior for taxable and nontaxable firms. Panel (b) replicates the regression in column (1) of table 1.5,
which estimates separate coefficients with respect to bonus incentives for taxable and nontaxable firms.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
Micro-foundation of owner-occupancy utility. We present a moral hazard framework in
which ownership utility matches the specification of (2.2). Our framework follows the spirit
of Henderson and Ioannides (1983)’s treatment of tenure choice, in which maintenance
frictions lead some residents to own instead of rent.
Residents derive utility from the particular way their house is “customized”: e.g. the
color of the walls, the way the lawn is maintained, et cetera. The set of possible customiza-
tions is K. Resident i’s utility from housing is v(∑k∈K ai,khk), where ai,k > 0 is his preference
for k and hk is the quantity of housing customized that way. Individual customization
choices are not contractible, but the right to customize one’s house is. If a landlord retains
the customization rights, then the tenant cannot customize the house, and the null cus-
tomization k = 0 occurs for which ai,0 = 1 for all residents i. If the tenant holds these rights,
he may choose any k ∈ K \ {0}.
Moral hazard arises due to a doomsday customization k = d. This customization incurs
a cost η(hd) to the owner of the house. All residents prefer this customization to all others:
d = arg maxk∈K ai,k. However, the costs of d outweigh the benefits: for all i and h,
v(ai,dh) < η(h).
The doomsday customization represents the proclivity of residents to damage a house when
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they do not bear the costs of doing so.
This inequality prevents landlords from ever selling customization rights to tenants.
Suppose the landlord sells the rights. Then the tenant chooses his preferred customization,
without taking into account the resultant costs, which the landlord bears. The tenant there-
fore chooses k = d. Knowing this, the landlord demands at least η(h) for the customization
rights. But the most the tenant is willing to pay is v(ai,dh)− v(h), which is less than η(h).
Therefore they agree not to trade. The landlord keeps the rights, and k = 0. The utility from
renting is v(h) because ai,0 = 1.
An owner-occupant chooses the customization, but also bears the costs if he chooses k =
d. Let k(i) denote the solution to his optimization problem maxk∈K\{0} v(ai,kh)− η(h)1k=d.
Due to the costliness of the doomsday customization, the resident never chooses it: k(i) 6= d.
Indeed, if k′ is any other customization, then v(ai,k′h) > v(ai,dh)− η(h) due to the above
inequality. We define ai ≡ ai,k(i). The utility from owning is v(aih). This form corresponds
exactly to (2.2).
Proof of Lemma 1. First we prove that construction occurs in each period. Construction
occurs at time 0 because the housing stock starts at 0, and the housing demand equation
(2.9) is positive. For a contradiction, let t1 > 0 denote the first period in which construction
does not occur. Let t2 > t1 denote the next time construction occurs (t2 may be infinite).
We now claim that rht > r
h
t1−1 for t1 ≤ t < t2. Along the trend growth path, x = 0, so
no uncertainty exists and by (2.7), a resident rents if and only if ai < 1. Because Fa has full
support on R+, some residents must rent. Landlords hence exist in equilibrium, and their
arbitrage equation pht = r
h
t + βp
h
t+1 holds. Aggregate housing demand resulting from the
first-order condition (2.6) is
Dht (r
h
t ) = Nt
(∫ 1
0
(v′)−1(rht )dFa +
∫ ∞
1
(v′)−1(rht /ai)/aidFa
)
. (A1)
By assumption, the housing stock and hence housing demand is the same for t1− 1 ≤ t < t2.
Equation (A1) decreases in rht because v
′′ < 0. Because x = 0 and g > 0, Nt increases with
t. The left side of (A1) stays constant for t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2 while Nt increases. Therefore, rt
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increases for t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2.
Because construction occurs at t1 − 1, we have pht1−1 = plt1−1 + K, which results from
zero homebuilder profits. Zero construction at t1 can only occur when pht1 ≤ plt1 + K, from
homebuilder profit maximization. The landlord and landowner arbitrage equations at
t1 − 1 deliver rht1−1 ≥ rlt1−1 + (1− β)K. The quantity of undeveloped land stays constant for
t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2 and hence rlt does as well, because firm land demand Dl does not change
over time. Therefore rht > r
l
t + (1− β)K for t1 ≤ t < t2. Then
pht1 = ∑
t1≤t<t2
βt−t1rht + βt2−t1 pht2
> ∑
t1≤t<t2
βt−t1(rlt + (1− β)K) + βt2−t1(plt2 + K)
= plt + K,
which contradicts the zero construction inequality pht1 ≤ plt + K. This contradiction proves
that construction occurs at all times t.
We now show that rents rht increase over time. Because construction occurs at all t,
pht = p
l
t + K for all t. Undeveloped land must always exist because perpetual construction
occurs. Therefore, landowners are indifferent between holding land until tomorrow or
selling it, so plt = r
l
t + βp
l
t+1. Together with the landlord arbitrage equation, this equation
gives rht = p
h
t − βpht+1 = plt + K − β(plt+1 + K) = rlt + (1 − β)K. Equilibrium rents are
determined by S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = Dht (rht ), where housing demand comes from (A1).
The left side increases in rht , whereas the right side deceases. Nt increases over time, which
shifts up Dht . Therefore r
h
t increases as well.
Finally, we can show directly that the supply elasticity decreases over time. The elasticity
by definition is
eSt =
rht (D
l)′(rht − (1− β)K)
S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K)
=
rht
rht − (1− β)K
Dl(rht )
Dht (r
h
t )
rlt(D
l)′(rlt)
Dl(rlt)
=
rht
rht − (1− β)K
(
S
Ht
− 1
)
el ,
which coincides with (2.4). We have shown directly that Ht and rht increase over time.
Therefore, when el is constant, eSt decreases over time.
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Proof of Proposition 2. We use (2.5) to write ph0 = r
h
0 + βE˜p
h
1. Let ∂/∂x denote the
partial derivative in which N0 stays constant. Then ∂ph0/∂x = ∂r
h
0/∂x + ∂βE˜p
h
1/∂x. We
calculate ∂rh0/∂x by differentiating (2.8) at x = 0. Let d(·) = (v′)−1(·), and let bi =
1+ β(E˜ph1 − Ei ph1)/rh0 . Note that when x = 0, bi = 1 for all i. Then
− (Dl)′ ∂r
h
0
∂x
= N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0
d′(rh0)
∂rh0
∂x
dFadFµ + N0
∫
M
d(rh0)
∂bi
∂x
dFµ
+ N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1
a−2i d
′(rh0/ai)
(
∂rh0
∂x
+
∂βE˜ph1
∂x
− ∂βEi p
h
1
∂x
)
dFadFµ − N0
∫
M
d(rh0)
∂bi
∂x
dFµ.
The extensive margins terms for the rental and owner-occupied populations cancel. We
simplify this equation to
∂rh0
∂x
= −
N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−2
i d
′(r0/ai)
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEi ph1/∂x
)
dFadFµ
(Dl)′ + N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0 d
′(rh0)dFadFµ + N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−2
i d
′(rh0/ai)dFadFµ
.
The proposition assumes a constant elasticity of housing demand eD. This property
occurs when individual demand d(·) displays the same constant elasticity. Indeed, from
(A1), the elasticity of housing demand when x = 0 is
eD = −
∫ 1
0 rd
′(r)dFa +
∫ ∞
1 ra
−2
i d
′(r/ai)dFa∫ 1
0 d(r)dFa +
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r/ai)dFa
,
which holds when rd′(r)/d(r) = −eD for all r. We can therefore rewrite ∂rh0/∂x as
∂rh0
∂x
= −
eD N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEi ph1/∂x
)
dFadFµ
rh0(Dl)′ + eD N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0 d(r
h
0)dFadFµ + eD N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFadFµ
.
Because Fa and Fµ are independent, we can write∫
M
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)Ei p
h
1dFadFµ =
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa
∫
M
Ei ph1dFµ
=
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)dFaEp
h
1,
where Eph1 ≡
∫
M Ei p
h
1dFµ is the average belief about p
h
1. Recall from (A1) that (h
rent
i,0 )
∗ =
d(rh0) if ai < 1 (and 0 otherwise) and (h
own
i,0 )
∗ = d(rh0/ai)/ai if ai ≥ 1 (and 0 otherwise).
The share of housing that is owner-occupied is χ =
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa/(
∫ 1
0 d(r
h
0)dFa +
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∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa). We can therefore divide through the equation for ∂r
h
0/∂x by the total
housing stock to get
∂rh0
∂x
= −
eDχ
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEph1/∂x
)
eS0 + e
D
.
Substituting into ∂ph0/∂x = ∂r
h
0/∂x + ∂βE˜p
h
1/∂x yields (2.10) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will calculate the effect of the shock zt on rht by differentiating
the equation S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = Dht (rht ) with respect to x at x = 0, where Dht (rht ) is
given by (A1). This derivative is valid if and only if this equilibrium condition holds for
x around 0. The condition holds as long as construction occurs at t. Our first task is thus
proving the existence of an open set I ∈ R such that 0 ∈ I and for x ∈ I, construction occurs
for all t.
As in the proof of Lemma 1, we can prove that construction must occur at t1 if, conditional
on the absence of construction at t1, rt > rht1−1 for t1 ≤ t < t2 where t2 is the next time
construction occurs. The key step in that proof was that Nt increases with t. We define
an open set I1 containing 0 such that Nt still increases in t for x ∈ I1. Because M is
uniformly bounded, there exist µmin and µmax such that µmin ≤ µ′ ≤ µmax for all µ′ that
are coordinates of vectors in M. Recall that Nt+1/Nt = eg+(µt+1−µt)x. Because g > 0, the set
I1 =
(−g/(µmax − µmin), g/(µmax − µmin)) is open. For any x ∈ I1, Nt+1/Nt > 1. With this
result, the proof of this increasing rent condition matches verbatim the proof given in the
proof of Lemma 1 when t1 > 1. When t1 = 1, Dht1−1 is no longer given by (A1) but instead
by (2.9).
The only new fact we must show therefore is that if construction fails to occur at t = 1,
then rh0 < r
h
1 . To do this, we first show that E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1 = O(x) as x → 0 for all i. We
have ph1 = ∑
∞
t=1 β
t−1rht . All residents agree on H0 and N0 because they are observable
at t = 0. Let t2 be the next time construction occurs given H0. Once it occurs it will
occur afterward forever due to the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1. In principle
residents could disagree about t2, but we will now show that for x small enough they
do not. While construction does not occur, rents are determined by H0 = NtDht (r
h
t ) and
S − H0 = Dl(rlt). Because Nt increases over time, rht must as well. When construction
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occurs next period but not today at t, pht < p
l
t + K while p
h
t+1 = p
l
t+1 + K, so using the
landlord and landowner arbitrage equations defined in the proof of Lemma 1, we find
that (Dht )
−1(H0/Nt) < (Dl)−1(S− H0) + (1− β)K while construction fails to occur. The
first time construction does occur, t = t2, is defined as the lowest value of t for which this
inequality fails to hold. Because we are in discrete time, and because the relationships
Nt = N0egt+(µt−1)x and µmin ≤ µt ≤ µmax hold, there exists an open I2 3 0 such that when
x ∈ I2, t2 is the same for all realizations of µ ∈ M. For 1 ≤ t < t2, rht is the solution to
H0 = NtDht (r
h
t ), and for t ≥ t2, rht solves S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = NtDht (rht ). In each case,
because Nt = N0egt+(µt−1)x, the resulting rht is a differentiable function of x for any value of
µt and is the same at x = 0 for any value of µt. Therefore, E˜rht − Eirht = O(x) as x → 0 for
all i, and the same then holds for ph1.
We now return to showing that if construction fails to occur at t = 1, then rh0 < r
h
1 .
Using (2.9), we write Dh0(r
h
0) = N0 f0(r
h
0), and using (A1), we write D
h
1(r
h
1) = N1 f1(r
h
1).
Without construction at t = 1, we have N0 f0(rh0) = N1 f1(r
h
1). Note from (2.9) and (A1) that
f0 = f1 +O(x) as x → 0; this fact follows because E˜ph1 − Ei ph1 = O(x) as x → 0 for all i.
Using N1 = N0eg+(µ1−1)x, we can conclude that eg+(µ1−1)x f1(rh1) = f1(r
h
0) +O(x) as x → 0.
Because eg+(µ1−1)x > 1 as x → 0 and f1 is decreasing, there exists an open I3 3 0 such that
for x ∈ I3, rh1 > r01. This inequality is what we needed to show to prove that construction
occurs at time 1, which is all that remained to prove that construction always occurs. We set
I = I1 ∩ I2 ∩ I3.
All of that proved that for t > 0, the effect of the shock zt on rht results from differentiating
the equation S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = Dht (rht ) with respect to x at x = 0. Doing so yields
−(Dl)′drht /dx = µtDht + (Dht )′drht /dx, from which it follows that drht /dx = −µtDht /((Dl)′ +
(Dht )
′) = µtrht /(eSt + eD). Similarly, the partial effect of the shock on current rents rh0 , holding
beliefs constant and letting N0 change, is ∂rh0/∂x = r
h
0/(e
S
0 + e
D). Putting together this
partial effect with the one in Proposition 2 yields
dph0
dx
=
rh0
eS0 + e
D
+
∞
∑
t=1
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜t +
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µt
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
,
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where µ˜t is the most optimistic belief of µt and µt is the average belief of µt. Because all
residents agree that µ0 = 1, we may rewrite this expression as
dph0
dx
=
∞
∑
t=0
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜t +
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µt
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
.
The text defines the mean persistence of the shock µ to be µ = ∑∞t=0 µtβtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1/
∑∞t=0 βtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1. We use this definition, and divide through by p0 = ∑∞i=0 βtrht , which
holds at x = 0, to derive
d log ph0
dx
=
(
∞
∑
t=0
βtrht
)−1 ∞
∑
t=0
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µ
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
=
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µ
)
1
e˜S + eD
,
where we have used the definition of the long-run supply elasticity e˜S given in the text. This
equation for d log ph0/dx matches (2.12) in Proposition 3.
Proof of Implication 7. We demonstrate a limiting case in which eS0 = ∞ while e˜
S < ∞.
Let Dl(r) = br−el for some constant b > 0. Consider the limit as b → 0. We know that
rht ≥ (1− β)K because rht = rlt + (1− β)K and rlt ≥ 0. Define N∗ to be the value of Nt that
solves the equation S = Dht ((1− β)K), where Dht is given by (A1). For Nt < N∗, housing
demand fails to exceed available land at the minimum rent, and there is no demand for
land in the limit, so the market clearing rent must be rht = (1− β)K while Ht < S. By (2.4),
eSt = ∞ in this case. But for Nt > N
∗, demand exceeds supply at the minimum rent, so
rht > (1− β)K and Ht > 0, leading to a finite elasticity. Since Nt grows at a constant rate g,
for any Nt < N∗ we have eS0 = ∞ but e˜
S < ∞.
Proof of Implication 8. Disagreement amplification ∆ equals
∆ =
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
.
We calculate this difference from subtracting from (2.12) the counterfactual in which we
substitute µ for µ˜. Define N∗0(χ) to be the value of development (which determines the
supply elasticities; see above) that maximizes ∆. When χ = 1, ∆ is 0 in the limits as N0 → 0
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and N0 → ∞, because e˜S = 0 in the first case and eS0 = 0 in the second. But ∆ > 0 for χ = 1,
so 0 < N∗0(1) < ∞ by continuity. But N
∗
0(χ) is continuous in χ as long as it exists and is
finite, so there must exist χ∗ < 1 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1, N∗0(χ) exists and is finite.
Proof of Implication 9. When χ = 1, the limit as N0 → ∞ of d log ph0/dx is µ/eD. For
any 0 < N0 < ∞, we can choose µ˜ to be large enough so that the price change given by
(2.12) is larger than µ/eD, because this price change becomes arbitrarily large with µ˜. By
continuity, we can do the same for some χ < 1.
Construction equation. By the definition of supply elasticity, the change in the log
housing stock is eS0 d log r
h
0/dx. The total effect of the shock on rents combines the effect in
the end of the proof of Proposition 2 and the direct effect of the shock on N0 derived in the
proof of Proposition 3. It is drh0/dx = r
h
0/(e
S
0 + e
D)− χeD(∂βE˜ph1∂x− ∂βEph1/∂x)/(eS0 + eD).
We substitute in for the beliefs from the Proof of Proposition 3 and divide through by rh0 ,
and then multiply by eS0 to get
d log H0
dx
=
eS0
eS0 + e
D
(
1− χe
D
e˜S + eD
ρ(µ˜− µ)
)
, (A2)
where ρ ≡ ph0/rh0 is the price-rent ratio of the city before the shock at x = 0.
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